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Preface!
Det er vanskelig å skulle beskrive med ra ord de opplevelser og erfaringer jeg har hatt i
forbindelse med doktorgradsarbeidet. Som for de fleste andre har det vært både medgang og
motgang, dager med inspirasjon, glede og følelse av kontroll og dager med frustrasjon, stress
og usikkerhet. Jeg vil allikevel med hånden på hjertet si at det overveiende har vært et
privilegium å kunne fordype seg i teori og metode. Det har vært spennende å arbeide seg
gjennom forskningsprosessen fra posisjonering til tolkningen av resultatene. Det har vært
spennende å begynne en skriveprosess man ikke helt vet hvor ender. Det har vært tid og rom
for de små gleder, som henrykkelse over en ny artikkel, eller et nytt teoretisk, logisk argument
som passer inn i arbeidet.
En viktig grunn til at arbeidet med avhandlingen har vært en overveiende positiv
opplevelse er min eminente doktorgradsveiledningskomite, bestående av Professor Sven
Haugland, Professor Ame Kalleberg, og Forsker Aksel Rokkan. Disse veilederne har alle vært
positive, kritiske, grundige, forståelsesfulle, inspirerende og støttende gjennom hele
prosessen. De har med sine kunnskaper og evner utfylt hverandre og bidratt til en komite med
stor kompetanse som jeg har kunnet nyte godt av. All takk til komiteen!
Arbeidet med doktorgraden kan ofte oppleves som en ensom prosess, og da blir gode
arbeidskollegaer desto viktigere. Jeg har satt stor pris på alle de faglige diskusjonene, på
hyggelige lunsjer i kantina, stipendiat vaffellunsjene og morsomme turer på byen. Takk til
hele stipendiatmiljøet for mange fine stunder! Takk også til de faste ansatte (både faglige og
administrative) for å ha bidratt til trivsel på instituttet. Jeg vil rette en spesiell takk til Ingeborg
Astrid Kleppe, som ansatte meg på hennes forskningsprosjekt ("Country Image") og som
guidet meg videre inn i doktorgradsprogrammet ved NHH. Takk for all støtte, gode råd og for
å være en god venn.
Selv om mye tid er brukt på kontoret foran pc-en, har jeg også benyttet muligheten til
å reise litt ut fra Instituttet, blant annet på konferanser, både norske, nordiske og
internasjonale og også i forbindelse med datainnsamlingen. Jeg vil rette en stor takk til NHH
for de fmansielle rammene som gjorde dette mulig. Å møte andre forskere på konferanser har
betydd mye både i en faglig og sosial sammenheng. Det har vært viktig å konfrontere ens
egne spirende ideer innenfor et forskningsfelt mot andres synspunkt og tenkemåter. I tillegg
l The audience of this preface is mainly Norwegian, and is consequently written in Norwegian. Thanks to the
French persons mentioned in this preface is already addressed in French.
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har jeg mange morsomme og hyggelige mmner fra konferanser, og retter l denne
sammenheng en hilsen til alle de som har bidratt til disse godeminnene.
Doktorgradsarbeidet brakte meg også til feltarbeid i mitt favorittland Frankrike. Til
sammen tilbrakte jeg vel 2 måneder i tre ulike byer/regioner, Boulogne-sur-Mer, Paris og
Marseille/Montpellier, hvor jeg besøkte 96 importørbedrifter. Til tross for mye stress under
planlegging og gjennomføring, var dette en opplevelse for livet! Datainnsamlingen medførte
mange spennende møter og diskusjoner med menneskene bak tallene i dataanalysen. Jeg har
blitt møtt med stor velvilje og interesse. Mine skrivebordsteorier og antagelser har blitt møtt
med tidvis sterk kritikk og engasjement fra økonomiske aktører som må forholde seg til en
kompleks virkelighet.
Jeg vil rette en stor takk til alle franske innkjøpere og bedriftsledere som har gitt av sin
knappe tid. Uten denne velvilligheten hadde ikke denne doktorgraden sett dagens lys. Jeg vil
rette en spesiell takk til ekteparet Eric Charles og Marie-Edith Charles Mylius, for stor
hjelpsomhet, gjestfrihet under mitt opphold i Boulogne-sur-Mer. Tusen takk for hyggelige
samtaler både på slottet og på kontoret. Jeg vil også takke bedriftslederen Francois Agussol
for hyggelige utflukter og faglige diskusjoner. Sist, men ikke minst vil jeg takke min private
drosjesjåfør i BsM, Alain Baillet. I tillegg til å være en svært hyggelig samtalepartner, en
sosial støtte (tidvis ensomt å bo alene på hotell i utlandet) var han også en nyttig informant, i
egenskap av å ha vært fisker i Nord-Atlanteren og i egenskap av å kjenne godt til
sjømatbransjen. Jeg vil også takke min venninne i Paris, Kadji Dicko, for losji og hyggelig
sosialt samvær under datainnsamlingen i Paris.
Takk rettes også til to forskerkollegaer og venner, Isabelle Prim-Allaz i Frankrike og
Moheb Deif i Italia, for uvurderlig hjelp til oversettelse av spørreskjemaet. Vel hjemme etter
datainnsamlingen, var Lasse Roald og Nils Risholm en stor hjelp for å finne ut av
dataregistrering og SPSS. Mange takk til Sunniva Whittaker ved NHH som bidro til å heve
kvaliteten på mine engelske sitat oversettelser betraktelig.
Min kjære og nære venn, Otto Baste, tildeles også stor takk. Dette gjelder for
datainnsamlingen i Sør-Frankrike, hvor han fungerte som min privatsjåfør og til tider livvakt
(skummelt i Marseille!). Takk for den utrolige opplevelsen det var å seile inn til fiskerihavnen
i Marseille! Jeg vil også hevde at uten din hjelp og støtte hadde denne avhandlingen
sannsynligvis ikke blitt fullført. Takk for at du fikk mitt liv på skinner igjen etter en tøff
skilsmisse!
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som utvidet min horisont og som beriker meg ennå i dag.
Jeg vil også takke mine søstrer, Grete, Tone og Laila for all støtte og gode samtaler.
Sist men ikke minst vil jeg takke barna mine, Madio (16) og Sophie (12). Dere er tapre og
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Abstract
This research examines the effect of relationship-specific investments with regard to tolerance
of conflict, exit intention and extendedness of relationship. Specific investments are proposed
to increase switching costs and thereby create barriers to exiting. Additionally, we presume
high levels of relationship-specific investments to enhance partners' ability and willingness to
resort to voice when defections and conflicts arise, and hence postpone exit. Moreover,
partner-specific investments may emerge as a consequence of individual- or organizational
level ties. In consequence, specific investments at both inter-organizational and interpersonal
levels are specified. More specifically we propose product adaptation, human asset
specificity, and logistical adaptation to be relevant specific investments at the
interorganizational level, while cultural knowledge, cultural adaptation and two-way
communication are proposed specific investments at the interpersonallevel. Furthermore, we
propose that organizational dimensions, such as centralization, formalization, size and levels
of inclusiveness and inter-organizational dimension, such as history moderate the effect of
interpersonal and inter-organizational ties upon the dependent variables. We conduct a
quantitative, cross-sectional study to investigate business relationships of French importers
and worldwide suppliers of seafood products.
The findings suggest that specific investments at the interpersonal level are more
important than investments at the interorganizational level. With regard to the moderating
effects of organizational and interorganizational dimensions the findings are mixed. By the
means of qualitative data we offer additional and alternative explanations of findings from
multiple regression analysis. The qualitative data equally shed light on limitations related to
the hypothetic deductive method and the cross sectional survey method used in the research.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Theme problem - Dissolution of business relationships
The purpose of this research is to investigate factors that reduce the dissolution of cross-
national business relationships. Until recently, research within the inter-organizational field
has focused on the formation and maintenance of business relationships. Lately, research has
emerged on dissolution and related constructs such as exit intention and switching (Halinen
and Tåhtinen, 1999a, Prim-Allaz, 2000, Tåhtinen and Havila, 2004, Vaaland, Haugland and
Purchase, 2004). However, few studies have investigated relationship dissolution in cross-
national dyads, in spite of the fact that in real life, business relationships, specifically cross-
national business relationships, experience the termination of relationships (Ping, 1993,
Grønhaug, Henjesand and Koveland, 1999, Vaaland, Haugland and Purchase, 2004).
Moreover, considerable costs both economic and psychological are associated with
relationship dissolution (Ping, 1993). Building a cross-national business relationship is
assumed to be quite complex, time-consuming and therefore costly. Relationship-specific
investments, such as development of common business practices, and investments in physical
and human capital represent significant switching costs, with regard to search and adaptation
costs. Because the termination of business relationships entails considerable costs and renders
relationship-specific investments obsolete', it is equally important to investigate the factors
leading to dissolution (ping, 1999, Halinen and Tåhtinen, 1999b). Lastly, new insights
regarding the dynamics and mechanisms within problematic marketing relationships could
contribute to problem solving and relationship maintenance.
Factors that reduce relationship dissolution
Scholars in the various literature fields have placed emphasis on distinct aspects in business
relationships, regarding potential impact upon the likelihood of relationship dissolution.
According to Transaction Cost theory, structural bonds in the form of partner-specific
investments are assumed to represent barriers with respect to the termination of business
relationships (Williamson, 1985, Anderson and Narus, 1990). This is because partners are
assumed to compare the efficiency of transactional options and the cost of exit when making
exchange decisions. When conflicts arise, partners typically weigh the cost of safeguarding
l We do, however, acknowledge that some business relationships are by nature temporary and time-limited, and
that the termination of relationships can be planned and desired (Halinen and Tåhtinen, 1999b). In this paper, we
focus on continuous business relationships, where potential decisions to dissolve are chosen by one of the
involved actors.
specific assets before making decisions to maintain or end the relationship. Dependence is
therefore seen as the primary motive for maintaining or dissolving relationships
(Gassenheimer, Houston, and Davis, 1998). Idiosyncratic investments in the formof structural
and administrative mechanisms for coordinating exchange, such as formalization and
standardization procedures, are equally seen as effective in order to reduce the likelihood of
relationship dissolution (Van de Ven, 1976,Williamson, 1985, Jap and Ganesan, 2000).
In accord with Relational Contract theory (Macneil, 1980), informal governance
mechanisms such as trust and relational norms are proposed to be predominant and highly
efficient in order to manage adjustments both inside and across organizations. These informal
mechanisms are typically materialized through personal contact between organizational
members such as boundary spanners. The effect of relational norms has been investigated in
various interfirm settings, and these have been found critical in business relationship
continuance (Haugland, 1988, Heide and John, 1992, Prim-Allaz, 2000). Relational aspects in
interorganizational relationships have equally been emphasized within the relationship
marketing field (e.g. Dwyer, Schurr and Oh, 1987, Doney and Cannon, 1997, Zaheer,
McEvily and Perrone, 1998). In parallel to the emphasis put on relationship marketing
strategies, boundary spanners, such as sales representatives and purchasing agents, have
gained greater attention (Doney and Cannon, 1997). This is because boundary spanners
frequently playa key role in the interface between two firms when establishing andmanaging
business relationships. These organizational members are critical in developing and
maintaining business exchange because of their ability to facilitate and develop trust and
communication (Currall and Judge, 1995, Doney and Cannon, 1997). Further, these
individuals are involved in making informal and formal adaptations, developing specialized
procedures (Nielson, 1997), reducing negotiation costs and facilitating relational conflict
solving (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh, 1987, Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998). The role of
personal contacts in the formation and maintenance stages of exchange relationships has
therefore received much attention (Håkansson and Snehota, 1995), while little research has
been done to investigate the impact of personal contacts in the termination phase (Halinen and
Salmi,2001).
1.2 Business relationships are multi-level phenomena
In order to investigate business relationship dissolution, we argue for a multi-level
perspective. In studies investigating business relationships and more specifically business
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relationship dissolution, multi-level issues are commonly neglected. The common practice is
the non-specification of levels and the mix of levels (Rousseau, 1985, Macintosh and
Lockshin, 1997, Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone, 1998). However, organizations and inter-
organizational relationships are by nature multi-level phenomena comprising organizational
members working in multiple departments both inside and across organizations as well as
structural properties and specific investments connected to the organizational and the inter-
organizational context. In accord with multi-level theory (Rousseau 1985, Klein, Dansereau
and Hall, 1994, House, Rousseau and Thomas-Hunt, 1995), both macro phenomena
(organization related structures and properties) and micro phenomena (individuals in
organizations) are presumed to have an impact upon relationship outcome. Consequently,
factors at different levels of analysis, such as interpersonal, organizational and inter-
organizational factors are thought to affect the termination of relationships.
Accordingly, studies dealing with inter-organizational issues are confronted with
highly complex measurement problems. For example, in the field of interorganizational
relations, attributes aligned to objects frequently exist at multiple levels. Empirical studies
typically deal with properties of departments, companies, business relationships (both at the
inter-organizational level and at the interpersonal level) and in some cases, networks of
companies. The common practice of non-specification of levels in these research fields
therefore often leads to confusion and level-related ambiguity regarding data-analysis (Klein,
Dansereau and Hall, 1994). When investigating business relationships the clarity of
measurement at the personal, the firm and the interfirm level is advocated to facilitate and
enhance more rigorous theory testing (Bagozzi, 1995, Iacobucci and Ostrom, 1996, Currall
and Inkpen, 2002).
The multilevel perspective in our research
In this research we investigate factors reducing business relationship dissolution at the
individual, organizational and interorganizational level. The research aims to study cross-
national buyer-supplier relationships, which are comprised of interpersonal relationships as
well as inter-organizational bonds and properties. Further, the cultural and geographical
distance between the dyadic partners are presumed to create additional challenges with
respect to the maintenance of the business relationships at both the interpersonal and
interorganizational level. For instance, boundary spanners, such as purchasing agents and
sales representatives, would play an even more critical role in cross-national dyads in
managing the additional complexity in international market channel governance (Thomas,
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1991, Nielson, 1997, Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998). In consequence, it is assumed that
dyadic partners make substantial adaptation efforts because of geographical distance as well
as because of cultural differences in business norms and conduct, trade policies, market
specificities, etc. Relationship-specific investments at both levels are therefore proposed to
reduce the likelihood of business relationship dissolution.
Additionally, we presume that the effect of relationship-specific investments at the two
levels is moderated by organizational and inter-organizational dimensions. This is because
boundary spanners are organizational members possessing both intra and inter-organizational
relationships, which in turn require different roles and knowledge (Rousseau, 1985, Seabright,
Levinthal and Fichman, 1992, Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998). Boundary spanners are,
for instance, assumed to be more closely involved in the interorganizational relationship than
are other members of the organization. Buyer and seller reps that have dealt with each other
for many years could develop a close relationship, which may involve more than a pure
economic exchange (Macaulay, 1963, Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998). This close
interpersonal relationship could affect the likelihood of business relationship termination.
Nevertheless, boundary spanners are organizational members and are equally affected by
company factors such as organizational culture, structure, strategies, working policies, norms
and procedures (Grønhaug, Henjesand and Koveland, 1999, Blois, 1999, Humphrey and
Ashforth, 2000). Up till now, scholars dealing with inter-organizational issues have to a large
extent excluded the rich stream of organization theory and research. Empirical evidence from
numerous studies demonstrates that organizations influence their members' behavior (Berger
and Cummings, 1979, Humphrey and Ashforth, 2000). For instance, organizational
dimensions such as size, formalization and centralization are assumed to influence individual
autonomy in decision-making (Butler, 1991, Shackleton, 1996, Lau, Goh and Phua, 1999).
Additionally, differences with regard to organization size, degree of formalization and
centralization are equally thought to affect organizational members' personal interactions with
the partner rep (Murry and Heide, 1998, Humphrey and Ashforth, 2000). The firm context
could therefore favor or constrain the development of interpersonal ties in business
relationships and as a result, the potential effect of those ties on business relationship
dissolution. Organizational dimensions are proposed to equally influence the development of
structural attachments between firms, and would consequently affect the impact of those ties
on dissolution. Additionally, interorganizational dimensions such as prior relationship history
are presumed to equally moderate the effect of interpersonal and interorganizational ties on
the dependent variable.
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To conclude, boundary spanners are presumed to be affected by their own organization
as well as the interorganizational relationship. Further, we suggest that organizational
dimensions moderate the effect of interpersonal ties on relationship dissolution and the effect
of structural ties on dissolution. Our hypotheses regarding when micro variables have a
greater effect than macro variables and vice versa are drawn from multi-level theory (e.g.
Rousseau, 1985, House, Rousseau and Thomas-Hunt, 1995). Additionally, we base
hypotheses on research that has explored and examined how organizations affect individual
behavior (e.g. Morand, 1995,Morris, Berthon and Pitt, 1999, Humphrey and Ashforth, 2000).
By means of this multi-level perspective we aim to enhance our understanding of the potential
constraints and effects of both structural and interpersonal ties upon business relationship
dissolution. Accordingly, we formulate the research question in this thesis as follows.
Research question: How and to what extent do organizational and interorganizational
dimensions moderate the effect of interpersonal and structural ties on the likelihood of
business relationship dissolution?
In order to illustrate my multi-level perspective, a figure is presented below. In the figure
there are four arrows: the horizontal arrows show structural ties (between the two firms) and
interpersonal ties (between the two boundary spanners) and the diagonal arrows illustrate the
effect of organizational dimensions in firms A and B on boundary spanner behavior. All the
presented relationships shown by the arrows are thought to affect interorganizational
relationship outcome.
Organization A Organization B
Boundary spanner A Boundary spanner B
Figure 1:An interorganizational relationship. Multiple level relationships
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1.3 Concept clarifications
Business relationships and business relationship dissolution
In the current study, we define the concept of business relationship in accord with Grønhaug,
Henjesand and Koveland (1999). They state that business relationships are often identified
through recurring transactions. According to the authors, however, the phenomenon of
recurring transactions is not sufficient in order to be termed a relationship. The time
dimension is an important criterion in contrast. In addition, and in accordance with the
Interaction and Network approach (e.g. Håkansson and Snehota, 1995) business exchange
relationships consist of three substantive elements: activity links, resource ties and actor
bonds. Activity links include resource exchange, communication, co-ordination and
adaptation processes. Resource ties mayencompass technological, material and knowledge
across firms involved. Finally, firms are connected via various actor bonds, which may
include personal relationships, technological bonds, inter-firm knowledge, contracts, norms
and inter-firm roles. There should also be some sort of continuity in the exchange
relationship, and that the expectation of future exchange is manifested in the relational bonds,
Le. reciprocity, voluntary participation, trust and commitment between firms (Thåthinen and
Halinen-Kaila, 1997, Grønhaug, Henjesand and Koveland, 1999).
With regard to business relationship dissolution, we notice that studies within the
Interaction and Network approach examining business relationship dissolution (e.g.
Alajoutsijårvi, Moller and Tahtinen, 2000), Thåthinen and Halinen-Kaila, 1997) define the
concept as a dichotomous variable: "a relationship is dissolved when all activity links are
broken and no resource ties and actor bonds exist between the companies" (Alajoutsijårvi et
al., 2000: 1272). The authors, however, acknowledge that there may remain interpersonal
relationships across organizations, and that these can be re-activated in other contexts (e.g.
Havila and Wilkinson, 1997). With respect to our study we intend to treat the concept of
relationship dissolution as a continuous variable. By treating relationship dissolution as a
continuous variable, we position ourselves consistent with the idea that it is possible
relationships never die. Nevertheless, we presume that firms (by the action of organizational
members) behave variably with regard to decisions of dissolution. With regard to the concept
of dissolution, we see a process towards cessation of transactions and de-escalation of partner-
specific investments.
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1.4 Outline of thesis
In part one - Theory we present literature that provides the theoretical fundament for our
empirical research. In Chapter 2 we introduce Transaction Cost theory and Relational
Contract theory to represent theoretical perspectives emphasizing structural and relational
aspects in contracts. A theoretical foundation for multi-level studies is offered in Chapter 3. In
Chapter 4 we review the literature on business relationship dissolution, and relevant research
on organizational effects on individuals' behavior. Development of the conceptual model and
hypotheses are carried out in Chapter 5.
In part two - Method and Measures we describe methodological and measurement
related strategies and subjects. In Chapter 6 we explain the research design and data
collection. Development of measures and operationalization is accounted for in Chapter 7. We
then validate the included measures in Chapter 8.
In part three - Analysis and Findings we test the hypotheses and present the results. In
Chapter 9 we test the direct effects of interpersonal and interorganizational variables on the
dependent variables. Moderating effects are tested in Chapter 10.
In part four - Discussions and Implications we discuss the main contribution of the
research, its implications and limitations. We equally present additional and alternative
explanations of findings from the regression analysis. We use mainly qualitative data from the
same observations to develop these explanations. Finally, future studies and managerial
implications are suggested.
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2. Theoretical perspectives: structural and relational aspects in
contracting
Structural and relational components have been integrated and empirically tested in the inter-
firm relationship marketing literature (Murry and Heide, 1998, Gassenheimer, Houston and
Davis, 1998, Wathne, Biong and Heide 2000). Different theories postulate the importance of
either structural or relational ties or both; e.g. Transaction Cost theory (Williamson, 1991),
economic sociology (Granovetter, 1985), organization theory (Ouchi, 1980) and Relational
Contract theory (Macaulay, 1963, Macneil, 1980). In the current research, we concentrate on
Transaction Cost theory (Williamson, 1979, Williamson, 1991) and Relational Contract
theory (Macaulay, 1963, Macneil, 1980) in order to elucidate the logic behind the importance
of structural and relational aspects in business relations. In harmony with our research
questions and our multi-level perspective, we additionally point out similarities and
complementarities in the two theories presented.
2.1 Transaction Cost theory
During the last decade Transaction Cost theory has supplanted traditional neoclassical
economics. The new paradigm "New Institutional economics" introduced the concept of the
firm, which in Transaction Cost theory is seen as a governance structure. Coase (1937)
postulated initially that firms and markets constitute alternative governance structures, which
differ in transaction costs. Transaction costs were defined as: "costs of running the system ".
These costs included both ex ante costs as e.g. negotiating contracts, and ex post costs like
monitoring and enforcing agreements. Based on Coase's earlier work, Williamson (1975,
1979, 1985, 1991) made several adjustments and refinements to the Transaction Cost
framework. In the framework of a doctoral thesis we will not give a comprehensive outline of
this theory, but instead concentrate on the main issues and focus on elements relevant for this
research.
The two main assumptions of human behavior
Bounded rationality refers to the human limited cognitive capacity to act rationally.
Williamson (1985), nevertheless, explains that economic actors have the intention to act
rationally. He further assumes that decision makers have specific problems in absorbing all
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relevant information when the environmental context is characterized by great uncertainty.
Potential effects of environmental uncertainty are the constant need for adjustments. In
situations where comprehensive contracts cannot be written, the economic actor will suffer
important costs due to continuous negotiations. Other potential effects might be the
performance evaluation problem, which causes extensive costs related for instance, to the
gathering of information.
By the assumption of opportunism, we understand that economic actors may seek to
serve their self-interests and that it is difficult to know in advance who is trustworthy and who
is not. Williamson (1985) defines opportunism as "self-interest seeking with guile".
Opportunistic behavior comprises e.g. lying, cheating and the violating of contracts. The risk
and the effect of opportunism is considerable when specific investments have been made in
the relationship, and where these investments have limited value outside the relationship.
Among other factors, the postulated behavioral assumptions are crucial in Transaction Cost
theory because the choice of governance mechanisms is highly interlinked with them.
Key dimensions of transactions
The main dimensions that distinguish transactions are: 1) asset specificity, 2) uncertainty, and
3) frequency. Williamson (1985) further identifies four subcategories of the concept of asset
specificity: a) site specificity, b) physical asset specificity, c) human asset specificity, and d)
dedicated asset specificity.
The basic logic of Transaction Cost theory
According to the basic logic of Transaction Cost theory, market governance will be chosen
when adaptation, performance, and safeguarding costs are low. When transaction costs are
high, firms tend to internalize transactions within the organization. Within the Transaction
Cost theory framework, internal organization is thought to possess superior properties (in
contrast to markets and hybrides ), such as the ability to control and monitor exchange, which
results in lower transaction costs. Organizational culture and socialization processes inside an
organization are also thought to diminish opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1975). In
addition to the two original alternative structures, market exchange and internal organization,
increased theoretical and empirical interest have been directed towards the variety of hybrids.
Concepts reflecting the hierarchical dimension, such as centralization and formalizing, have
subsequently been employed for inter-organizational exchange (Williamson, 1985). Recent
empirical studies have also developed and extended the concept of vertical integration to
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encompass, for example, vertical controlover suppliers' decisions (Grossman and Hart,
1986). Some empirical studies have also integrated and tested the effects of informal
mechanisms, such as relational norms (Haugland, 1988, Heide and John 1992, Prim-Allaz,
2000).
2.1.1 The contract problem
Williamson explains that although the discrete transaction paradigm has served both law and
economics well, "...there is increasing awareness that many contractual relations are not of
this well-defined kind" (Williamson, 1979:235). Thus, because transactions vary in nature,
different forms of contracts will be needed. With respect to the above position he considers
the work ofMacneil (1980) as a major contribution in the field, "...as the legal rule emphasis
associated with the study of discrete contracting has given way to a more general concern
with the contractual purposes to be served" (1979:235). Hence, the purpose behind any kind
of contract is to facilitate exchange between economic partners. Different kinds of contracts
and relevant contracting problems are described below.
Classical contract law
With reference to classical contract law, the major purpose is to enhance and intensify
presentiation. Presentiation refers here to attempts to "...make or render present in place or
time; to cause to be perceived or realized at present" (Williamson, 1979: 236). In an
economic context a complete presentiation would entail comprehensive contracting where all
future contingencies are taken into account. In order to fulfill discreteness and presentiation,
classical contract law also presumes the following. First, the identity of the parties is
considered irrelevant. Second, the formal governance mechanisms are treated superior to
informal governance mechanisms. Third, when problems arise with respect to the exchange,
formal and legal documents are seen as predominant in order to solve disagreements.
Neoclassical contract law
Not all kinds of transactions suit the classical contract criteria. Complete presentiation is
thought to be difficult when contracts are long-term and when environmental situations are
fluctuating and uncertain. In such conditions predicting and implementing all potential
contingencies in a written contract is seen as very costly and rather impossible. In order to
manage contracting under the abovementioned conditions, three alternative solutions are
offered (Williamson, 1979). First, transactions of this kind could be renounced. Second, these
10
kinds oftransactions could be subject to internalization, and thereby controlled by hierarchical
mechanisms. Finally, third party assistance by arbitration should be provided, as it possesses a
number of advantages compared to litigation.
Idiosyncratic exchange
In his article "Transaction-cost economics: the governance of contractual relations",
Williamson (1979) makes attempts to integrate insights from Relational Contract theory into a
Transaction Cost framework. Although, Williamson recognizes elements in Macneil's theory,
he also identifies some weaknesses. He points out that Macneil (1980) makes clear that
governance structures will vary with the nature of the transaction, but he does not explain the
critical dimensions of contract, or the purposes of governance. Williamson (1979) claims that
the concept of incomplete contracts remains too vague. In addition, Williamson (1979)
contends that "harmonizing interests" appear to be an important governance function in
Macneil's elaboration of relational contracting, although this assumption is not explicitly
stated. Williamson thus makes attempts to clarify and define more closely attributes of
transactions, by integrating the critical dimensions for characterizing transactions from
Transaction Cost theory: 1) uncertainty, 2) the frequency with which transactions recur, and
3) the degree to which durable transaction-specific investments are incurred (1979:239).
These three dimensions must be analyzed together in order to assess the adequate governance
structure for different types of exchange.
Idiosyncratic exchange, criteria and characteristics
The degree of transaction-specific investments relates to problems of marketability. Is it, for
instance, possible for customers to tum to alternative suppliers to buy the commodity? How
important is the particular identity of the parties when it comes to consequences of costs?
Exchanges are defined as idiosyncratic,where the identity of the parties has a major impact
upon costs and where specific investments have little value outside the relationship
(Williamson, 1979). Physical capital investments (e.g. specific production equipment) and
human capital investments (e.g. specialized training) are, according to Williamson (1979), the
most important forms of asset specificity and those which qualify as the definition of
idiosyncratic exchange. In these exchanges, which are long-term and ongoing, institutional
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and personal trust most commonly evolves", One reason for this is that: "(o)ther things being
equal, idiosyncratic exchange relations which feature personal trust will survive greater
stress and display greater adaptability" (1979:240,241). The author stresses that it is the lack
of opportunistic behavior in idiosyncratic exchange, which makes ongoing sequential
adjustments possible. Williamson (1979) also contends that, due to the transaction-specific
costs mentioned above, the ongoing relationship between the parties will be transformed over
time to a bilateral monopoly. Williamson (1979) thereby specifies inter-organizational
situations under which relational aspects have an impact on relationship outcome, continuance
and dissolution.
The problem of adaptability, bilateral and unified structures
Williamson (1979) underscores that the problem of opportunism also might occur in
idiosyncratic exchange. In order to diminish opportunism one has to resort to governance
structures presumed to create confidence. It is the problem of potential adjustments that
represents the main governance problem. In his article of 1979 he distinguishes two types of
idiosyncraticexchange, bilateral structures and unified structures.
Unified structure refers to internal organization (hierarchy) of transactions. With
respect to adaptive capability, internal organization has superior properties. One reason for
this is the assumption of internal coordinating mechanisms (both informal and formal
mechanisms),which are thought to diminish opportunistic behavior. Internal organization also
requires less documentation regarding adjustments. Further, internal conflicts can be more
easily resolved by fiat at less cost. Information is more easily exchanged and interpreted.
Internal organization also disposes of a number of incentive instruments, such as career
reward (Williamson, 1991).
In contrast, in bilateral exchange the parties involved are thought to confront major
problems in coping with adjustments. One reason for this is that adjustments have to be
mutually agreed upon by the two autonomous parties. Potential conflicting interests and hence
opportunistic behavior might therefore arise. The author, however, contends that the problem
of opportunism varies according to the kind of adjustments required. The author argues that
quantity adjustments are much more easily adjusted than price adjustments, among other
factors because of their better incentive-compatibility qualities. In addition, quantity
2 The following citation gives an illustration ofwhat the author means: "Where personal integrity is believed to
be operative, individuals located at the interface may refuse to be part of opportunistic efforts to take advantage
of (rely on) the letter of contract when the spirit of the exchange is emasculated" (79:240).
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adjustments should be induced by exogenous factors, and not by strategic goals. Williamson
(1979), nevertheless, argues that price adjustments can be made, despite the hazards of
opportunism. Price adjustments are however limited to, or relate to, exogenous, germane, and
easily verifiable events (Williamson, 1979:250-254). The author discloses that requirements
of both quantity and price adjustments would render idiosyncratic exchange impossible.
Consequently, while Williamson (1991) recognizes the existence of internal
coordinating mechanisms and their assumed ability to diminish opportunism inside
organizations, he is more reluctant to acknowledge inter-organizational coordinating
mechanisms and their potential to reduce opportunistic behavior across organizations.
Consequently, when considerable adjustments must be done, internalization of transactions is
recommended (Williamson, 1979, 1991). According to Relational Contract theory (Macneil,
1980) accounted for below, informal governance mechanisms are seen as predominant and
highly efficient in order to manage adjustments both inside organizations and across
organizations.
2.2 Relational contract theory
Definitions of contract
In more traditional contract in law perspectives promise is understood as a central concept.
According to these perspectives (cf 2.1.1), contract can for example be defined as "...a
promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty" (Macneil, 1980:4-5).
Macneil's definition of contract differs significantly from definitions of contract in traditional
law perspectives, as he defines contract as "...no less than the relations among parties to the
process ofprojecting exchange into thefuture" (1980:4). Related to the concept of promise in
contracts, and in contrast to the discrete contract paradigm, the author stresses that in a great
number of contractual relations promise is of less importance and is less effective as an
exchange projector. Several reasons underlie the above position.
The co-existence of promissory and nonpromissory projectors
First, promissory projectors are thought to be less important because of the existence of
nonpromissory exchange-projectors, such as customs, norms, status and habits present in all
societies. Because contract occurs in society, Macneil (1980) disagrees with the idea that no
relation exists between business partners besides the simple exchange of goods. Contract
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between totally isolated, utility-maximizing individuals cannot possibly be thought of as
contract, but rather war. As a consequence, the theoretical construct, discrete transaction can
exist neither in theory nor in reality.
Macneil (1980) contends that although some nonpromissory projectors, such as
kinship, might be more important in societies characterized by a low level of division of labor,
nonpromissory exchange-projectors are highly relevant for modem and complex societies as
well. Some nonpromissory exchange-projectors, such as positions of command in hierarchies
(in organizations) and bureaucracies are even more prominent in modem society. The author
underscores that the abovementioned nonpromissory projectors often will be accompanied by
promises. Promissory projectors are always accompanied by nonpromissory projectors. In
order to govern and project exchange into the future, business partners, therefore, usually
resort to both promissory and non-promissory projectors.
Second, in societies characterized by a complex and advanced division of labor,
promises will typically remain fragments of any contractual relation or transaction no matter
how discrete. This is due to the limited capacity of human beings to absorb information (i.e.
bounded rationality). Thus, the inherently fragmentary nature of promises is also thought to
explain the co-existence ofboth promissory and nonpromissory projectors in contracts.
The latter explanatory factor relates to how promises are understood. In a number of
contexts, business people are thought to have an overt or tacit recognition that the promise
made is never exactly the same as the promise received. This position is due to the fact that a
promise always contains two promises, the buyer's and the seller's. Consequently, non -mutual
understandings and interpretations might arise. Nevertheless, empirical studies (e.g.
Macaulay, 1963) explain that in contractual relations "(m)uch promise breaking is tolerated,
expected, and, indeed, desired" (Macneil, 1980:9). In order to compensate when promises are
seen as less than absolute, nonpromissory projectors therefore will occur.
2.2.1 Discrete transactions and modern contractual relations
Macneil (1980) offers a description of discrete transactions and modem contractual relations
in his elaboration on "The New Social Contract". In order to elucidate differences between the
two types of contract, he presents them as fictional constructs at both ends of a continuum.
Below, we see that modem contractual relations, in contrast to discrete transactions, integrate
relational aspects in contracting. Business people involved in exchange are presumed to act
according to prescribed norms and practices in society and in the specific business
relationship. Thus, presuming that economic actors want to establish business relations in the
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future, one expects business partners to act in harmony with the existing norms, by relying on
a number of nonpromissory projectors (e.g. relational norms such as solidarity and flexibility).
In discrete transactions however, promissory projectors are predominant, such as formal
agreements and substance issues. We will not scrutinize each dimension but present a
summary in Table (2.1), where all the dimensions are shown for discrete and modem
contractual relations respectively.
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Table 2.1 Discrete transactions and modern contractual relations
Discrete transactions Modern contractual relations
l. Personal relations
Nonprimary Primary
Limited in scope Unlimited in scope
Involve a small part of the personality Involve the whole person
Formal communication Informal communication
2. Numbers
Two parties A large number ofpeople
3. Measurement and specificity
High levels of measurement and specificity High levels of measurement and specificity
Emphasis on processes and structures in the
ongoing relation
4. Sources of contractual solidarity
External sourcesof contractual solidarity External and internal sources of contractual
solidarity
Internal and external sources are closely
intertwined
5. Planning
High degree of measurement and specification High degree of measurement and specification
5. l Substance issues
Exclusive focus on substance issues Focus on substance issues, structures and
processes
5.2 Completeness-specificity
Complete and specific Incomplete
5.3 Tacit assumptions
Non-existent Existent
5.4 Participation
Unilateral planning acquiring mutuality Mutual participation in planning
only by adhesion of the other
5.5 Post-commencement planning
Non-existent Existent
5.6 Bindingness
Entirely binding Subject to change
6. Sharing and dividing benefits and
burdens
Benefits and burdens are sharply divided Benefits and burdens are sharply divided
between the parties between the parties
Benefits and burdens are shared
7. Obligations
Originate from the promises of the parties Originate from the promises of the parties
Or!ginate from the relation itself
8. Transferab ility
Transferable Transferable
9. Attitude
9. l Awareness of conflict of interest
High awareness of conflict of interest High awareness of conflict of interest
9.2 Unity
Non-existent High levels of interdependence produce common
interests
9.3 Time
Presentiated Presentiated and not presentiated
9.4 Trouble
Non-existent Existent
10. Power, hierarchy and command
The relative power of dependence is static, The relative balance of dependence is dynamic
and given initially and becomes a product of the ongoing relation
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2.2.2 Intermediate contract norms
Macneil (1980) further argues for the existence of intermediate norms. Intermediate norms are
customs, social habits, morality and the like, which are thought to play a crucial role in
economic life and in society in general. These norms can be either internal or external. Norms
enforced by the legal system are examples of an external norm. Internal norms are specific for
a particular relationship. However, internal and external norms typically merge in societies.
Macneil (1980) develop nine intermediate norms: 1) role integrity, 2) mutuality, 3)
implementation ofplanning, 4) effectuation of consent, 5) flexibility, 6) contractual solidarity,
7) the linking norms: restitution, reliance, and expectation interests, 8) creation and restraint
of power, and 9) harmonization with the social matrix (cf 1980:36-59). In the below outline
we focus on a limited number of norms relevant for the study.
Mutuality,jlexibility and contractual solidarity
Mutuality originates "...from the fundamental nature of choice-induced exchange; it occurs
only when all participants perceive a possible improvement from their pre-exchange
positions" (Macneil, 1980:44). By the norm ofmutuality, we do not mean complete equality,
but rather some kind of evenness. Given the existence of other alternatives to the parties
taking part in exchange, mutuality entails the continuance of the relation. The sources of the
norm of mutuality are several. Contractual solidarity, the social matrix of modem
technological societies, and contractual norms developed in the specific relation, represent
some potential sources. As a result of bounded rationality and the continuous changes in the
economic world, the norm of flexibility is needed in contracting. In discrete contracts, the
norm of flexibility will be found outside the transaction. The flexibility, therefore, is limited
to the scope of transaction. In contractual relations, the norm of flexibility is internal within
the relations, partly because of the nature of exchange (e.g. contracts are incomplete and long-
term). Contractual solidarity is the norm of maintaining exchanges together. No exchange
would be possible without this norm.
The linking norms: restitution, reliance and expectation interest
Restitution interest is seen as the problem caused by someone profiting by making promises
and then breaking them. Reliance interest is viewed in terms of reasonable reliance on
promises. Finally, expectation interest is similar to what has been promised (Macneil,
1980:53). The above norms are called the linking norms because they have the capacity to
link the other norms to more accurate rules of behavior, including legal rules. In discrete
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contracts "...the restitution, reliance, and expectation interests are served by rigorous
adherence to their promissory definition, letting all elsefall as it may" (Macneil, 1980:55). In
modem contractual relations, the abovementioned linking norms will be subject to change in
the ongoing relationship. The existence of nonpromissory projectors in contractual relations,
which are thought to represent the foundation of reliance interests, contributes to making
these relations work.
Creation and restraint ofpower
.,f',
The author underpins that power is inherent in the concept of exchange. In order to make the
abovementioned concepts such as the act of consent, the planning, the linking norms and the
like happen, the participants must have the ability to create and change power relations. In
contractual relations we can find different types of power, such as economic, social, political,
and finally legal power. Contracts are also heavily governed by the norm ofrestraining power.
The other norms previously treated, such as mutuality, contractual solidarity and flexibility
playa major role in restraining power in contractual relations. In the below discussion on non-
contractual practices, we illustrate how and why our previous explanations of informal
contractual governance mechanisms function in a business context.
2.2.3 Non-contractual relations
Prior to Macneil's (1980) elaboration on relational contracts, Macaulay (1963) revealed non-
contractual relations in business contexts, more specifically the functions and dysfunctions of
contract in an industrial context. Macaulay's findings highlight the ideas on relational
contracting presented above. With reference to his study, Macaulay (1963) understands
contract by referring to two distinct elements (1963:266): a) rational planning of the
transaction with careful provision for as many future contingenciesas can beforeseen, and b)
the existence or use of actual or potential legal sanctions to induce performance of the
exchange or to compensate for non-performance. The author then explains the use and non-
use of contract in business relationships. Below, we focus on the author's tentative
explanations with respect to the limited practice and focus on detailed planning and legal
sanctions in business relationships.
Tentative explanations of non-contractual practices
The empirical study revealed that business people usually do not see the need of contract in
most situations. Several explanatory factors explain this statement. First, business people see
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other safeguarding mechanisms as more effective. Consequently, business people prefer to
rely on non-contractual governance mechanisms. In addition, in order to avoid
misunderstandings and conflicts regarding expectations of quality for example, products are
often standardized and specified by professionals in the industry. The use of standardized
purchase or seller order forms is also common in exchange. As a result, costs related to the
writing and negotiation of contract are lowered.
Second, organizational members tend to follow norms widely accepted in the industry.
One reason for this is that organizational members are continually confronted with the ruling
norms, either by internal sanctions inside a department in the organization, or across levels in
the organization. Organizational members are also confronted with sanctions across
organizational boundaries. This is a position that leads us to the third explanation.
Usually, business people have expectations for exchanges in the future. It is, therefore,
in their interest to perform according to shared norms and values in an industrial context or in
a specific business relationship. Business people are well aware of the fact that dishonest
behavior and bad performance lead to a negative reputation, which is seen as very damaging
for future business exchange. Thus, according to the above explanations, informal and non-
contractual practices are seen as effective governance mechanisms in business relationships.
Contract and undesirable consequences
In addition to the perception that contract IS not needed, contracts may also possess
undesirable consequences. For example, demands from one party regarding details III
contracts in order to plan for contingencies are often seen in conflict with the norm of
flexibility, so often needed in contracting. Requirements of details in contracts may also be
interpreted as a demonstration of lack of trust in your business partner, and hence create
conflicting exchange relationships. Solving exchange conflicts by litigation or by the threat of
litigation is also seen as costlyand very damaging for future business relationships. Most
business people will, therefore, make an effort to avoid a court trial. Despite the negative
feelings with respect to contracts, contractual practices exist. A number of reasons underlie
this fact. First, comprehensive planning is conducted when "...planning and a potential legal
sanction will have more advantages than disadvantages" (1963:278). Thus, contract is needed
when there is a probability that significant problems will arise. Second, detailed planning is
usually accomplished when the contract can ease the communication inside the organization
(e.g. between the sales manager and the product manager).
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Summary
Macaulay's research reveals that basic behavioral assumptions, such as trust and good faith
are common in business relationships. Non-contractual mechanisms are also seen as highly
efficient when it comes to making adjustments and solving disputes in an ongoing
relationship. Hence, opportunism is not seen as the predominantly ruling behavioral
assumption among business people. In order to cope with adjustments, non-promissory
projectors were present in most cases and were seen as or even more effective than
promissory projectors. In many situations, the norm of flexibility was seen as equally
important compared to detailedplanning. Finally, common norms widely held in the business
context represented effective sanctions towards individuals behaving in disharmony with the
norms. The abovementionedfindings harmonize with Macneil's (1980) elaboration on modem
contractual relations, as he contends that societal and relational aspects constitute important
and efficient governancemechanisms in order to manage business relationships.
Transaction Cost theory is more reluctant with regard to reliance upon more informal
governance mechanisms across organizations. According to the theory, informal mechanisms,
such as social norms are only effective and reliable inside organizations, and thus, bound to
organizational boundaries. One exception is idiosyncratic exchange, where highly specialized
assets produce a kind of bilateral monopoly. However, in bilateral exchange adjustments are
thought to produce major contracting problems. According to Transaction Cost theory,
requirements of major adjustments constitute a recurrent problem, mainly because of
presumed opportunistic behavior and because formal governance mechanisms are seen as
superior to more informal mechanisms.
Nevertheless, even though Relational Contract theory emphasizes informal governance
mechanisms, and Transaction Cost theory highlights formal mechanisms, neither Macneil
(1980) nor Williamson (1979) reject the existence and importance of formal and informal
governance mechanisms in business exchange. With reference to Macneil's (1980) elaboration
on discrete transactions and modem contractual relations, and in accordance with Table 2.1,
we see that modem contractual relations possess both discrete and relational aspects
(specifically dimensions: 3,4, 5, 5.2, 6, 7, 9. 2). However, the logic and explanation behind
the need for discrete elements in contracting vary between Transaction Cost theory and
Relational Contract theory. Macneil (1980) argues that discrete elements in modem
contractual relations are needed as a governance mechanism due to the advanced and complex
division oflabor in modem society. Transaction Cost theory also acknowledges complexity,
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but the underlying assumption of opportunism is central in order to bring forth the need to
safeguard.
In our research, the different views proposed in Transaction Cost theory and Relational
Contract theory are not conflicting respectively, since we see business relationships as a
multi-level phenomenon, possessing both structural and relational ties. In the chapter that
followswe present a theoretical foundation for multi-level studies.
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3. A theoretical foundation for multi-level studies
3.1 Introduction
Rousseau (1985) underscores that most phenomena that are investigated in organizational
research" intrinsically possess multi-level and cross-level characteristics. Multi-level issues
should therefore be of great importance and interest in organizational research. Unfortunately,
until today few theories in organizational research have addressed multi-level issues
(Rousseau, 1985). During the last decade, however, a variety of multi-level research has
emerged". In the field of inter-firm relationship marketing, the number of articles dealingwith
multi-level issues even fewer (Fichman and Goodman 1996, Doney and Cannon 1997,
Rokkan 1999). A great number of theories in organization theory derive from several basic
disciplines, such as psychology and sociology. Traditionally, research in organizational
behavior has adopted the levels emphasized in the parent field. Rousseau (1985), however,
argues for increased multi-level research as a means to establish organizational behavior as a
discipline in its own right'. The neglect of multi-level issues makes, for example research
dealing with organizational behavior hardly distinguishable from that published by their
colleges in psychology and sociology (Whetten, 1978). Klein, Dansereau and Hall (1994)
offer a theoretical argument for elaborating multi-level studies. The authors claim that three
alternative assumptions underlie the specifications of levels of theory throughout
organizational behavior: a) homogeneity of subunits within higher level units, b)
independence of subunits from higher level units, c) heterogeneity of subunits within higher
level units.
3 In the theoretical articles dealing with multi-level issues (Rousseau 1985, Klein et al. 1994, House et al. 1995),
the authors discuss organization theory and organizational research. In the current study, we are dealing with
inter-organizational issues as well. We, however, contend that what the above-mentioned articles say about
organizations and multi-level issues is equally relevant for inter-organizational research. For practical reasons,
we use the term organization, as the authors do, when elaborating on multi-level issues.
4 House, Rousseau, and Thomas-Hunt (1995) reviewed six years of publications in two journals, Administrative
Science Quarterly and the Academy of Management Journal from 1988-1993. These journals were chosen
primarily because they are the leading U.S. journals in Organizational Behavior. Articles were defined as meso
research when the examined effects spanned at least two levels, and included both micro and macro phenomena.
The authors found 124 articles (32,2%), which could be classified as meso. The authors make a further
classification, along different characteristics, for further reading (1995: l 04-1 06).
5 From 1988 to 1993,67% of the empirical articles in the leadingjournals addressed either the micro or macro
organizationallevel of analysis, and ignored the other (House et al. 1995).
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The authors further argue that the aforementioned "...assumptions influence the nature of
theoretical constructs and propositions and should, ideallyalso influence data collection,
analysis and interpretation" (Klein et al. 1994:195). The majority of the literature in the
organizational field dealing with level issues puts emphasis on the alternative assumptions: a)
homogeneity and b) independence. The alternative assumption ofheterogeneity has been dealt
with in some previous work on level issues" (e.g. Dansereau, Graen and Haga 1975, Rafaeli
and Sutton 1991, Porter 1980).
The authors, however, claim that the meaning, relevance and implications of
heterogeneity have only been explored to a small extent in the organizationalliterature. The
authors further present a framework comprising guidance for level issues in theory
development, data-collection and data-analysis? In contrast to previous contributions (mostly
statistical approaches) on level issues (one prominent exception is Rousseau's (1985) typology
of mixed-level theories), the authors present a theory-based approach to multi-level issues.
Literature adopting a statistical approach focuses on how to justify aggregation, how to
analyze data in accordance with the level oftheory, and how to analyze multilevel data (Klein
et al. 1994). In organization research there has been controversy and confusion regarding the
appropriate level of analysis, and thus the appropriate conclusions to be drawn from research
in various topics. Klein, Dansereau and Hall (1994), however, claim that statistical
approaches have not been able to solve level-related ambiguities, controversies, and critiques.
The authors instead argue for an emphasis on the primacy of theory in addressing level issues.
A theory-based approach, nevertheless, is not seen as incompatible with statistical indicators
used to test level issues.
3.2 A theoretical foundation for meso theory and research
While House, Rousseau and Thomas-Hunt (1995) recognize the growing number of multi-
level research, they acknowledge the lack of "...a coherent framework to guide, codify,
accumulate, and integrate such research" (House et al. 1995:71). In order to argue for the
need to integrate both macro and micro variables in this study, we will draw on insights and
propositions elaborated in the House et al. article: "Themeso-paradigm: A framework for the
integration of micro and macro organizational behavior".Meso theory and research concerns
"...the simultaneous study of at least two levels of analysis wherein aj one or more levels
6 We choose not to go into depth for these examples, as they do not deal with inter-organizational phenomena.
7 We will not give a detailed presentation of the elaboration by Klein et al. in this section, but relevant insights
and propositions from the article will be used when required throughout the proposal.
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concern individual or group behavioral processes or variables, b) one or more levels concern
organizational processes or variables, and c) the processes by which the levels of analysis are
articulated in the form of bridging, or linking, propositions" (House et al., 1995:73). The
authors offer criticism to both the macro paradigm and the micro paradigm, and claim that
these paradigms possess inherent limitations, which in turn lead to non-specified theories of
organizational behavior. In order to encourage further meso research they give descriptions of
how micro and macro theory and research can be incorporated into the meso paradigm. House
et al. (1995) also suggest a number of propositions illuminating ways of linking macro and
micro phenomena.
Inherent limitations of macro-theories
Impersonal aspects of organizations are addressed by macro theory, since it deals with "..the
behavior of organizations as entities and the nature and effects of their formal and collective
parts" (House et al., 1995: 75). The major causes for organizational actions and performance
are assumed to be organizational form, technology, and environmental properties. Several
macro variables are uniquely attached to organizations, e.g. hierarchical differentiation, chains
of command, formalization, standardization and centralization. Examples of well-known
macro theories in the inter-organizational field are Agency theory, Resource Dependency
theory, and Transaction Cost theory. A common weakness of these theories is their tendency
of making fl•.•predictions of organizational functioning and performance while treating
individuals and groups as "black boxes" whose functioning they do not explain" (House et al.,
1995:76). All that matters is just impersonal social, political, economic and historical forces.
Human processes and the role of human agency have received little attention in these macro
theories, despite a growing number of empirical studies demonstrating that individuals and
groups influencemacro phenomena (e.g. Miner, 1987).
Micro-level phenomena and their potential impact upon macro-level phenomena
Micro-level phenomena are thought to have potential impact upon organizations. One basic
reason for this is that organizations do not act, but organizational members do. Not all
organizational members do, however, have an equal potential in order to affect
organizational-level phenomena. Stawand Sutton (1992) suggest several processes by which
micro forces have effects in organizations. Organizational members occupying specific
organizational roles are assumed to have a great deal of discretion in representing
organizations, such as salespersons, retail buyers, recruiters, investment bankers, etc.
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Powerful individuals in top-manager positions can formulate strategic decisions influencing
behavior in the organization. Organizational members at lower-order levels (e.g. in sales
departments) may, however, influence the implementation of strategies initiated by
individuals at higher-order levels. Organizational climate and culture are thought to be the
aggregate of individual attributes, beliefs, and emotions (House et al., 1995). Hence,
individual and group level behavior affect organizations in various ways. For example,
boundary-spanning groups affect organization structure and are themselves affected by
structure (Ancona, 1990). Boundary spanning individuals are also assumed to potentially
influence the decision-making not only within their own organization but also in partner
organizations (Gulati, 1998). In parallel, with the emphasis put on relationship marketing
strategies, micro-phenomena, such as the role and importance of the salesperson, have gained
increased attention in the marketing literature. However, little research has addressed the
relative effects of micro and macro variables in inter-organizational settings (Fichman and
Goodman, 1996).
The need for meso theorizing in order to develop a meso paradigm
House et al. (1995) give six arguments for the need to integrate micro and macro phenomena
in research in order to understand organizational behavior. First, they underpin that: 1) several
micro and macro phenomena are unique to organizations, 2) meso research can contribute to
specify the appropriate level of analysis and thereby avoid level-related measurement
problems and ambiguities, 3) there are a number ofphenomena that are common across levels
of analysis and hierarchical echelons", 4) there are a number of phenomena that vary across
levels of analysis and hierarchical echelons, 5) postulating questions within a meso
perspective offers a more integrative investigation, and 6) the meso framework permits
"...codification of empirical findings in a manner that reveals consistencies and gaps in
knowledge and facilitates accumulation of knowledge" (House et al., 1995:79). Furthermore,
the authors claim that if scholars in organization theory shift their focus of research and
variables to the study of organizationally relevant behavior in organizational contexts and
develop tools to conduct research within this perspective, a new paradigm will emerge.
8 In order to distinguish two qualitatively different levels, House et al. (1995) employ the word echelon to refer
to hierarchical or organizationallevels, while level of analysis refers to, for example individuals, dyads, groups,
organizations or cluster of organizations.
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3.3 Linkages between micro and macro phenomena
Meso research investigates the relationships between organizational contexts and behavior of
individuals, groups, organizations and the like, and evaluates how those relationships shape
outcome. In organizations there is a constant mutual feedback process going on linking
macro phenomena and micro-phenomena. In order to elaborate on meso research we need
mechanisms which can "...help us conceptualize the complex relations between units at
different levels of analysis, or at different hierarchical echelons, in organizational settings"
(House et al. 1995:86). In addition, the authors explain that there are "...several processes by
which micro and macro variables interact and affect each other in ways important for
organizational scholars..." (House et al., 1995:87). The three generic meso processes
considered important are: isomorphism, discontinuities and interlevel relationships. Within
these three groups several under-categories are identified. In this thesis we present phenomena
considered relevant.
Isomorphism
Isomorphism is the degree to which the constituent component of a phenomenon and the
relationships among the components are similar across levels of analysis (House et al., 1995:
87). House et al. (1995) argue that when isomorphism is identified, consistent patterns of
important behavior across individual, group, and organizational processes are revealed, which
consequently contributes to the integration and coherence of organizational research. Scholars
should therefore search for isomorphism in order to develop a theory of behavior in
organizations. A description of an isomorphic phenomenon consists of two kinds of assertions
(House et al. 1995:88): 1) a composition assertion specifying the underlying similarity of
constructs at different levels of analysis and 2) a multi-level assertion specifying causal
relations between constructs, which could be generalized across levels.
The authors suggest five isomorphic phenomena: inclusiveness, entrainment, selection
effects, sense making and situational ambiguity. Inclusiveness and entrainment are structural
phenomena; selection effects and sense making are psychological processes; situational
ambiguity is both structural and social phenomena. In our study we will focus on
inclusiveness.
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Inclusiveness
The concept of inclusiveness refers to the proportion of the activity of a unit dedicated to or
involved in those of another unit (as in individuals in groups or task forces in organizations).
Inclusiveness among units at different levels of analysis is hence thought to be an important
moderator of effects of one levelon another. The more the activities of one unit are involved
with those of another, the more impact one will have on the other (House et al., 1995: 89). The
phenomenon of inclusiveness does not only occur inside organizational boundaries, for
example, across echelons (i.e. hierarchies in organizations); the phenomenon occurs equally
between organizations, such as among network partners, due to task interdependence,
resource dependence, and institutional affiliations (House et al., 1995 :90).
The phenomenon of inclusiveness is highly relevant to questions concerning the role,
the function and the autonomy of boundary spanners. For example, a salesperson that is
highly dependent on and integrated towards another department of the organization (e.g. the
product development department) will have to playa different role than salespersons that are
less included with respect to specific departments in the organization. Prominent examples of
boundary spanners with low levels of inclusiveness would be agents (or salesmen who work
for different organizations, but are not regular employees). Agents who only work temporarily
for organizations would be less influenced by the culture, the norms, and other specific
features connected to the organization, than a full-time employee would. Consequently, this
person's work motivation would be better predicted by individual predictions (or in some
cases driven by customer need rather than by the needs of his temporary employer). Agents
having low levels of inclusiveness with the organization thus give rise to autonomous
behavior (House et al., 1995).
House et al. (1995:90) postulate the following propositions:1) Effects of one level of
analysis on another will be proportionate to the degree to which one level is included in the
other, and 2) Inclusiveness in a lower level unit of analysis will be highest when': a)
organizational members of the lower units are disposed to be susceptible to the influence of
higher level unit members, b) resources are shared by members of unit, c) information is
shared by members of unit, and d) organizational members of units serve common clients or
customers.
9 We only focus on and point out factors relevant to this study.
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Inter-level relationships and the relative effects of macro and micro level variables
With respect to inter-level relationships, the authors postulate propositions regarding the
relative effects of macro and micro level variables on each other, and the moderating effects
of organizational levelon decisions (House et al. 1995:98). Moreover, the authors discuss
under which conditions individuals tend to have a greater impact upon organizational-
variables, and vice versa under which conditions organizational variables tend to have greater
impact upon micro-variables. We summarize the discussion in the following propositions
(House et al., 1995:99): 1) Under conditions of situational ambiguity and where
organizational routines and cultural norms have not been established, micro level variables
(e.g. boundary spanners) will have their greatest influence on macro level variables (e.g.
formalized processes).
Individuals therefore are presumed to have less impact upon organizational variables
when the organization is old, large and where stable and strong organizational cultures are
institutionalized. Micro-phenomena are thought to have greater impact upon organizational
variables when organizations are young.
The moderating effect of organizational levels
Another relevant dimension addressed by House et al. (1995) is the degree to which units at
different echelons are loosely versus tightly coupled. A tight coupling is assumed to provoke
dependence or interdependence. Tight coupling refers to the degree to which the behaviors of
units of analysis are covariate with each other. Behaviors of coupled units are assumed to be
interactive (not additive), as they bring forth results by reciprocal influence and coordination.
Thus, tightly coupled units are more interdependent, since the behaviors of the units are
strongly relevant to each other. Loosely coupled units are more independent of each other and
the behavior in each unit is less relevant to each other. The above discussion leads us to the
following proposition: 1) The tighter the coupling between and among units located at
different hierarchical echelons or levels of analysis, the larger will the effect of actions taken
by units at one echelon or levelon the activities of units at other echelons or levels.
The above proposition is highly relevant to studies dealing with business relationships.
When there are high levels of inclusiveness, the behavior of boundary spanners is assumed to
be covariate with the effect of structural factors. And as the two behaviors are interdependent,
only high effects of both units can produce a positive relationship outcome.
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4. Literature review of relationship dissolution
In this chapter we present studies dealing with business relationship dissolution and related
constructs such as exit intention and switching. We then discuss relevant organizational
research and interorganizational studies that investigate multi-level issues. The body of
research investigating dissolution can roughly be divided into two parts: one, whose focus is
the factors leading towards dissolution and that employ a quantitative approach, the other,
whose focus is the process, and that employs a qualitative research design. With reference to
the presented studies we specifically comment on the neglect of multi-level issues, and
problems connected to this.
4.1 Studies investigating business relationship dissolution
Studies with a quantitative approach
In the empirical studies conducted by Ping (1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999) the major focus is
to examine either antecedents or structural constraints of retailer exit intention. Theoretical
perspectives are mainly drawn from the Political economy framework (Stem and Reve, 1980),
from economics (Hirschman, 1970), employee turnover literature and the ending of intimate
relationships (Duck, 1982). Further, the author investigates existing relationships, and uses
behavioral intention variables (e.g. the intention to exit, the propensity to exit) in order to test
associations related to the termination of relationships. The empirical research is conducted in
retailer settings using field surveys. Structural equation technique is used to analyze the data.
In Ping (1993), the author studied the effects of satisfaction and structural constraints
on retailer exiting, voice, loyalty, opportunism, and neglect. The proposed antecedents were
overall satisfaction with the relationship, the relationship "structural constraints" of alternative
attractiveness, relationship investment and switching costs. Exiting associations was
explained mainly by satisfaction and alternative attractiveness.
In another study, Ping (1994) examined whether satisfaction moderates the association
between alternative attractiveness and exit intention. The study supported the conceptual
buyer-seller relationship framework proposed by Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) showing that
higher satisfaction attenuates the alternative attractiveness-exit intention association. The
study provides significant findings, i.e. that satisfaction moderated the alternative
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attractiveness-exit intention association, and moreover, satisfaction reduced the alternative
attractiveness-exit intention interaction.
An examination of antecedents of retailer exit intention was done in Ping (1995). In
addition to satisfaction, the author included traditional economic variables, such as retailer
revenue and productivity, and hence tried to fill the gap in the channel reactions-to-
dissatisfaction literature ''. In this study economic variables such as revenue, return on
investment, and revenue-per-employee were postulated to affect exit intention. Findings
suggest that satisfaction was the most important antecedent of exit intention. Revenue, return
on investment, revenue-per-employee, and competitive stores were influential about half as
much or less on exit intention by comparison. Years in business and years with the wholesaler
did not affect exit intention.
In an empirical study, Ping (1997) postulates that cost to exit, overall relationship
satisfaction, and demographic variables affect a firm' s voice. In addition, demographic
variables, such as partner firm revenue, years with partner, years in business, the number of
employees, revenue per employee, competition, and return on investment, are included in the
study. In the study Ping uses the term structural commitment, which is argued to encompass
the following dimensions: alternative attractiveness, investment, and switching costs. The
author labels the second-order construct, cost-of-exit. Overall satisfaction had the largest
overall effect on voice. Increased retailer cost-of-exit also enhanced the use of voice. Years
with the wholesaler was positively correlated with satisfaction and cost-of-exit, which suggest
that long-term relationships were associated with increased satisfaction and higher cost-of-
exit. Therefore, years with wholesaler were positively, but indirectly, associated with voice.
In Ping (1999) overall satisfaction with a relationship and lack of alternative
attractiveness were found to reduce exiting. The author tested the proposed linkages among
exit-propensity'", and other responses to relationship problems, such as loyal behavior, voice
and neglect. Of the proposed hypotheses involving the relationship between loyal behavior,
voice, neglect, and exit-propensity, all but the voice-exit-propensity associations were
significant.
Heide and Weiss (1995) studied two aspects of buyer decision-making in high-
technology markets'f: 1) whether buyers include new vendors at the consideration stage of
the process, and 2) whether they switch to new vendors at the choice stage of the process.
10whose focus is psychosocial rather than economic
11Exit propensity is the disinclination to continue the current relationship
12which are characterized by high uncertainty and the presence of switching costs tied to technologies or
vendors
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Further, buyer's consideration sets may be defined as closed, i.e. restricted to existing
vendors, or open, i.e. can include new vendors. Moreover, the authors' main focus is on the
factors, which influence whether buyers include new vendors at the consideration stage of the
process, and whether they stay with an existing vendor or switch to a new vendor, once the
consideration stage is formed.Three categories of factors are included: 1) buyer uncertainty'",
2) switching costs"; and 3) situational factors'[. Findings show that prior experience had no
significant effect on buyer consideration set decision. Switching costs had a limiting effect on
buyer considerationprocess.Moreover, vendor related costs restricted buyer choice behavior.
Decision importance demonstrated significant and negative effects upon buyer propensity to
use a closed consideration set. The variable did not demonstrate any significant effect on
switching behavior. Buying process formalization was found to restrict the buyer decision
process, both at the consideration and switching phases. While centralization of buyer
authority influenced buyers with open consideration sets to favor new vendors at the choice
stage, centralizationdid not affect the consideration decision.
Wathne, Biong and Heide (2000) examined how relationship variables (social and
structural) and marketing variables influence supplier choice. The study demonstrates that
social bonds had limited effect relative to structural and marketing variables on supplier
choice and the likelihood of switching. Social bonds did not play the role of a buffer that
protects against competition. The authors also found that buyers and suppliers hold
systematically distinct views of the determinants of switching.
Seabright, Levinthal and Fichman (1992) proposed that changes in resource fit
between firms were likely to bring forth relationship dissolution, whereas individual and
structural attachments developed in interfirm exchange were predicted to reduce the
likelihood of dissolution. In their empirical examination of auditor-client relationships using a
case-control design, changes in resource fit contributed to increase dissolution, but attachment
of individuals decreased dissolution. The conclusion of the study is that boundary spanners
play a major role in maintaining relationships. This dissolution study is one of few that
explicitly specifies and investigates attachments at both levels.
In her doctoral thesis, Prim-Allaz (2000) examines factors that cause business
relationship dissolution between small and medium businesses and the banking sector.
Relational norms are proposed to playa major role in ensuring relationship continuance.
13 pace oftechnological change, technological heterogeneity, and lack of experience
14 technology and vendor-related
15 buying process centralization and formalization, and purchase importance
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Empirical evidence shows that the existence of relational norms is critical. Further,
moderating effects of age of the relationship, history of the relationship and structural
constraints were found.
Summary
Findings in Ping (1993, 1994, and 1995) could indicate that overall satisfaction with a
relationship serves as a form of mobility barrier. However, since the level is not specified, it is
unclear to what the author refers. We argue that multi-level issues are neglected in studies
conducted by Ping (1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, and 1999). The author refers in his articles to
literature whose focus is interpersonal relationships (e.g. Duck 1982, Rusbult, Johnson, and
Morrow, 1986) without discussing potential problems of the analogy from individual-to-
individual relationships to firm-to-firm relationships. By not taken into consideration the
multi-level issue, the author thereby implicitly assumes independence of individuals from
higher-level orders or homogeneity ofindividuals within higher-level orders (e.g. Ping, 1993,
1994). Heide and Weiss (1995) also lean to literature whose focus is not a fum-to-firm
relationship. We argue that constructs, such as experience, formalization and centralization
are aligned to the organizational level without a sufficient theoretical argument. In Ping
(1993, 1999) the behavioral response, neglect, was explained as 'emotional' exiting
characterized by impersonal, reluctant, even 'grudging' exchanges. The measure was also
explained as the intention to reduce physical contact with the partner firm. These are
inherently individual-level characteristics, and the wording of the items gives the impression
that the author deals with an individual-to-firm relationship'", although the author examines a
firm-to-firm relationship (cf 1.4). Further, Ping (1993, 1999) explains that neglect involves
reduced contact and reduced social exchanges, but not necessarily reduced exchanges with the
other party. With regard to this construct it is not clear whether Ping (1999) means that
disengagement originates from deteriorated interpersonal bonds, or whether other factors
exogenous to the interpersonal relationship leading to business relationship termination lead
to deteriorated interpersonal bonds.
Studies with a qualitative approach
A number of studies have investigated the dissolution of relationships by using a qualitative
approach. In order to study this phenomenon these studies mainly draw on theories from
16 This is also the case for the constructs: investment, loyalty, exit, voice, and opportunism.
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economics (e.g. Hirschman, 1975), sociology (e.g. Simmel, 1950), and social psychology (e.g.
Baxter, 1985, Duck, 1982). The majority of studies focus on the process of the relationship
ending (e.g. Tåthinen and Halinen-Kaila, 1997, Havila and Wilkinson, 1997, Giller and
Matear, 2000, Alajoutsijårvi, Moller and Tåhtinen, 2000). Some authors do, however, discuss
and propose factors influencing the process (e.g. Tåhtinen, 1998). Communication strategies
employed by the actors during the dissolution process are also studied by some scholars (e.g.
Giller and Matear, 2000, Alajoutsijårvi, Moller and Tahtinen, 2000, Tåhtinen, 2001). Potential
factors connected to a relationship that would affect the firm' s choice of communication
strategies are specified ex ante by the authors. A minority, Havila and Wilkinson (1997),
focus on the situation resulting after the dissolution of a business relationship.
Perrien, Paradis and Banting (1995) aim to shed light in their study on the dissolution
process and specifically examine the reasons why buyers and sellers disengage from a
relationship in the commercial banking sector. The authors found that dissolution is mainlya
consequence of organizational norms and policies and pricing decisions. Individuals in the
sales force that are directly in contact with customers and could eventually contribute to
customer retention were not responsible for the global strategies and objectives that produced
dissolution. This qualitative study therefore reveals that frontline people do not always
possess the power or authority to reduce dissolution.
The majority of studies use a qualitative research design with a strong weight on
longitudinal case studies. Findings result, in some studies, in process models and typologies
(e.g. Tåhtinen and Halinen-Kaila, 1997, Tåhtinen and Halinen, 1999, Alajoutsijårvi, Moller
and Tåhtinen, 2000, Tåhtinen, 2001) trying to cover all kinds of endings and all stages of the
termination process. Thus, the main contribution of these studies within the literature
investigating relationship ending is knowledge of the dissolution phase per se (Halinen and
Tåthinen, 2000). Although the authors main purpose of their research is to describe and
understand the phenomenon of dissolution, we point out some suggestions and results from
the studies.
Personal ties and effects
Havila and Wilkinson (1997) found that, despite the existence of interpersonal bonds,
boundary spanner bonds did not demonstrate any influence upon the decision to end the focal
relationships, due to factors either endogenous to the company (such as organization policy or
new market strategies) or because of exogenous reasons (such as political factors, market
changes, network changes). This finding indicates that individuals taking part in business
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relationship activities have limited decision-making power with regard to major decisions. In
contrast, with regard to the choice and use of communication strategies, relational bonds had
an impact. For instance, Alajoutsijårvi, Moller and Tåhtinen, (2000) found that the beauty of
exit was emphasized when strong personal bonds had been developed. Giller and Matear
(2001) showed that prior closeness between the firms17led to the use ofless indirect and more
other-oriented strategies. Social bonds also had the tendency to facilitate the termination of
the relationship.
Summary
Contrary to most of the quantitative studies presented earlier, the above studies discuss and
mention both individual and organizational-level variables (such as personal relationships,
technological bonds, inter-firm knowledge, contracts, norms and inter-firm roles).
Nevertheless, the neglect of multi-level issues is likewise in this research tradition. The reason
for this is the non-specification of levels, and the mix of levels in descriptions of the cases
(e.g. Tahtinen and Halinen-Kaila, 1997, Alajoutsijårvi, Moller and Tåhtinen, 2000). Further,
the alignment of constructs from individual-level to organizational-level is rarely questioned
or theoretically justified. The ambiguity of the multi-level nature of a number of constructs is
not addressed. In accord with Rousseau (1985), Heide and John, (1994), Iacobucci and
Ostrom, (1996), and Blois, (1999), we argue that alignment from one level to another ought to
be a theoretical justification.
Moreover, the researchers employ a number of theories, whose focus is individuals,
without discussing potential limitations when applying these theoretical frameworks to
business-to-business settings. Some researchers do, nevertheless, address that business
relationships are more complex, and that the theories employed may possess some limitations.
For example, Giller and Matear (2001) explain that financial, legal, technical and
administrative bonds in business relationships do render these relationships more complex and
complicated. InAlajoutsijårvi, Moller and Tåhtinen (2000), Baxter's model was found to not
completely grasp the multi-level and multi-actor complexity of the strategies obvious in
business relationships. A number of studies also suggest that reasons or factors leading
towards dissolution may come from multiple levels, such as the individual, the company, the
dyad, the network and the environment (e.g. Havila and Wilkinson, 1997, Tåhtinen and
Halinen-Kaila, 1997, Tåhtinen, 2001). However, no theoretical discussion underlies this
17 The authors refer to close relationships among boundary spanners.
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account, and the relative effect of the various factors is not postulated. Consequently, it is
unclear from what kind of factor, or from which level the process of dissolution originates.
Moreover, Halinen-Kaila (1997) and Tåhtinen (2001) suggest variability among firms with
respect to a number of firm characteristics, and that these may have an impact upon firms
exiting and use of voice. These assumptions of heterogeneity are not discussed theoretically
and not proposed further for testing.
Some of the scholars discuss the phenomenon that individuals in organizations act on
behalf of their organization, and probably are affected by, for example company culture,
norms and procedures, in contrast to individuals" and consumers who act on behalf of
themselves. Grønhaug, Henjesand and Koveland (1999) point out this issue and state that
"(stales representatives and purchasing agents are constrained and influenced by their
organizational context as well, e.g. by organizational rules and procedures directing tasks
and the way in which they are assumed to be done" (1999: 179). Another study addresses the
possibility that individuals may be influenced by, e.g. the cultural dimension in contexts"
(Halinen and Salmi, 2001). Further, the authors address power differences among individuals
at unlike hierarchical levels (2001:14). To conclude they identify the issue of managing
personal relations, and thereby introduce the idea that macro-levels can affect individual
relationships.
In our study we claim there is a need to specify the level of constructs, and to test the
effect of constructs at multiple levels. Furthermore, we claim that variables, which appear to
interact with the theoretical constructs in the study, should be included in the conceptual
modelon a logical and theoretical basis (McGrath and Brinberg, 1983, Heide and John, 1994,
Klein et al., 1994). Halinen and Salmi, (2001) suggest in their article that little is known about
the role of personal contacts in the termination phase. Since organizational members probably
are affected by organizational and inter-organizational relationships, we argue that a multi-
level perspective could shed light on this issue.
4.2 The logic behind organizational structures and procedures
In accord with our multi-level argument, we assume that organizational members typically are
influenced by organizational factors. Individual independence or lack of independence with
regard to tasks and decision-making is presumed to be influenced by organizational structures.
In this research we presume organizational dimensions to have an impact on the effect of
18 in individual-to-individual relationships
19 The authors do not specify what level, e.g. the nation, an industry setting, a company?
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structural ties versus interpersonal ties. It is therefore of great importance to highlight the
theory and logic behind this assumption (Klein, Dansereau and Hall, 1994). In the following
sections we elaborate on formal versus informal interaction orders. We then explain the logic
behind and the effects of centralization, formalization and standardization. Moreover, we
present literature that has addressed, integrated and investigated the multi-level issue in
business relationships. In this thesis we include Macaulay's account on the multi-level
phenomenon, findings resulting from the buyer center literature and business-to-business
studies that have adopted a multi-level perspective.
Formal and informal interaction orders
Morand (1995) elaborates on how organizational contexts can encourage either formal or
informal "interaction orders". The author reveals how behavioral informality may be
instrumental in the social construction of innovative, organic work of organizations and how
formality is implicated in the social construction of bureaucratic, impersonal work
organizations. With the terms formality and informality two distinct forms of "interaction
orders" are meant. These two forms of interaction possess distinct a set of understandings or
conventions about how actors are to orient and conduct themselves (Morand, 1995). The
former signals looser, more casual modes of behavior and situational involvement, the latter
more disciplined and impersonal modes. Morand's (1995) elaboration ends up in a model
showing how formality and informality can play a functional role in different types of
organizational settings (1995: 843). The author's argument is highly relevant for the current
study, because he addresses the potential impact of organizational factors upon the
development of interpersonal relationships. In consistence with Morand (1995) we also
underscore that not all organizations wish to encourage the development of close, personal
ties. In some organizations, such as public offices, personal relations with clients are even
thought of as inappropriate.
The logic behind and effects of centralization.formalization and standardization
Staw, Sandelands and Dutton (1981) discuss the logic behind increased centralization,
formalization and standardization and their effects. The authors link the enhancement of
control processes to threat. Their discussion is however relevant to organizations' constant
confrontation with different forms of environmental changes (e.g. competition, market
changes etc.). In addition the authors discuss control processes with a multi-level perspective,
which is highly relevant to the study. Stawet al. (1981) contend that for organizations it is
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logical to enhance control and coordination processes when they are exposed to threats. A
general phenomenon in organizations follows: "...as the importance of decisions increases,
they are made at progressively higher levels within an organizational hierarchy, presumably
because top-level decision-making is less likely to differ from the core values or goals of the
organization" (Staw et al. 1981 :513). In other words, in threatening situations greater
coordination and control is needed since lower-level personnel typically are characterized by
heterogeneous motives.
To conclude, in organizations with a high degree of centralization and formalization,
organizational members at lower-order levels are likely to possess less decision-making
power. The potential effect of interpersonal ties is therefore thought to have less impact upon
decisions, such as dissolution. In organizations with a low degree of centralization and
formalization the effect of interpersonal ties is expected to be higher.
4.3 Buyer Center literature
The buyer center literature is relevant with respect to this study, among other factors, because
a large number of these studies employ a multi-level perspective. This literature focuses on
individual, group or buying center, and organizational level variables. In the buyer center
literature, purchase decisions are also understood as complex. One reason for that is that a
large number of organizational members are involved in the decision-making. Dimensions at
higher-level orders (i.e. at the buyer center level and at the organizationallevel) are assumed
to influence individual or group behavior.
Katrichis (1998) found that departmental level interaction patterns influenced
organizational purchasing decisions. Morris, Berthon and Pitt (1999) suggested the structure
of industrial buying centers to affect purchase decisions. A number of studies have examined
the effect ofbuyer center structural dimensions on boundary personnel behavior. According to
these studies, complexity, formalization and centralization constitute the principal dimensions
of organizational structure (Lau, Goh, Phua 1999). According to Webster and Wind's model,
industrial buying behavior is influenced by (in an hierarchical manner) by environmental,
organizational, interpersonal, and individual factors (Lau, Goh, Phua 1999). Shet (1973)
explains that industrial behavior is influenced by situational factors, company-specific factors,
product-specific factors and psychological factors. Kohli (1989) gives an overview of the
main research streams examining the composition of influence in buying centers. The first
stream empirical studies show that individual influence on purchase decisions is related to
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information control, expertise, position in communication flow, specific self confidence,
perceived importance in the decision, formal authority, reward power, risk or novelty of the
purchase decision, and size of the buying center. In the second stream, scholars have
investigated the pattern of influence of different positions or departments in buying decisions.
Findings demonstrate that influence varied according to product type, the stage of the decision
process, the decision type, organization size, and organizational structure.
Thus, according to the above outline a number of dimensions designating
organizational structure, such as organization size, centralization and formalization, have an
impact upon individual influence on purchase decisions. The unit of analysis in the above
studies is the buyer center, while we aim to investigate business relationships. Nevertheless,
we argue the results are relevant for our research as well. In the below sections we discuss
relevant literature that has investigated business-to-business relationships.
4.4 The effect of organizations in business relationships
Macaulay's accounts on multi-level issues
Macaulay (1963) argued that interpersonal ties across levels in an organization as well as
across organizational boundaries affect the ongoing business relationship. Although, personal
relationships across levels of the two business units put pressure on individuals to perform in
conformity to expectations, conflicts and incompatibility typically exist among personnel
across levels and firms. Different norms, cultures, rules, procedures, professional background
and the like often are existent in intra and inter-organizations. A salesman and a buyer may
have dealt with each other for several decades, and a close relationship, which involves more
than pure economic exchange may typically evolve. The author hereby emphasizes that
business relationships are a multi-level phenomenon. Macaulay's (1963) account for multi-
level issues supports the assumption of heterogeneity inside an organization as well as
between organizations.
Perceptions of the need of contract
The above-mentioned accounts bring forth potential conflicts when it comes to perceptions of
the need of contract. In consistency with the above outline on tentative explanations of
business people's perceptions on contract, Macaulay (1963) argues that organizational
members at different levels and departments in an organization and across organizations will
have different attitudes towards the need to use contract. Salespeople are typically often
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opposed to the use of contracts, as contractual negotiations may represent "...a hurdle in the
way of a sale" (1963:279). "Holding a customer to the letter o/the contract" (1963:279) can
also be damaging for future customer relationships.
Purchasing agents and their buyers are typically less hostile to contracts, but they may
consider planning contracts as a waste of time. The control department, for example the
treasurer, might view contracts as an adequate organizing tool controlling the activities inside
the organization. Based onMacaulay's (1963) account on differences in the perceptions on the
need of contract, we suggest that people at lower levels in the organization, such as sales-
people and buyers, are more reluctant towards the use of contract. One reason for this might
be that boundary spanners deal directly with representatives in other organizations. One
might, therefore, suspect that relational components are involved when boundary spanners
e.g. negotiate in business exchange. Consequently, individuals at lower levels in the
organization are assumed to act in a more heterogeneous way. Although Macaulay (1963)
addressed the multi-level issue years ago, researchers in the marketing field have, to a small
extent, investigated business-relationships with a multi-level perspective (Fichman and
Goodman, 1996). Below, we present two relevant studies that have examined business
relationships using a multi-level perspective. None of these studies have examined
relationship dissolution.
Interorganizational relationship studies with multi-level perspectives
Humphrey and Ashforth (2000) found that exit-voice strategies at the macro-level influenced
interpersonal relationships between company representatives and buyers. Moreover, the
empirical study showed that "(b)ecause of strong environmental pressures operating on
buyers and suppliers, the interpersonal communications buyers and supplier agents use does
not reflect their individual personalities so much as it does the situation" (2000:728).
Murry and Heide (1998) examined effects (independent and joint effects) of both
interpersonal relationships and organization-level variables on two aspects of participation,
more specifically: 1) retailer agreement to participate in point-of-purchase programs, and 2)
retailer compliance with established agreements. The authors found that the presence of
strong personal relationships did not diminish the importance of other variables. Economic
incentives (e.g. incentive premiums and monitoring efforts) were stronger determinants of
participation than interpersonal relationships. Related to the findings they explain "(m)any
manufacturers indirectly promote the use of weak ties by systematically rotating salespeople
across retail accounts" (1998:59).
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Luo (2001) investigates how personal attachments between boundary spanners within cross-
cultural cooperative ventures are established and their affect on venture performance. The
research shows that that personal attachment depends on three factors: the individual,
organizational and the environmental level. At the individual level, an increasing function of
overlap in tenure is critical with regard to attachment. At the organizational level, attachment
is strengthened by goal congruity between the involved firms, but is obstructed by cultural
distance. Market disturbance and regulatory deterrence is found to increase attachment.
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5. Development of hypotheses and conceptual model
5.1 Relationship-specific investments and effects on dissolution
In Chapter 2 we presented the major ideas in Transaction Cost theory and Relational Contract
theory, and thereby aimed to explain the logic behind the importance of structural and
relational aspects in business relationships. Even though the theories differ with regard to
human behavioral assumptions, advice that concerns governance mechanisms and reliance on
micro versus macro variables, somesimilarities and complementarities exist.
In accord with TransactionCost theory, structural ties (macro-variables) are presumed
critical and highly efficient, while Relational Contract theory emphasizes the importance of
relational ties (micro-variables). To govern bilateral exchange the former theory therefore
relies extra on formal governance mechanism (impersonal modes), while the latter theory
depends largely on informal governance modes (personal modes). The major reason for
disparity with respect to recommendationsof governancemechanism lies in the assumption of
human behavior, i.e. whether dyadic partners expect opportunistic or trusting behavior.
Despite the emphasis on either formal or informal modes, the above theories recognize the
existence and need for both formal and informal governance mechanisms in business
relationships.
In this research, the purpose is to examine the effect of relationship-specific
investments on dissolution. In accord with Transaction Cost theory, relationship-specific
investments, in the form of structural bonds, physical assets, and formalized and standardized
governance procedures are presumed to enhance continuity and thereby reduce the likelihood
of business relationship termination (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh, 1987, Anderson and Weitz,
1992). With respect to investments made in a relationship, there is a difference between
specific assets that are specialized, and therefore cannot be used outside a given relationship
without a loss in value, and assets that are unspecialized (Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1991).
Even if the establishment and maintenance of exchange relationships demand both types of
investments, only the specialized ones build attachment. Because general investments retain
their value in another relationship, they do not bind exchange partners. Idiosyncratic
investments, however, lose value upon transfer to another exchange partner. Because of the
associated costs related to marketing or acquiring such investments, exchange partners
become locked into existing relationships. Thus, in order to anticipate and safeguard against
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potential problems related to adjustments in bilateral exchange, relationship-specific
investments serve as barriers to relationship dissolution.
In Relational Contract theory, informal governance mechanisms in the form of trust
and relational norms are seen as highly efficient. These informal governance mechanisms
typically operate through personal relationships. In this research we therefore use the term
interpersonal ties when referring to relational ties. Individuals responsible for dyadic
exchange therefore need to make relationship-specific investments with regard to the partner
representative, in the form of building interpersonal trust, adjusting to the other partner,
gaining relationship-specific knowledge and improving interpersonal communication. These
relationship-specific assets developed by boundary spanners are found to increase the
understanding of the other' s idiosyncrasies, reduce opportunism and thereby lower
negotiation and adaptation costs as well as facilitate conflict solving (Dwyer, Schurr anf Oh,
1987, Currall and Judge, 1995, Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998). High levels of specific
assets therefore are presumed to increase boundary spanner ability and willingness to resort to
voice when defections and conflicts arise, and hence reduce the liability to exit (Hirschman,
1970). Relationship-specific assets between boundary spanners therefore are presumed to
enhance both perceived and real switching costs and thereby reduce the likelihood of
relationship dissolution (Seabright, Levinthal and Fichman, 1992, Nicholson, Compeau and
Sethi,2000).
Consistent with the above outline, we propose that relationship-specific investments in
the form of structural ties and interpersonal ties reduce the likelihood of relationship
dissolution, since specific investments increase switching costs and hence produce
'immobility' with respect to exiting. In addition, high levels of specific investments are
expected to increase partners' ability and willingness to resort to voice when defections and
conflicts arise, and thereby reduce the liability to exit. Accordingly, we formulate the below
propositions (P):
Pl: The stronger interpersonal ties are the less likely is it that relationships will be dissolved
P2: The stronger structural ties are the less likely is it that relationships will be dissolved
In harmony with the above outline and our multi-level argument, we further specify that
relationship-specific investments can be made at both the inter-organizational and at the
interpersonallevel. Further, we claim that these can be analytically distinguished, although we
recognize specific investments at both levels are related. In organizations, there is mutual
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feedback linking macro phenomena and micro phenomena (Giddens, 1979, Rousseau, 1985,
Coleman, 1990). For example macro phenomena, such as specific inter-organizational
business norms, may emerge as a consequence of informal commitments made by boundary
spanners during the formation of a specific relationship. New individual boundary spanners
who enter the inter-firm exchange may internalize the existing and prevailing norms in the
business relationship (Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998).
In accordance with Seabright et al. (1992), we specify attachments or 'immobility'
factors between exchange partners that are embedded in structural ties between two
organizations and in individual relationships developed by boundary spanners. In this
research, structural ties refer to partner-specific investments at the interorganizational level,
in the form of physical and human asset investments. These investments are bound in physical
equipment or formalized arrangements and procedures that constitute a sort of collective
memory in the organization. Even though these investments necessarily are established and
maintained by boundary spanners, these assets are assumed to exist despite boundary spanner
turnover. It is the collectivity, rather than specific individuals, that is the repository of these
assets (Seabright et al., 1992). As the duration of the business relationship increases,
structural ties are assumed to increase.
Interpersonal ties refer to ties between boundary spanners. Interpersonal ties
encompass personal skills, knowledge, and personal relationships. Boundary spanners are thus
seen as the repository of such assets. Previous experience with boundary spanners thus refers
to the interpersonal history of learning and socialization during involvement in exchange
activities. Interpersonal ties, however, are related to the tenure of individuals in boundary
spanning roles in the exchange relationship. Consequently, boundary spanners establish and
maintain interpersonal relationships as long as they are involved with specific exchange
activities. Turnover in boundary spanning positions, thus has the potential to weaken business
relationships (Seabright et al., 1992).
Interpersonal ties specified in the model
As aforementioned, research on business relationships has investigated different forms of
specific investments or assets in relationships between boundary spanners. The phenomenon
of interest in our research is cross-national business relationships and more specifically
relationships between buyer and supplier organizations and their respective representatives. In
this research we specify the following interpersonal investments or adaptations as relevant for
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the cross-national business relationships, cultural knowledge, cultural adaptation and two-
way communication.
By cultural knowledge we refer to knowledge of the partner 's society, culture, norms,
customs, and the ability to speak the language of the partner. To possess cultural knowledge
of the partner firms' culture is advantageouswhen dealing with cross-national exchange (Kale
and Barnes, 1991, Thomas, 1998, Bhawuk and Brislin, 2000). This is because boundary
spanners holding comprehensive knowledge of foreign cultures are assumed to be aware of
differences in morals, customs, beliefs, and lifestyles in numerous countries. Cultural
competence is equally associated with openness and tolerance toward culturally different
partners. Foreign language fluency is additionally found critical in intercultural business
exchange (Kale and Barnes, 1991, Thomas, 1998). One reason for this is that language
competence facilitates the understanding and assessment of critical governance issues that are
likely to increase the functioning of dyadic exchange. In consequence, boundary spanners that
possess cultural knowledge are expected to be highly competent in order to manage cross-
national business exchange, and thereby contribute to reduce the likelihood of dissolution. In
this research, cultural knowledge is associated to supplier reps only (cf 7.5).
Cultural adaptation refers to the ability and willingness to adapt culturally to the
partner rep on a number of dimensions. Drawing on cross-cultural research, the following
dimensions are found central with respect to cultural adaptation: the partner rep' s
psychological mind-set, values and beliefs, way of negotiating and the handling of
disagreement (peterson, Kameda and Shimada, 1981, Kale and Barnes, 1991, Simintiras and
Thomas, 1998, Mintu-Wimsatt and Gassenheimer, 2000). In the research, cultural adaptation
is associated with both supplier and buyer reps. When dealing with cross-national business
exchange, cultural adaptation to the partner is recommended (Francis, 1991, Matveev and
Nelson, 2004). This is because adaptation is assumed to reduce the probability of
inappropriate behaviors and misunderstandings. Further, adaptability involves the ability to
understand the culturally different partner, to display empathy and tolerance for cultural
differences, to exhibit great knowledge of communicative and interactional styles in various
cultures and to be flexible with respect to, e.g. way of thinking and conflict resolution styles
(Mead, 1990, Borisoff and Victor, 1998,Matveev and Nelson, 2004). Cultural adaptability is
therefore found valuable with respect to the governance of cross-national dyads, and thereby
is presumed to reduce the likelihood of relationship dissolution.
Two-way communication refers to the ability and willingness for a two-way
communication. Important aspects with respect to this variable are the motivation for an open
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information sharing, the willingness to allow weaknesses and strengths to be seen as well as
to share confidential information (Anderson and Weitz, 1992, Doney and Cannon, 1997). In
our research, two-way communication is associated with both supplier and buyer reps. In
business relationships contact between boundary spanners is the key mechanism for
information gathering and communication (Hakansson, 1982, Mohr and Nevin, 1990,
Nielson, 1997). High quality communication between boundary spanners is found to foster
interpersonal trust, to increase coordinative behaviors and to enhance problem solving
capabilities, which in consequence reduces the likelihood of business relationship termination
(Dwyer, Schurr and Oh, 1987, Shapiro, 1988, Anderson and Weitz, 1989, Anderson and
Weitz, 1992). In cross-national dyads, communication is even more critical and challenging
because of cultural differences (Morris et al., 1998, Simintiras and Thomas, 1998, Mintu-
Wimsatt and Gassenheimer, 2000, Matveev and Nelson, 2004).). In addition to the usual
business divergences in marketing channels, boundary spanners are required to make an extra
effort to surmount various cultural differences, such as by investing in high levels of two-way
communication. Based on the above outline we presume that high levels of cultural
knowledge, cultural adaptation and two-way communication reduce the likelihood of
relationships dissolution. Accordingly, we formulate the following general hypotheses':
Hl: Supplier rep cultural knowledge is negatively related to relationship dissolution
H2: Supplier rep cultural adaptation is negatively related to relationship dissolution
H3: Buyer rep cultural adaptation is negatively related to relationship dissolution
H4: Supplier rep and buyer rep two-way communication' is negatively related to
relationship dissolution
Structural ties specified in the model
Interorganizational studies provide various measures that aim to reflect relationship-specific
measures in business relationships (e.g. Anderson and Weitz, 1992, Haugland and Reve,
1994, Haugland, 1999, Bensaou and Anderson, 1999, Jap and Ganesan, 2000). In this
literature the construct relationship-specific investments is commonly specified to the
l In Chapter 9 we formulate more specified hypotheses that we use in the empirical test. The formulated
hypotheses presented in Chapter 9 equally include three dependent variables. Exit intention and Tolerance of
conflict, that are assumed to reflect aspects or perceptions of dissolution (cf 7.4), and Extendedness of
relationship that is included to function as a control analysis.
2 Initially we formulated and tested two-way communication as two different measures; supplier rep two-way
communication and buyer rep two-way communication. Factor analysis (cfChapter 8) recommended that these
reflect one measure. Therefore, because of data analysis later on in the thesis we formulate only one hypothesis.
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interorganizational level (e.g. Ping, 1993, Bensaou and Anderson, 1999, Haugland, 1999).
Important dimensions reflected in measures that are employed In empirical studies are
specific investments in the form of product adaptation (such as tailoring products to
customers), human asset specificity (such as training of personnel) and logistical adaptation
(such as improving the distribution of goods):'. These dimensions are assumed critical with
respect to governance in cross-national business relationships that are subject to investigation
in our research. Partner firms in cross-national dyads are presumed to invest even more in
specific investments because of the geographical and cultural distance between the involved
parties (Nakata and Sivakumar, 2001, Shenkar, 2001). With regard to structural ties in the
form of product adaptation, human asset specificity and logistical adaptation, we propose
these investments to reduce the likelihood of relationship dissolution (high levels of e.g.
product adaptation are negatively related to relationship dissolution). Structural ties are
specified for both organizations involved in the business relationship, and more specifically
for this research - the buyer and supplier organization. Below, we formulate general
hypotheses (cf previous section) postulating direct effects of structural ties on dissolution.
HS: Supplier firm product adaptation is negatively related to relationship dissolution
H6: Buyer firm product adaptation is negatively related to relationship dissolution
H7: Supplier firm human asset specificity is negatively related to relationship dissolution
H8: Buyer firm human asset specificity is negatively related to relationship dissolution
H9: Supplier firm logistical adaptation is negatively related to relationship dissolution
HIO: Buyer firm logistical adaptation is negatively related to relationship dissolution
Moderators specified in the model
In accord with our research question (cf Chapter 1) we aim to examine whether organizational
and interorganizational dimensions moderate the effect of structural and interpersonal ties
upon relationship dissolution. In this research the following dimensions are proposed to
moderate the effect of macro and micro variables: formalization, centralization, size and
levels of inclusiveness (organizational dimensions) and history with organization
(interorganizational dimensions). In consistence with multi-level theory, organization theory
and interorganizational research with a multi-level perspective, we formulate the following
proposition. Our multi-level argument is presented in the model below.
3 Development of measures and operationalization is offered in Chapter 7.
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P3: Organizational and interorganizational dimensions are expected to moderate the effect of
structural and interpersonal ties upon relationship dissolution
Moderator (z)
l
Independent variable (x) -----_ Dependent variable (y)
Figure 5.1: Cross-level model
In the above model interpersonal ties and structural ties are independent variables (x),
organizational and inter-organizational dimensions are presumed moderators (Z), and
relationship dissolution is the dependent variable (y).
In the discussion that follows we present the chosen moderators and explain their conceptual
relationship with structural and interpersonal ties and with relationship dissolution.
5.2 Organizational and interorganizational dimensions
The theory and research findings presented in Chapter 4 show that organizational members'
behavior is influenced by organizational dimensions (Berger and Cummings, 1979, Kohli,
1989, Humphrey and Ashforth, 2000, Wilson, 2000). Further, scholars explain that
organizational characteristics, such as formalization and centralization playa functional role
in organizational settings, such as to encourage either formal or informal interpersonal
interactions and to increase or reduce controlover lower level organizational members
(Morand, 1995, Staw et al., 1981). In the sections that follow, we present and discuss the
following moderators: centralization, formalization, organization size, levels of inclusiveness
and history with the organization, and their moderating effects on the relationships between
structural ties and dissolution and interpersonal ties and dissolution. In the empirical test later
on, we associate the organizational dimensions with the buyer organization only. In
consequence, only buyer firm and buyer rep specific investments are assumed to be
moderated by the specified organizational dimensions. One exception is the
interorganizational dimension: history with supplier organization, where we presume that both
supplier and buyer (firm and rep) specific investments are moderated by this moderator. In the
hypotheses specified later on in Chapter 10, interpersonal ties include buyer rep cultural
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adaptation and supplier and buyer rep two-way communication (cf Chapter 8). Structural ties
consist of buyer firm product adaptation, buyer firm human asset specificity and buyer firm
logistical adaptation. In this chapter we only formulate propositions of moderators and their
moderating effects. The moderator hypotheses are first specified in Chapter 104•
Centralization
By centralization, we refer to the distribution of formal control and power within an
organization (Lau, Goh and Phua, 1999). In organizations with a high degree of
centralization, concentration of power and control are typically located among a limited
number of organizational members that are likely to be at higher levels in the organization. In
organizations with a low degree of centralization, the distribution of power and control is
more decentralized. In this study, centralization is treated as the degree to which purchasing
decisions are controlled and made by a boundary spanner or at higher levels in the
organization (Lau, Goh and Phua, 1999). We suggest the degree of centralization to influence
boundary spanners' degree autonomy in decision-making. Centralization therefore is
presumed to moderate the effect of interpersonal ties. This is because boundary spanners'
autonomy in buying decisions influences the eventual effect of interpersonal ties and
structural ties on relationship dissolution. Moreover, highly centralized organizations would
not encourage the establishment of 'close' personal relationships, since the central logic
behind increasing centralization is to enhance control of decisions made by lower level
organizational members (Staw, Sandelands andDutton, 1981).
Formalization
By formalization, we refer to the degree to which written plans, rules, policies, and
procedures are clearly stated. In organizations with a high degree of formalization, we
presume boundary spanners to have less discretion in decisions. In organizations
characterized by a low degree of formalization, we suggest boundary spanners to be more
autonomous and enjoy more discretion in their decision-making. In this study, formalization
is defined as the degree to which purchasing decisions are formally prescribed by rules,
policies, and procedures to befollowed (Lau, Goh and Phua, 1999).
4 With regard to the hypotheses formulated in Chapter lOwe specify the effect of each variable toward three
different dependent variables (cf reference to general hypotheses ofinterpersonal ties). In addition, it is difficult
to present general hypotheses in this chapter because the organization and structure of the specified moderator
hypotheses changes some (compared to the general and specified hypotheses of direct effects, which keep the
same structure).
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Further, formalization is assumed to possess moderating effects because boundary spanners'
level of autonomy in performing buyer tasks influences the potential impact of interpersonal
ties and structural ties upon the likelihoodof relationship dissolution.
In addition to the more formal constraints or lack of constraints upon organizational
members, we also suggest that organizations characterized by a high degree of formalization
would encourage a more formal and impersonal interaction style towards supplier
representatives. The development of 'close' interpersonal relationships would therefore be
less likely. In contrast, for organizations characterized by a low degree of formalization, a
more informal and personal interaction style towards supplier representatives would be
advanced. In this context, the developmentof 'close' interpersonal relationships is more likely
(Morand, 1995). In accord with the above discussion, the following propositions are
formulated:
P4: The negative effect of interpersonal ties upon the likelihood of relationship dissolution is
expected to be stronger when 1) centralization is low and 2) formalization is low.
P5: The negative effect of structural ties upon the likelihood of relationship dissolution is
expected to be stronger when 1) centralization is high, and 2) formalization is high.
Levels 0/ inclusiveness
Levels of inclusiveness refer "to the proportion of the activity of a unit dedicated to or
involved in those of another unit" (House, Rousseau and Thomas-Hunt, 1995:89). In the
study, levels of inclusiveness refer more specifically to the degree to which a boundary
spanner is dedicated to or involved in activities performed by other members in the
organization. This moderator is therefore associated with the functional or task-related
relationship the buyer representative has toward his organization.
The phenomenon of inclusiveness occurs inside organizational boundaries, e.g.
between production and selling related activities. Likewise, it takes place between
organizations, such as among network partners, due to task interdependence and resources
dependence (House et al., 1995). Inclusiveness between different units (e.g. departments) is
thought to be an important moderator of the effects of one on another. The higher the
involvement of activities in one department with those of another, the higher the effect one
will have on the other.
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The phenomenon of inclusiveness is highly relevant to questions concerning the role,
function and autonomy of boundary spanners, such as salespersons or purchasing agents.
Boundary spanners who are highly dependent on and integrated with other departments in the
organization (e.g. the product development department) will have to playa different role than
boundary spanners less integrated with activities performed in other departments. An example
of relevance to the study would be purchasing agents making buying decisions with respect to
products that would not be processed inside their own organizations. These boundary spanners
would have low levels of inclusiveness towards the production department in their
organization. In contrast, a salesperson that sells products developed and produced inside his
company would be highly dependent upon activities within the company' s production
domain. This boundary spanner has high levels of inclusiveness with his organization's
production department.
With respect to this research, we argue that levels of inclusiveness possess moderating
effects on the relationship between interpersonal and structural ties upon the likelihood of
relationship dissolution. For example, in situations where boundary spanners have low levels
of inclusiveness, the potential impact of interpersonal ties on dissolution would be higher than
when boundary spanners have high levels of inclusiveness. This is because when levels of
inclusiveness are low, relationship-specific investments would most likely be bound with the
boundary spanner and in the interpersonal relationship and specific investments at the
organizationallevel would be minor. Further, the role and function of the boundary spanner is
assumed to be more autonomous when he or she to a lesser degree is integrated with other
parts of the organization. In cases where boundary spanners have low levels of inclusiveness,
there is also a potential for boundary spanner-customer turnover connection".
In contrast, when boundary spanners have high levels of inclusiveness with the
organization they represent, we assume that relationship-specific investments at the
organizational level (structural ties), such as product adaptations, would be of great
importance. Although the boundary spanner's ability to coordinate information and activities
among departments and across organizations is assumed to be significant, he or she would be
more like a coordinator. Specific assets related to the organization (and not the specific
boundary spanner) would be of greater importance. For example, the boundary spanner could
5 Organizations may perform trading activities in addition to processing activities.
6 The phenomenon of boundary spanner-customer turnover connection (discussed by e.g. Lovett, Harrison and
Virick, 1997) occurs in business life. In most cases where this phenomenon takes place, boundary spanners have
low levels of inclusiveness with the organization they represent (see e.g. Seabright, Levinthal and Fichman,
1992, Rokkan, 1999), and relationship-specific assets are mostly bound in the boundary spanner and the
interpersonal relationship.
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not take the customers with him to a new organization because what the firm offers is highly
linked to the whole organization. With respect to levels of inclusiveness we specify
moderating effects only with regard to the effect of structural ties on dissolution.
P6: The negative effect of structural ties upon the likelihood of relationship dissolution is
expected to be stronger when the buyer representative has high levels of inclusiveness with
the organization he represents.
Size of organization
By size of organization, we refer to an organization's overall size, indicated by business sales
and the number of employees (Doney and Cannon, 1997). According to House et al. (1995)
and their account on the relative effect of micro and macro variables, organizational size, age
and institutionalization need to be considered. The reason for this is that through social
interaction, organizational members create specific social realities, which in tum evolve to
specific norms that guide organizational behavior. In tum, these norms will exist
independently of the specific individual. When the organization is large, organization-specific
norms are expected to have a great impact upon individuals. Conversely, in small
organizations, individuals would have greater impact upon the specific norms existing within
a firm. Thus, when organizations become large and mature, individual organizational
members (micro variables) are assumed to have less impact upon macro level variables.
Boundary spanners working in large organizations are thus presumed to act in a non-
autonomous way. In contrast, in small organizations, boundary spanners are thought to act in
a more autonomous way.
In very small organizations with e.g. 2-3 members, the manager and the boundary
spanner could be the same person, or play the same roles interchangeably. In large firms, the
boundary personnel responsible for purchase decisions may have to consider and consult both
higher-level managers and other departments in the organization before making a purchase
decision. These different situations are presumed to affect the potential impact of
interpersonal ties and structural ties upon the likelihood of relationship dissolution. We
presume size of organization to moderate the effect of interpersonal ties and structural ties on
dissolution. Furthermore, firms with few employees " ...may provide an especially fertile
ground for embeddedness that might not exist for larger firms. As firms grow, ties among
individuals may become insufficient sources of embeddedness, and other social mechanisms
such as interlocks or shared equity may then be needed' (Uzzi 1997:64). Likewise, smaller
organizations frequently depend upon close interpersonal relationships with business partners,
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among other factors because small organizations are less able to compete on a cost basis
(Lovett, Harrison and Virick, 1997). Since social obligations are an important source of
competitive advantage for small businesses, we assume interpersonal ties to have a greater
impact upon the likelihood of relationship dissolution in small organizations. Large
organizations, however, are less dependent upon specific organizational members since the
organization size exhibits a signal (e.g. reputation, competence, market share, etc.) that this
firm can be trusted, independently of interpersonal relationships (Doney and Cannon, 1997).
We therefore presume interpersonal ties to have less impact upon the likelihood of
relationship dissolution in large organizations. In accord with the above discussion the
following propositions are formulated.
P7: The negative effect of interpersonal ties upon the likelihood of relationship dissolution is
expected to be stronger when organization size is small
P8: The negative effect of structural ties upon the likelihood of relationship dissolution is
expected to be stronger when organization size is large
History with organization
This moderator represents an interorganizational dimension and is associated with the
relationship between buyer and supplier. A number of studies have demonstrated that history
or length of relationship reduce the likelihood of relationship dissolution (Anderson and
Weitz, 1989, Heide and John, 1990, Heide and Miner, 1992). The reason for this is that
parties make adjustments and learn about each other procedures and values over time.
Business partners may also have survived several crises. In the first phases of business
relationship building, such as in the awareness and exploration phase, interpersonal
relationships are seen as most important. This is because trust building, the development of
norms and expectations, to a large extent would depend on competence, perceptions and
attraction among boundary spanner personnel (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh, 1987). For business
relationships that have reached the commitment phase, governance mechanisms, such as
common norms and value systems, would then ensure sustained interdependence. An
institutionalization of habits, norms and rules of business practices typically arises as business
exchange persists. The beliefs and social meaning shared by the members in the organizations
involved thus evolves to a specific culture, which is thought to survive and be transferred
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despite the fact that organizational members leave the organization (Van de Ven, 1976,
House, Rousseau and Thomas-Hunt, 1995).
History with the organization is assumed to have moderating effects on the
relationship between interpersonal ties and dissolution, and structural ties and dissolution.
When business relationships are young, and an institutionalization of norms and business
practices has not been established, interpersonal ties are assumed to have a higher effect upon
the likelihood of relationship dissolution. When business relationships have lasted for several
years, and structural ties, such as investments of specific assets and procedures have
increased, interpersonal ties would playaminor role, because institutionalized business
practices would exert pressure on boundary spanner behavior and because structural
'immobility' would present a significant barrier towards exit. One might also assume that
organizations are reluctant to jeopardize years of business exchange because of tension
between two boundary spanners. Accordingly, the followingpropositions are formulated.
P9: The negative effect of interpersonal ties upon the likelihood of relationship dissolution is
expected to be stronger when history with the organization is short
PlO: The negative effect of structural ties upon the likelihood of relationship dissolution is
expected to be stronger when history with the organization is long.
Below, we present the conceptual model.
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Independent variables
Structural ties:
Product adaptation
Human asset specificity
Logistical adaptation
Interpersonal ties:
Cultural knowledge
Cultural adaptation
Two-way communication
Moderators
Centralization
Formalization
Levels of
inclusiveness
Size
History with
organization
Figure 5.2: Conceptual model
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Dependent variable
Relationship
dissolution
6. Research design and methodology
6.1 Research design and limitations in cross-sectional design
With respect to ontological assumptions, we lean to Cook and Campbell (1979). This view
does not presuppose a comprehensive explanation of all the causal forces that produce a
particular outcome, nor is it intended to establish sufficient and necessary causes. Further, the
approach favors a process of falsification, although it recognizes that the observations made in
test situations are not theory-free and that the researcher has not conceptualized all the
relevant alternative theories. Additionally, it emphasizes attempts to achieve knowledge by
pitting causal hypotheses not against other explanatory or descriptive theories but against
mundane nuisance factors, which suggest that an observed relationship may not be causal or
may involve different constructs than those in which the researcher is interested. The
conception of cause thus precludes an essentialist explanation and settles for an investigation
of probabilistic causal connections (Cook and Campbell, 1979, Troye, 1994). Further, we
employ a hypothetic-deductive method as research strategy. This approach builds on existing
research in order to develop the conceptual model and hypotheses.
In this research we adopted a cross-sectional design with a quantitative approach
conducted in a field setting. Further, our study is theory testing research; consequently
internal validity is of great concern. Internal validity refers to whether the study is robust
enough to infer causal relationships between the variables (Cook and Campbell 1979, Troye,
1994).Cross-sectional designs in natural settings are, however, weak designs with respect to
theory testing. This is because researchers cannot manipulate independent variables and
control for confounding factors. Furthermore, in field studies it is difficult to establish the
order of events, such as the causal direction of theoretical variables, among other factors since
statistical correlation does not demonstrate causation (Meehl, 1990). Therefore, in cross-
sectional field studies researchers must establish the time sequence, or causal direction, on a
theoretical and logical basis (Troye, 1994). Experiments are thought to be superior in order to
ensure internal validity, because researchers have greater controlover third variables that
threaten valid inference making (Cook and Campbell, 1979). External validity, i.e. whether
causal relationships found in one study can be generalized across persons, settings and times,
is nonetheless of equal interest for researchers. External validity is difficult to achieve in
experiments due to low representativeness in samples and the reactive arrangements in
research procedures (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). By increasing heterogeneity
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of samples and realism researchers sacrifice controlover rival explanations and the possibility
of making unambiguous inferences (Cook and Campbell, 1979). Nevertheless, external
validity is considered vital in our research since cross-sectional designs carried out in natural
settings 1 allow researchers to make statistical inferences to broader populations and permit the
generalization of findings to real-life situations.
To sum up, both internal and external validity are critical in the study, therefore
concerns regarding both heterogeneity and homogeneity of the sample population are
important issues when elaborating the sampling strategy. With regard to our sampling strategy
we acknowledge a trade-offbetween 1) the aim to acquire variation with regard to variables in
the model, and 2) to control for extraneous variables (Cook and Campbell, 1979). Further, we
used two methods in order to control for extraneous variables: 1) physical control, and 2)
statistical control. Physical control concerns arrangements in the survey instrument or data
collection procedures that ensure that e.g. all companies possess similar properties with
respect to extraneous variables. Alternatively, extraneous variables can be included in the
model as a control for alternative explanations', and can be statistically controlled (Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, Troye, 1994).
6.2 Choice of empirical setting
We selected one specific industry or business setting, the seafood industry. In consequence,
potential confounding factors related to particular industries and businesses' were excluded.
Further, the empirical context should fulfill certain main criteria set by theory; more
specifically variables included in the conceptual model should manifest themselves in the
empirical setting to varying degrees (Troye, 1994, Wathne, 2001). Business relationships
between French buyers and suppliers worldwide constitute the level of analysis in the study.
Below, we argue for the appropriateness of the empirical setting and the focal business
relationships. Likewise, physical and statistical methods employed in order to control for
extraneous variables are accounted for in this study.
Relationship-specific investments at both interfirm and interpersonallevels are critical
variables in the study. It is therefore of great importance that specific investments are likely to
l Additional arguments favoring natural settings are: 1) cross-national business relationships are complex social
phenomena, and hence difficult to replicate realistically in a laboratory and 2) the main theoretical variables of
interest in the study are dynamic, social phenomena and typically the result of long-term evolvement, hence not
possible to test within limited time intervals in experiments.
2 For example, variables likely to correlate with independent and dependent variables, or either independent or
dependent variables, should be included in the model as controls (Wathne, 2001).
3 Such as industry specific norms and practices, legal restrictions and requirements, product specificities and
market factors etc.
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exist in the chosen dyads. Building business-ta-business relationships is considered to be
quite complex, time and energy consuming. Cross-national dyads are presumed to be even
more complex to establish and to maintain since both cultural differences and geographical
distance create additional challenges (Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998, Nakata and
Sivakumar, 2001, Shenkar, 2001). These factors are thought to increase the amount of
boundary spanning (Thomas, 1991), as are efforts with respect to cultural adaptation and
communication. In consequence, it is likely that there is a need to make specific investments
at both levels in the chosen dyads in order to overcome exchange complexity and cultural
barriers. The French seafood industry was selected as the empirical setting. The seafood
industry today is generally characterized by globalization of markets and production. France
represents one of the largest seafood markets in Europe. Further, French buyers mainly
depend on imports and typically apply a global sourcing strategy to ensure supply (Produits
de la Mer, 2004). The purchasing activity of French buyers therefore implies dealing with
geographically and culturally distant business partners. In the questionnaire design, key
informants (buyer reps) were asked to select suppliers that originate from either a Nordic
country or a non-European country in order to ensure some geographical and cultural distance
between the dyadic partners 4•
Closely related to the phenomenon of specific investments is the long-term orientation
of the dyadic partners. Although high volatility in resources and price to some degree
discourage the use of specified long-term contracts in the seafood industry, long-term
relationships are nevertheless seen as beneficial by the actors. The seafood industry is
additionally characterized by a number of uncertainty factors, such as variation in availability,
lack of stable supply and extreme perishableness, and long-term business relationships are
thought to diminish uncertainty (Nilssen, 1994, Pettersen, 1998). Further, today' s fish markets
have an increased focus on quality requirements and traceability. Moreover, there is a growth
in the amount and kinds of brands related to fish products, including private labels, industrial
brands, Quality labels, and collective brands (Produits de la Mer, 2004). The above industry
and market characteristics would indicate that relationship-specific investments at both levels
are necessary in dyadic exchange.
4 With respect to this criterion some exceptions were made to avoid the canceling of established interviews.
Specifically, a number ofbuyers in the south imported largely from Spain. Scotland and Holland were also
important supplier countries for buyers up North. Cluster analysis however supports our assumption of cultural
distance among France and the included countries. According to Ronen and Shenkar (1985) indications from
cluster analysis suggest the Latin European cluster can be subdivided into two groups: France and Belgium and
Spain and Italy. In several studies the Germanic and the Nordic countries are differentiated (appear in different
clusters) from France (Ronen and Shenkar, 1985).
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The likelihood of dissolution of business relationships, or more specifically in this
study buyers' exit intention and tolerance of conflict, are principal variables in the study.
Selection bias, different forms of dependency, and restrictions with regard to relationship
termination, should therefore be excluded or controlled for in the research design. In the
questionnaire key informants were asked to select the second or thirdmost important supplier,
in order to reduce selection bias (Ganesan, 1994, Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998). To
further ensure partners' independence, buyers were asked to select suppliers with whom they
had no financial ties other than the exchange of goods and services. Dependency was
controlled for by including variables that encompass dependency in the measurement
instrument, such as buyers' perceived availability of alternative partners and switching costs
with regard to the selected supplier.
6.3 Data-collection on the buyer side of the dyad
In the study the level of analysis is the business relationship while the level of data collection
is the buyer organization. Below, we discuss factors related to one-sided data versus dyadic
data. Further, we offer several arguments for adopting a buyer perspective.
In our study we aim to examine buyers' perceptions with regard to a number of variables.
Further, we acknowledge that these perceptions are naturally influenced by their business
environment, their position in the French market, the value chain for seafood products as well
as the global seafood industry. Suppliers worldwide with whom the French buyers are
connected are likely to have different perceptions on the same issues, influenced by their
specific environment and position in industry and markets. The purpose of the study is
therefore not to identify 'objective realities' in these business relationships, but to get insights
into French buyers' perceptions. Thus, with respect to the choice of collecting data only on
the buyer side we lean to Heide and John (1994) who argue that "...the relevance or
appropriateness of dyadic comparisons as an element of a measure-validation process may
depend entirely on the nature of the substantive hypothesis being examined" (1994:543).
When the phenomenon of interest is exit intention and tolerance of conflict, it is vital
to consider power relations (Sayer, 1996, Baker, Faulkner and Fisher, 1998), more
specifically, which dyadic partner is likely to make decisions regarding termination of
relationships. Buyers and sellers do not necessarily share the same perceptions with respect to
termination (Baker et al., 1998). Further, the risk of dissolution depends on who has the
power, the buyer or the seller (Baker et al., 1998). Generally it is presumed that when buyers
have the power, relationships are put at risk, while relationships are more likely to be
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continued when sellers possess the power (Baker et al. 1998). As asymmetric power relations
are assumed to be natural in market exchange, buyers and sellers may possess dissimilar
motives and means to enter into stable or unstable business relationships (Sayer, 1996, Baker
et al., 1998). Although power relations, motives and means held by organizational members
may differ across business contexts, we presume for this study that buyers most likely have
the power of decisions to terminate relationships. With respect to the phenomenon of exit
intention and tolerance of conflict we therefore consider it relevant to investigate buyers'
perceptions.
6.4 Definitions of population and sampling strategy
With respect to the data-collection in France, we defined the target population as follows: we
included actors in the seafood industry who were importers of fish products and had direct
contact with suppliers'. Actors we included in my sample were typically fish wholesalers",
seafood traders", and companies involved in salting and curing, canning, shrimp cooking,
filleting, and in the production of ready-cooked, dishes and value-added products'',
The data collection was conducted in three geographical clusters. The three following
regions/city regions were selected: Boulogne-sur-Mer, southern France (Marseille and
Montpellier) and Paris (paris centre and the Rungis market outside Paris). The major
population of the French seafood industry is covered within these geographical clusters"
(Produits de la Mer, 2004). In these regions, companies within the industry are physically
concentrated 'in clusters', around harbors, within industrial zones or within specific fish
markets. We refer to the total population of companies in these regions as the sample
population. The population of companies we obtained in the sample will be referred to as the
achieved sample.
5 Direct contact with suppliers is central since questions in the questionnaire require knowledge about suppliers.
6 In French: 'Mareyeurs'. These actors traditionally provided their supplies only from inshore fisheries, but with
today's reduced quotas, they increasingly import. We included wholesalers who were importers as well as
wholesalers.
7 In French: "negoce" or "negociant", These actors normally buy and resell to other customers. Sometimes they
are involved in repackaging of imported products, or they forward products to be filleted by order companies
before selling. Recently, a number ofnegotiators dealing with fresh fish invested in their own filleting
production equipment. Nevertheless, we define these actors as seafood traders and not processing industry. The
seafood traders often emphasized in discussions that they were not industrial ("pas industrieis"), thereby making
a distinction between their activity and others.
8 In French: « saleurs-saurisseurs, conserverie, cuisson de crevettes, filetage, fabrication de plats cuisines et
froduits elabores ».
The region of Bretagne is also an important area with respect to the seafood industry. I excluded this region
mainly because companies were not located in clusters such as e.g. Boulogne-sur-Mer, and would therefore
increase the costs of collecting data. In addition, the industry in this region is similar to Boulogne-sur-Mer, Le.
that they equally import from the North Atlantic, possess the same mentality, culture), and would not increase
the representativeness of my sample population.
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By including the three abovementioned regions in the sample population, we increased
the heterogeneity in my sample population, and hence increased external validity with respect
to the target population (Calder, Philips and Tybout, 1982, McGrath and Brinberg, 1983).
Companies located in northern France (Boulogne-sur-Mer) were to a greater degree oriented
towards Nordic suppliers, and in consequence imported fish species from the North Atlantic
(both fresh and frozen fish). Importers in the south (Marseille and Montpellier) were oriented
toward overseas supplier continents, such as Africa, Asia and Latin America. Consequently,
they imported warm sea fish species and mainly frozen products. Importers at the
international market of Rungis (outside Paris) were mainly seafood traders and positioned in
the fresh fish market. Companies located in the centre and periphery of Paris, however, were
more oriented towards frozen products. Therefore, the representativeness of the sample is
increased by including three different geographical regions. This sampling strategy is
consistent with the model of deliberate sampling for heterogeneity, suggested by Cook and
Campbell (1979:75).
Within regions there were also some differences among companies with respect to
activities, type of product (species or frozen versus fresh fish), and regarding supplier origins.
In addition, the above aspects of heterogeneity ensured variation in the sample population
with respect to the included variables concerning organizational dimensions: organization
size, centralization, formalization and levels of inclusiveness. The sampling strategy therefore
ensured sufficient heterogeneity in the sample population in order to obtain external validity.
To conclude, with regard to the sampling strategy we adopted a deductive process in
order to examine internal validity threats'? as well as to ensure variation in the sample. The
main purpose of the sampling strategy was therefore to maximize the three-homed dilemma
of generalizability, precision and realism (McGrath, 1982).
6.5 Data collecting strategy
6.5.1 Using personal interviews to collect data
Personal interviews were employed to collect data. A number of reasons underlie the choice
of this data collecting strategy. First, the questionnaire was considered too lengthy to use mail
questionnaire designs or telephone methods. Second, we assumed ex ante that difficulties
J<Xelevant factors were e.g. the inclusion ofboth wild fish and farmed fish suppliers in the survey. Delivery of
farmed fish is assumed to be more stable and easy to plan, which is not the case with wild fish, and could affect
the structure and the organization of the buying process (e.g. formalization and centralization). With respect to
the relationship between environmental uncertainty and organizational structure, there are inconsistent findings,
thus no strong relationship is found in the literature (McCabe, 1987). Both wild fish and farmed fish suppliers
were therefore included in the sample population.
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related to questions and instructions would require assistance when filling out the
questionnaire. Third, mail questionnaire designs are in general associated with low response
rates. The main focus of the personal interviews was to fill out a structured questionnaire.
However, the personal interviews allow both the interviewer and key informant to probe for
additional information and to clarify questions. Further, the researcher has greater control
over the interviewing situation, ensuring e.g. that key informants possess adequate knowledge
when answering questions!'. Additionally, personal interviews are assumed to increase
response rates since respondents who would not normally take the time to reply to an
impersonal mail questionnaire will often respond to a request for a personal interview'<.
Furthermore, personal interviews permit complementary collection of data, which may
include additional information about the key-informant, the company, and the working
environment. The interviewer situation also allows unstructured discussions related to
questions in the survey. This additional information may produce further insights into the
phenomena of interest, and hence increase the quality of data analysis (Frankfort-Nachmias
andNachmias, 1996).
A number of disadvantages are also related to conducting personal interviews
(Franfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). First, for reasons of economy and efficacy the
companies to be interviewed need to be located in clusters within specific geographical areas
(Wilson, 2003). Second, high costs are normally associated with personal interviews.
However, by organizing the data collection in four intensive fieldwork periods and by
conducting all the interviews myself lB managed to decrease the costs. Third, the possibility
for interviewer bias is always present when there is an interaction between interviewer and
key-informant, and reactivity is considered to be a possible threat of internal validity (Cook
and Campbell, 1979). I therefore acknowledge that there is always a tradeoff between
methods, but argue that the benefits of personal interviewing were greater than its assumed
weaknesses. Fourth, personal interviews are assumed to increase the lack of anonymity and
hence augment concerns of confidentiality (Franfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). With
respect to these issues I experienced that personal trust building by communication and by
physical presence largely decreased initial concern and worries with regard to this.
Il This was specifically useful in order to ensure that key-informants had sufficient knowledge of the research
phenomenon, which is a frequent methodological issue in interorganizational studies (Kumar, Stem and
Anderson, 1993).
12 Personal experience with data collection in the focal industry (from previous work and the present study)
supports this claim, and was indeed the case for the sample of interest. The fact that 1 came all the way from
Norway and asked for 30 minutes ofattention increased people's motivation to participate in the research
project.
13 With respect to personal experiences related to the data collection 1prefer to use "I" instead of"we".
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6.5.2 Key informant methodology
Key informants in the study were mainly purchasing agents and general managers in the
buyer organization. The key informant method comprises a collection of information about
organizations and business relationships in question by using selected knowledgeable
organizational members. The key informants are usually selected because of their role and
position in the company, and because they possess knowledge and experience about e.g.
specific business relationships. They are expected to report on business-related phenomena
and patterns of behavior in a global fashion. Therefore, it is presumed that the informant
avoids reporting on more personal relations and evaluations connected to the phenomena
(Seidler, 1974).
The key informant methodology may possess some weaknesses, such as informant
bias and random error". Using multiple informants is one strategy in order to increase the
reliability and validity of reports (Kumar, Stem and Anderson, 1993, Heide and John, 1994).
However, several problems are connected to multiple informant methodology, such as the
selection problem and the perceptual agreement problem (Kumar et al., 1993). In addition, the
literature offers inconsistent findings and cannot say that multiple informant methodology
always is better (Heide and John, 1994). With respect to my study, the selection problem is
highly relevant. Knowledgeable key-informants for my study normally occupy positions such
as the purchasing agent or the general manager. Since we also include small and medium-
sized businesses (in addition to large ones), the number of organizational members having
these positions is limited 15. Although the key informant method has received some criticism
lately (Kumar et al. 1993), this method is the most frequently used in the field of interfirm
marketing relationships (Kumar et al. 1993, Heide and John, 1994). One explanation for this
practice is the number of advantages related to this method. The key informant method allows
a measure to be specifically created to reflect a theoretical construct, which is not the case
with archival methods. Further, global measures (reported on by key informants) are superior
for measuring unit-level constructs (Roberts, Hulin and Rousseau, 1978) compared to
composite measures'". This is because they are directly linked to the focallevel, and hence do
not entaillevel-related ambiguity and confusion such as aggregated data (Klein, Dansereau
14 Relevant problem issues are; memory failure related to retrospective accounts, social desirability bias and
attributional bias etc. (cfKumar, Stern and Anderson 1993).
15!nmany companies only one person was in charge of purchasing. Additionally, purchasing agents were often
on business journeys abroad visiting suppliers, which also reduced the number of available informants. Heide
and John (1990) also experienced the selection problem and concluded that the distribution ofknowledge in the
context in question made an intrafirm multiple-informant validation strategy virtually infeasible.
16Measures that are constructed byaggregating measures at the individuallevel
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and Hall, 1994, Rousseau, 1985). Last, key informant reports are highly efficient compared to
composite measures, because a single statement from one individual suffices to measure
theoretical constructs (Heide and John, 1994).
Key-informants who participated in the research had the following characteristics
(N=96): 65,6% were general managers equally responsible for purchasing activities, 25%
were purchasing agents, and 9,4% other functions, 12,5% were women and 87,5% men. With
respect to education levels, 35,4% had secondary schoollhigh-school, 28,1% had A-
levelslhigh-school diploma +2, and 36,5% had more than /high-school diploma +2. The age of
key-informants varied: 27,1% was up to 40, 35,4 % were between 40 and 50, and 37,5%
above 50 years (descriptive statistics).
6.6 Data collection procedures
6.6.1 Translation of the questionnaire
All measurement scales were initially developed in English. In order to conduct the survey in
France, a translation of the questionnaire was necessary. With respect to translation of my
instrument from English to French, the back translation procedure was employed. This
procedure is commonly used in cross-cultural research (Brislin, 1976, Cavusgil and Das,
1997). In back translation, a researcher prepares the measurement instrument in one language
and hands it over to a bilingual who translates it into another language. Then, a second
bilingual translates the instrument blindly back into the original language. As a result the
researcher possesses two versions of the instrument in the original language and can evaluate
the quality of the translation. Moreover, the back translation technique has the benefit of
"decentering", i.e. the process H ••• by which one set o/materials is not translated with as little
change as possible into another language. Rather, the material in one language is changed so
that there will be a smooth, natural-sounding version in the second language" (Brislin, 1976:
222). As a result, the idiosyncrasies of each language add to the final version of the
measurement instrument. Furthermore, quality assessment of the translated version is
enhanced ifthe researcher knows the target language (Brislin, 1976).
The translation of my instrument from English to French was carried out by two
bilingual French and English speaking colleagues'", In addition, I know the target language
17 Isabelle Prim-Allaz (Associate professor at the University of Lyon) translated the questionnaire from English
to French, and Moheb Deif (Post-doc at the University of Bologna) translated the French version back into
English.
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French and could therefore make a proper judgment of the final French version of the
questionnaire. Both questionnaires are included in Appendices.
6.6.2 Sample population and sources
The sample population was drawn from two different sources: 1) the Seafood Sector Guide
for Boulogne-sur-Mer in France (2001-2002l8, 2) The Seafood Directory France -200i9. In
source 1) all kinds of seafood related companies located in Boulogne-sur-Mer were registered.
The guide also offered useful information about the companies, such as the name of the
general manager and purchasing manager, the number of employees, business sales, activities,
trading area, products on sale and address, telephone and fax number. Source 2) included all
kinds of seafood related companies in France. This directory offered useful company related
information, such as the name of the general manager and purchasing manager, the activities,
trading area, products on sale, and the address, telephone and fax number. Information given
in the sources was useful for including relevant companies for the study. Since I conducted
personal interviews, the location (exact address) of the companies was critical to the
organizing of the data collection.
6.6.3 Procedures to schedule personal interviews
Obtaining personal interviews with relevant and knowledgeable individuals in business
companies is laborious and time-consuming (Wilson, 2003). The data collection was
organized in four intensive fieldwork periods, two in Boulogne-sur-Mer, one in southern
France, and one in Paris. Preparations for each intensive fieldwork commenced approximately
two weeks before departure. The following procedures were employed.
First, I sent by fax a presentation letter in French introducing myself and my doctoral
project. In this letter I notified them that I would be calling them in a few days to schedule a
personal interview for a specific period of time. Few companies, however, responded to this
presentation letter (for example by saying yes, I am welcome or no, we don't have time to
receive you). Therefore, the next step was to call the companies and mention the presentation
letter. Although, the sources (list of companies) provided some information about the
companies in order to select relevant companies, some were excluded from the initial sample
18 In French: « Filiere produits de la mer - Boulogne-sur-Mer» (published by Boulogne-sur-Mer Seafood
Promotion Department).
19 In French: « Produits de la Mer. Annuaire 2002 » (published by the business newspaper: «Produits de la
Mer »).
64
population after the first telephone contact because they did not fulfil the inclusion criteria (cf.
6.4). In addition, a number of companies were excluded for the following reasons: the
company was owned by a foreign supplier firm, the company did not exist as an independent
unit anymore (because ofmergers and acquisitions) the company had their buying department
outside the region (consequently the purchasing manager was out of reach), the firm was
practically the same as one other or other companies, i.e. only legally independent units (these
related companies usually had only one buying department). The process from initial sample
population to achieved sample is accounted for in section 6.7.
Normally, when calling the companies, it took some time to access the right person
(the general manager or purchasing manager), because they were either on the phone, in a
meeting or traveling. Therefore, I usually spent 1 to 2 weeks calling companies to establish
interviews before each fieldwork period. I also contacted companies, by phone and by
personal visits to schedule additional interviews. Personal visits typically increased the
likelihood of obtaining interviews. The practical feasibility of personal visits was however
larger in Boulogne-sur-Mer than the other regions because of the distance among the
companies and time constraints. This is one factor that explains the higher response rate for
the city region of Boulogne-sur-Mer. I also experienced that key informants helped me to
obtain interviews with other companies by referring me to them as a personal contact.
Considerable effort lay behind each personal interview obtained.
6.6.4 Procedures to conduct personal interviews
The personal interviews were carried out as follows: I presented myself and my research
project and asked the key informant to fill out the questionnaire, preferably while I sat in front
of the key-informant (thus having the possibility to closely follow how they answered the
different questions). Although most key informants had minor problems filling out the
questionnaire, a number of them needed small explanations and confirmations that they were
doing it correctly. In order to obtain further insights into the phenomena of interest, I asked
key informants why and how questions related to a number of issues. For example, if the key
informant reported low values for supplier product adaptations, I would ask if these low
supplier investments for product adaptations created problems for the buyer, and eventually
why. Further, ifthey reported high degree offormalization related to buying tasks and method
of handling conflicts and disagreements I would ask why and how these activities usually
were carried out. This additional information was handwritten during the interview, and
rewritten properly the same evening. During the fieldwork periods I also wrote down thoughts
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and reflections inspired by discussions with key informants. Key informants used between 20
to 40 minutes to fill out the questionnaire. The interviews, however, lasted from 20 minutes to
two hours, depending on their willingness to elaborate on the various phenomena of interest.
Below, I describe the data collection in each of the geographic regions.
6.7 Data collection in three geographic regions
Data-collection and achieved sample in Boulogne-sur-Mer
From the initial list of 83 companies, 62 were included in the sample population of Boulogne-
sur-Mer according to the aforementioned inclusion criteria. From the sample population of 62
companies the achieved sample was 50, resulting in a response rate of 80,6%. With respect to
practical aspects of the data-collection, the logistical challenges were minor. The majority of
companies were concentrated in the industrial zone ('La Capecure') and within walking
distance. In order to visit companies located elsewhere I used a taxi2o• Because of the co-
localization of firms I could conduct up to five interviews per day. During my two stays I
visited respectively 22 companies in 9 days (pre-test) and 26 companies in 8 days.
Data-collection and achieved sample in southern France
The data collection in southern France was logistically challenging. I visited companies in
two city regions: Montpellier and Marseille. In Montpellier most companies were located in
the industrial zone of Frontignan (near Sete). From a list of24 companies 8 were excluded'",
thus the sample population consisted of 16 companies. Unfortunately, a number of companies
could not receive me because of an important seafood exposition in Brussels (3 companies).
There were also indirect effects of this exposition, since the personnel who stayed home were
quite busy. Additionally, the 8th of May was a holiday in France, which also increased the
amount of labor for this sector the other days. Other companies did not participate for other
reasons. Therefore, an unusually high number of companies (compared to previous
experiences) could not receive me. The achieved sample was therefore only 6 companies. For
this reason I spent only three days in this city area. Because of the data collection planned in
20 During my journey in Boulogne-sur-Mer (totalone month) I had a 'personal' taxi driver with whom I
socialized. He was earlier a fisherman sailing in the North Atlantic, and had a great deal ofknowledge about the
seafood industry in general as well as the local seafood industry. He offered interesting 'inside information'
about the industry and people in Boulogne-sur-Mer.
21 In contrast to the fish wholesalers in Boulogne-sur-Mer, few of the se were importers in this region, and
consequently did not have any direct contact with foreign suppliers. Their main supplies offish products came
from the coastal float and local fish auction markets: 'Les Criees'. This fact reduced the sample population in
this area. Coming from Boulogne-sur-Mer, where the majority offish wholesalers equally were importers, I
expected a greater number to be importers in the south as well.
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Marseille the next week, I could not postpone interviews to the next week. The final response
rate in Montpellier was 37,5%.
In Marseille the initial list of companies was 27, from which five were excluded
because they had no direct contact with suppliers. Further, I excluded one company because
the buyer unit was located in Monaco. Five companies did not have time to receive me. Thus
of 21 companies I obtained interviews with 16, which means a response rate of 76%. Due to
recommendations from a seafood importe?2 I socialized with in Boulogne-sur-Mer, I easily
obtained interviews with a number of companies in Marseille (a fact which probably
increased my response rate in this area).
With respect to practical, logistical aspects of the data-collection, the companies I
visited were to some degree concentrated, around fish harbors (Port-de-Bouc and Min de
Saumaty), industrial zones (rue Payan d' Augery) and the centre of Marseille (the old
harbourr". The other companies were located outside the city (Aix-en-Provence, Aubagne
and Pennes Mirabeau) and these visits represented some constraints with respect to the
number of companies I could reach in one day. In the Marseille region I visited a total of 17
companies in five days in spite of considerable logistical challenges, thanks to a well-
organized time schedule and good navigation on the road".
To conclude, for the area of southern France I obtained a response rate of 60% (37
companies in total and 22 interviews). Few companies demonstrated a negative attitude with
respect to participation in my research project on the phone. They mainly could not participate
because of practical reasons during the specific period. Expanding the stay therefore could
have heightened the response rate significantly. Unfortunately, time and financial constraints
did not allow this possibility.
Data collection and achieved sample in Paris region
The data collection in Paris was conducted at the International market of Rungis (south of
Paris) and in Paris centre and suburban areas. These different areas represented different
challenges with respect to companies and logistics.
Companies located at Rungis were mainly seafood traders. The seafood market is
operative during the night, thus most personnel start their workday late in the evening and
22 He was a personal friend with a number of seafood importers in southern France, and pointed out the
companies and persons he knew (from a list I presented) in order to help me to obtain interviews.
23 13 companies were located in these areas.
24 Thanks to a very good friend of mine who operated as my personal driver in southern France. Because of him I
manage to accomplish the data collection despite large logistical challenges.
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leave their office in the morning between 9 and 10 a.m. Usually the buying and selling are
completed by 7 o'clock in the morning. The companies' work schedule therefore complicated
my data collection, since their available time to receive me was restricted. However, despite
their limited time and tiring work a fairly large number of these companies were willing to
receive me (even at 7 o' clock after hours of work during the night!). Most of the interviews
were conducted between 7:00 and 12:00 in the morning. A small number of companies
however also worked in the afternoon (i.e. from 14:00 too 17-18:00 hours). The companies
were co-localized and it was possible to visit a number of companies in one day (e.g. 4, 5 in
one day). The co-localization also gave me the opportunity to conduct personal visits. From
an initial population of 42 companies, 12 were excluded, which resulted in a sample
population of 30. The achieved samplewas 13companies, thus a response rate of 43,3%.
Companies in Paris centre and the suburban area were mainly seafood traders and
processing industry. These companies worked during the day; interviews could therefore be
conducted both in the morning and in the afternoon. It was however difficult to obtain
interviews with these companies. A great number of companies exhibited a negative attitude,
and were not willing to receiveme25• The logistics were complicated and time-consuming in
this area. I used the underground (Metro), suburban trains, buses and taxis in order to visit
companies. To get from one section of Paris to another could take up to 2 hours. The
maximum number of companies I could visit in one day was therefore only 2 or 3. The initial
number of companies was 45, from which I excluded 9 firms, which resulted in a sample
population of 36. From this sample population the achieved sample was 11, which refers to a
response rate of 30,5%. In total, I ended up with 24 personal interviews in Paris centre and
suburban areas and at the International Market of Rungis a total sample of 66, referring to a
response rate of 36,4%.
To conclude, the achieved sample population from 4 journeys to France: Boulogne-
sur-Mer (2 journeys), southern France (MarseillelMontpellier) and Paris was 96 companies.
Below, an overview of the sample population and the achieved sample for each region is
presented.
25 The high non-response in this area might be a large city problem. People are stressed and less sympathetic than
people in small towns. In addition, these companies probably receive inquiries from students quite often since a
great number ofuniversities and business schools are located in Paris. A French research colleague of mine
experienced the same problem with companies located in Paris, and achieved a response rate of only 33%.
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Table 6.1: Data-collection in France-2003 - Sample and achieved population
Sample populatioDlAchieved sam
Boulogne-sur-Mer 62/50
Southern France 59,5%37/22
Paris 66/24 36,4%
In total 165/96
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58,2%

7. Measurement and operationalization
7.1 Construct validity
Construct validity is the most fundamental form of validity and refers to the extent to which
an operationalization measures the concept it claims to measure (Cook and Campbell, 1979,
Reve, 1985, Troye, 1994). Construct validity thus refers to whether there is a fit between the
theory level and the operational level. Does the data really measure what it intends to
measure? Further, to ensure meaningful, interpretable and generalizable results, construct
validity is a necessary condition. Construct validity includes four subforms of validity: face
validity, convergent validity, discriminant validity and nomological validity (Reve, 1985).
Face validity refers to intuitive equivalence between theoretical and operational
definitions of variables. Conducting exploratory studies, using expert evaluations and
studying existing empirical studies are methods in order to assess face validity. Moreover,
multiple measures and multiple methods are advocated in order to ensure construct validity
(Cook and Campbell, 1979, Reve, 1985). By multiple measures one refers to the
operationalization of constructs by several dimensions or traits. In the study all constructs are
measured by multi-item measures except two control variables and two moderator variables.
Multi-item measures, multiple measures and multiple methods allow the researcher to test
construct validity by analyzing convergent and discriminant validity. Convergent validity
refers to whether there is a correspondence between multiple measures or methods.
Discriminant validity concerns the extent to which a construct differs from another construct.
Nomological validity describes the fit between obtained data-patterns and the theoretical
predictions about such data-patterns (Cook and Campbell, 1979, Reve, 1985). In Chapter 8,
we use factor analysis to test convergent and discriminant validity in the study. To ensure
construct validity in the study we followed the recommended procedures (cf. 7.3) that involve
specifying the domain of the construct, generating a sample of items, and purification of
measures (Churchill, 1979).
7.2 Measurement of interorganizational phenomena and level issues
The majority of constructs or phenomena investigated in the social sciences are not subject to
direct measurement or observation. Most of the constructs are latent and must be inferred
indirectly from other indicators (Kumar, Stern and Anderson, 1993, Heide and John, 1994,
Troye, 1994). When developing research frameworks measurement issues therefore are vital.
In interorganizational research scholars are confronted with additional problems since objects
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whose attributes are subject to measurement normally exist at multiple levels, and frequently
at a higher level than that of organizational members (Heide and John, 1994). Within the
interorganizational field, theoretical constructs typically involve properties of organizations
and interfirm relationships. These higher-order units are thought to possess particular
properties, which exist independently from the organizational members composing them
(Spekman and Stem, 1979, Heide and John, 1994). Further, problems are connected to the
development and administration of appropriatemeasures since higher order units typically are
measured by collecting data from individuals.
Furthermore in the field of interorganizational research, analogies from individuals to
higher-level units are frequently drawn (Blois, 1999). These analogies from lower-level units
to higher-level units are rarely questioned or theoretically justified. One reason for this
practice could be that theoretical constructs (e.g. trust and commitment) are drawn from
research fields where the level of analysis is the individual or relationships between
individuals (and not individuals operating within firms or in business dyads). When aligning
one construct from the individual level to the organizationallevel, researchers should specify
how they translate from individuals to organizations in order to avoid theoretical confusion
(Iacobucci and Ostrom, 1996,Doney and Cannon, 1997,Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998).
For instance, it is likely that interpersonal trust and interfirm trust would differ as a
phenomenon.
It is therefore vital to specify theoretically meaningful constructs at interpersonal and
interorganizational levels respectively. Consequently, in the process of measurement and
operationalization we specify the level of theory. Further, constructs at different levels are
theoretically accounted for'. Moreover, when developing the measurement scale the wording
of items is in harmony with the level of theory'. In accord with Robert, Hulin and Rousseau
(1978), Rousseau (1985), and Klein et al. (1994), I employ global measures' when measuring
unit-level constructs (such as properties of organizations, departments, and interorganizational
relationships).
I For example, we specify relationship-specific investments at interorganizational and interpersonallevels that
are theoretically meaningful at these levels. In accord with Iacobucci and Ostrom (1996) we argue that structural
differences among dissimilar business relationships (e.g. firm-to-firm, individual-to-individual, and individual-
to-firm) modify the nature of dyads, such as their relational characteristics, and further what kind oftheoretical
constructs that are meaningful.
2 For example, I use the word supplier firm when referring to the firm, and supplier rep when referring to the
individual. Further, I use we when referring to the buyer firm and Iwhen referring to the buyer rep.
3 Global measures refer to methods for measuring relationship properties in a direct or global fashion. Content
analytic approaches and key-informant approaches represent the main global methods. Composite approaches
measure properties ofunit-Ievel constructs in an indirect way by aggregating individual measures (Heide and
John, 1994).
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7.3 Operationalization and measurement
The process of measurement or operationalization involves "rules for assigning numbers to
objects to represent quantities of attributes" (Churchill, 1979:65). This definition includes the
idea that it is the attributes of objects that are measured and not the objects themselves. With
regard to specified rules for the process of measurement, we have been inclined to use the
framework provided by Churchill (1979). 1) Specify the domain of the construct, which
includes a thorough description of what is included in the definition and what is excluded. In
order to conceptualize constructs and specify conceptual domains, we carried out a
comprehensive literature review. When available and adequate for the study we used existing
measures. Existing scales used in previous research were checked for unidimensionality,
internal consistency and reliability of the measures, ensuring measures having Cronbach's
Alpha well above the 0,7 criterion suggested by Nunnally (1978). When possible new
measures in the study were developed based on conceptual dimensions drawn from the
literature. 2) Generate a sample of items, which capture the conceptual domain specified in
the study. When generating items a combination of an inductive and deductive approach was
employed. Reviews of the literature, discussions with colleagues" as well as extensive reading
of available context related information' (e.g. business newspapers) was effected in order to
generate relevant items. In order to verify the relevance and the clarity of the items, we
conducted a pre-test of the questionnaire among 22 French buyer firms in Boulogne-sur-Mer.
Only small modifications of the items were made as a result of the pre-test, and the test firms
were included in the final sample. Face validity of measures was consequently tested by
consulting literature, colleagues and practitioners. Below, we explain the procedures related to
the process of measurement or operationalization for all variables.
7.4 Dependent variables
Relationship dissolution - How to study relationships dissolution?
In the relationship dissolution literature, studies are either retrospective in character, or tend to
deal with hypothetical relationships (Duck, 1982). The use of retrospective reports in
dissolution studies is considered problematic however. Several reasons underlie this position.
In personal relationships for example, one assumes a considerable post mortem attributional
activity, regarding retrospective explanations and analysis for both the relationship and the
4 Judgment and ideas from these colleagues represent some form of experience survey (Churchill, 1979) since
they have extensive knowledge with regard to measures within the theoretical field as well as the focal industry.
5 I primarily read the French business newspaper, "Produits de la Mer", dealing with the French seafood industry
and the French market in particular and in general the seafood industry worldwide.
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dissolution. The abovementioned aspects of relationship dissolution are significant, and are
"...recognized tacitly in the objections that are sometimes raised against retrospective
reports of relationship dissolution" (Duck, 1982:27). The reports may mirror retrospective
biases, idealization and self-interest.
Researchers investigating relationship dissolution between business actors also address
problems with retrospective reports (e.g. Ping, 1993, Wathne, Biong and Heide, 2000, Prim-
Allaz, 2000). Respondents being asked questions ex post about their behaviors related to a
terminated business relationship might introduce retrospective biases, due to lack of memory
about the relevant factors and considerations. More seriously, social desirability biases may
be introduced, to the extent that respondents would rationalize their actual choices (Wathne,
Biong and Heide, 2000). Further, non-response problems are reported in dissolution research
using retrospective approaches, since business actors typically are not willing to elaborate and
explain the reasons for leaving a relationship (ping, 1993, Prim-Allaz, 2000).
In order to avoid the abovementioned problems related to retrospective reports with respect to
dissolution we opted for behavioral intention variables. Further, we intended to treat the
concept of relationship dissolution as a continuous variable. The study therefore aims to
measure intentions to dissolve.
Exit intention
We prefer Ping (1993, 1994, 1995, and 1999)6 with respect to conceptual definition,
conceptual domain, and operational definition and items in order to measure buyer firm' s
intention to dissolve relationships or in Pings wording intention to exit. The conceptualization
taps the degree of intention to discontinue the relationship with the current partner. In the
study, intention to exit is operationalized as the propensity to terminate the current supplier
relationship. The intention to exit construct includes a number of activities preceding the act
of physically leaving a relationship, such as thinking of exiting, intending to search for
alternatives, and intention to exit. Physical exit is the last step in this sequence and involves
actually leaving the relationship.
The exit intention measure includes buyer firm' s consideration with regard to
continuation, replacement of the supplier and ending of the business relationship (Ping, 1994).
Some modifications were done with respect to the wording of items. We have used
systematically my firm is looking for a replacement supplier instead of Ping's systematic
wording (e.g. 1993, 1995, 1999) "I am looking for a ..." instead of "My firm is...", which
6 The author has defined the concept slightly differently in the mentioned studies, but the items are the same.
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produces by this wording of items confusion with respect to the level of analysis. The
anchors of the scale range from 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. The items are
listed below. The complete questionnaire in English and in French is included in Appendices.
1. Occasionally my firm will consider ending the business relationship to the supplier.
2. My firm is not likely to continue the business relationship with the supplier.
3. My firm will probably consider a replacement supplier in the near future.
4. My firm will probably stop doing business with my supplier in the future.
Tolerance 0/ conflict
Multiple measures and methods are advocated in order to cross-validate the results (Cook and
Campbell, 1979). In the study we have therefore included a hypothetical or prospective
element in order to measure buyer's tolerance of conflict related to a number of relevant but
hypothetical conflict issues. This measure is conceptually related to intention to exit since
informants are asked to what degree they would leave the current partner depending on
different conflict issues. Tolerance of conflict is further defined as the degree of intention to
discontinue the relationship with the current partner given conflict situations. By placing key-
informants in hypothetical but specific and relevant conflict situations we aim to measure
buyer's tolerance of conflict, or in other words to what degree they would resort to voice or
exit related to a number of conflict situations. Thus, prospective methods presuppose a view
of humans as thinking, strategizing social actors recognizing "...the role which imagination
and mental rehearsal plays in real social life" (Baxter, 1982:240). Acknowledging that
hypothetical situations cannot substitute recalled conflict experiences or actual interaction
behavior, prospective methods can nevertheless produce insights, which suggest what
situational factors could affect predictable strategy choices (such as exit) (Harre and Secord,
1973, Baxter, 1982).
In order to develop the measurement scale, and specifically identify relevant conflict
dimensions, we have drawn on existing studies from the market channel conflict literature
(e.g. Lusch, 1976a, Lusch, 1976b, Wilkinson, 1981) and an exploratory critical incident
study' (Keaveny 19958). The following conflict dimensions were identified as relevant for the
study: Product quality, Quantity, Delivery, Holding back information, Pricing, and Response
7 The critical incident technique is essentially a procedure allowing the collection of events or facts (positive or
negative) relatively important with respect to behavior, in specific situations. The procedure further permits
classification, using content analysis in order to define categories from a set of data. The technique should be
perceived as a set offlexible principles, adapted to the specific study (e.g. Keaveny, 1995, Perrien, Paradis and
Banting, 1995, Prim-Allaz, 2000).
8 The study aims to understand the determinants of customer's decisions to switch service providers. Questions
are: what critical events, combination of events, or series of events cause switching? The study included 500
service customers and resulted in more than 800 critical behaviors which caused switching. Further, these critical
incidents were classified into eight general categories, 8 causal variables (Keaveny, 1995).
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to failures. Items related to quantity and delivery were deleted in the measure validation
process (Chapter 8). Items presented below do not include the deleted items. The response
anchors are: 1= very likelyand 7 = not likely at all.
1. If this supplier occasionally delivers products of lower quality than our firm requires, we would
consider leaving the current partner.
2. If this supplier holds back information that could be useful to us, we would consider leaving the
current partner.
3. If this supplier demands too high prices, we would consider leaving the current partner.
4. If this supplier occasionally does not respond in order to correct failures, we would consider leaving
the current partner.
Extendedness of relationship
Extendedness of a relationship is defmed as the degree to which the parties anticipate the
relationship will continue into the future with an indeterminate end point (Heide and Miner,
1992). The more strongly a party expects that a relationship will continue in the future and
that its end point is indeterminate, the higher is the extendedness of that relationship. A
relationship's level of extendedness thus reflects the strength of the expectation that it will
continue indeterminately. The scale is adapted from Lusch and Brown (19969). The anchors
are 1= strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. The items are presented below.
1. We expect our relationship with this supplier to continue a long time.
2. Renewal of the relationship with this supplier is virtually automatic.
3. Our relationship with this supplier is enduring.
4. Our relationship with this supplier is a long-term alliance.
This dependent variable was included to function as a control analysis compared to exit
intention and tolerance of conflict that are assumed to reflect perceptions of dissolution.
7.5 Independent variables
Belationship-specific investments at the interorganizationallevel
The interorganizational literature provides various measures in order to capture the construct
relationship-specific investments (e.g. Anderson and Weitz, 1992, Bensaou and Anderson,
1999). In this section we focus on relationship specific investments at the interorganizational
level. Measures found in the literature vary according to the number of dimensions included,
and the degree of context specificity. With respect to my study and the specific industry we
identified, the following dimensions regarding relationship-specific investments are relevant:
product adaptation, human assets specificity and logistic adaptation. With regard to the
degree of context specificity, the product adaptation scale and the logistical adaptation scale
9 Their scale is adapted from Noordewier, John, and Nevin (1990) and Heide and Miner (1992)
75
are highly adapted to the industrial context, while the human assets specificity scale is more
general in character.
Further, in the study buyer perceived relationship-specific investments as well as
buyer perception of supplier relationship specific investments were measured. When relevant
we formulated identical items for both buyer and supplier relationship-specific investments,
such as the scale measuring human assets specificity. With respect to product adaptation and
logistical adaptation, items varied to some degree between buyer firm and supplier firm
because the partners were involved in different activities due to their position in the value
chain.
Productadaptanon
In order to develop the product adaptation scale we resorted to the interorganizational
literature (e.g. Anderson and Weitz, 1992, lap and Ganesan, 2000), empirical research
examining distribution channels for farmed salmon (Haugland and Reve, 1994, Haugland,
1999), an exploratory study conducted in the seafood industry (Pettersen, 1998), as well as
extensive reading of the French business newspaper, "Produits de la Mer". Prior empirical
studies from the same industry provided only items measuring supplier's relationship-specific
investments. For the study relevant items for buyer firms have been equally developed. In the
study both suppliers delivering both farmed fish and wild fish were included in the sample.
Because of differences related to the 'production' activities lO of the final product, two
separated scales were developed, one for farmed fish and one for wild fish. Ex post data-
collection these two scales were combined in data analysis.
Conceptual definition is the degree to which the product is adapted to a specific firm.
The scale includes the following dimensions: specific investments in plant and equipment,
selection of specific fish farmers (farmed fish) or fishing boats (wild fish), specific fish
feedingmethods (farmed fish) or capture methods (wild fish), slaughter methods (farmed fish)
or technical improvements (wild fish), quality, traceability and method of packaging. The
multi-item scale consists of 7 items with anchors ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = to a large
degree. The items for both supplier scales and one buyer scale are presented below.
10 Farming activities for farmed fish and harvesting activities for wild fish.
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Supplier product adaptation scale
1. This supplier has made specific investments in plant and equipment in order to deliver fish to our
firm.
2. This supplier has chosen specific fish farmers/fishing boats as suppliers to our firm.
3. This supplier has invested in specific fish feeding methods/capture methods adapted to our firm's
requirements.
4. This supplier has made significant investments in slaughter methods/technical improvement aboard
adapted to our firm's requirements.
s. This supplier has made significant investments to provide fish of quality adapted to our
requirements.
6. This supplier has made specific adaptations ensuring that the fish is traceable according to our
requirements.
7. This supplier has made specific investments to adapt the method of packaging in accordance with
our firm's requests.
Buyer product adaptation scale
1. We have made specific investments in plant and equipment in order to take delivery offish products
from this supplier.
2. We have made specific investments in our processing methods to deal with fish from this supplier.
3. We have invested significantly in the method of handling fish from this supplier resulting in the best
possible quality.
4. We have invested a great deal to ensure the traceability of the fish delivered from this supplier.
5. We have made specific investments in the method ofpackaging dedicated to fish products from this
supplier.
6. We have invested a great deal to market fish products from this supplier.
Human asset specificity
The human asset specificity scale describes the degree of specific human knowledge
necessary for handling the business relationship with a specific partner firm. The scale
includes dimensions regarding investments in personnel, learning about the other firm, the
establishment of satisfying communication procedures, becoming familiar with the partner
and development of procedures and routines. The multi-item scale, which includes 5 items
(anchors 1 = not at all, 7 = to a large degree), has been adapted from Anderson and Weitz
(1992), Heide and John (1990), and Haugland (1999). The supplier scale is presented below.
In the buyer scale "We have made ..." is used instead of "This supplier ...".
1. This supplier has made a substantial investment in personnel dedicated to this relationship.
2. In cooperation with our firm, this supplier had to learn about our firm on many dimensions.
3. This supplier has put in a lot of energy in order to establish satisfying communication procedures
with our firm.
4. This supplier has put in a lot of effort in order to become familiar with our firm.
5. The supplier has developed procedures and routines that are dedicated to this specific exchange
relationship.
Logistic adaptation
The logistic adaptation scale describes the extent to which the logistic is adapted to the partner
In the literature, 10gistic1adaptations are frequently measured with a single item, often
Norges Bandelshøysko e
Biblioteket
77
included as one dimension in a general multi-item scale measuring relationship-specific
investments (e.g. Cannon and Perrault, 1999,Buvik and John, 2000, Jap and Ganesan, 2000).
The multi-item logistic adaptation scale in my study has been developed and adapted from
interorganizational research (Cannon and Perrault, 1999, Buvik and John, 2000, Jap and
Ganesan, 2000), and prior research within the same industry (Pettersen, 1998, Haugland,
1999). The scale includes investments regarding the terms of delivery, freshness/cold chain
requirements, volumes of fish to be delivered and punctual delivery. The multi-item scale
includes 4 items (anchors 1 = not at all, 7 = to a large degree). The supplier and buyer scale
items differ, therefore both are presented below.
Supplier logistic adaptation scale
1. This supplier has tailored his logistics systems to meet our firm' s requirements with respect to
terms of delivery.
2. This supplier has made internal adjustments in order to deliver fish in accordance with our firm's
freshness/cold chain requirements
3. This supplier has made significant adaptations in order to meet our firm's requests regarding
volumes of fish to be delivered.
4. This supplier has made extensive adjustments in order to meet our firm's requirements with
respect to punctual delivery.
Buyer logistic adaptation scale
1. We have adapted our logistical systems to meet the requirements of further distribution of fish
from this supplier.
2. We have made significant internal adjustments in order to take delivery offresh/frozen fish
from this supplier.
3. We have made significant adaptations in order to handle the volumes offish delivered from
this supplier.
4. We have made extensive adjustments in order to take punctual delivery of fish from this supplier.
Relationship-specific investments at the interpersonallevel
Research within the interorganizational literature has examined various measures related to
investments or bonds at the interpersonal level (e.g. Seabright et al., 1992, Doney and
Cannon, 1997, Nicholson, Comepeau and Sethi, 2001). With respect to this study of cross-
national buyer-supplier business relationships, we have specified the following dimensions of
interpersonal investments or adaptations as relevant: cultural knowledge, cultural adaptation
and two-way communication. The cultural knowledge and cultural adaptation scales were
developed based on dimensions drawn from the cross-cultural literature and two-way
communication was based on existing scales from the relationship marketing literature.
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Cultural knowledge
The cultural knowledge scale taps the degree of knowledge about France. The scale includes
the following dimensions: society and culture, norms and customs, and language. The scale
was developed based on dimensions drawn from the cross-cultural literature (Kale and
Barnes, 1991, Thomas, 1998, Bhawuk, Dharm and Brislin, 2000, Nakata and Sivakumar,
2001). The multi-item scale includes 3 items with anchors 1 = strongly disagree to 7 =
strongly agree. Only supplier rep cultural knowledge has been measured in the study. This is
because we assume a greater need for supplier reps to understand French society, culture and
language than vice versa since supplier firms and reps are obliged to adapt their export
activity to the French market. Supplier rep cultural knowledge is further associated with
general cultural competence about the partner's national culture and language, and hence
refers to a personal competence asset. This measure therefore has the character of being a
general-purpose measure (and not a relationship-specific measure unless the supplier rep
relates to only one French customer). The items are presented below (we use the term rep
instead of representative).
1. This supplier rep has good knowledge about French society and culture.
2. This supplier rep has a good understanding of French norms and customs.
3. This supplier rep speaks good French.
Cultural adaptation
The cultural adaptation scale describes the degree of capability and willingness to adapt
culturally to a partner firm 's rep. The scale consists of the following dimensions:
psychological mind-set, values and beliefs, way of negotiating, and the handling of
disagreements. The scale was developed based on dimensions drawn from the cross-cultural
literature (Peterson, Kameda and Shimada, 1981, Kale and Barnes, 1991, Simintiras and
Thomas, 1998, Schults, Evans and Good, 1999, Mintu-Wimsatt and Gassenheimer, 2000,
Bhawuk, Dharm and Brislin, 2000, Nakata and Sivakumar, 2001). The multi-item scale
includes 4 items with the anchors 1 = not at all to 7 = to a large degree. In the study both
supplier and buyer rep cultural adaptation is measured, and the supplier scale is shown below.
In the buyer scale "I have" is used instead of "this supplier representative ..."
1. This supplier rep has put a lot of energy into understanding my way ofthinking.
2. This supplier rep has invested much time into comprehending my values and beliefs.
3. This supplier rep has put a lot of energy into adapting to my way of negotiating.
4. This supplier rep has made an effort to become accustomed to my way of handling disagreements.
79
Two-way communication
In order to develop a communication scale relevant for my study, we gave preference to the
scales by Anderson and Weitz (1992) and Doney and Cannon (1997). The communication
scale taps degrees of partner 's capability and willingness for a two-way communication. The
scale encompasses dimensions including partner's willingness to maintain open and frequent
two-way interchanges on relevant issues, showing weaknesses and strengths, and to share
confidential information. The multi-item scale includes 4 items (anchors 1 = strongly
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Both supplier and buyer rep capability and willingness for a
two-way communication were measured in the study. The supplier rep communication scale
is presented below. The buyer rep communication scale differs as we use "I keep ..." instead of
"This supplier ..."
1. This supplier rep keeps us well informed about what is going on in their firm and related activities.
2. This supplier rep seeks our advice and counsel concerning their marketing efforts.
3. This supplier rep is willing to let us see their weaknesses as well as their strengths.
4. This supplier rep will share confidential information to help us.
7.6 Moderators
Organizational dimensions: Centralization and formalization
In the study the constructs centralization and formalization are connected to the buyer
organization!', more specifically at the buying department level". In accord with Rousseau
(1985) we argue that it is important to specify and to identify relevant and meaningfullevels
of measurement. It is vital to identify the organizational unit whose characteristics are
assumed to influence the behavior of purchasing agents. Within the buying group literature,
the above constructs are either associated to the task level (e.g. buying process) or at the
departmental or firm level (McCabe, 1987). In this study measures at both levels have been
developed and included in the questionnaire. The four constructs came out as distinct
constructs in factor analysis (see Appendix D). However, only the measure at the buying
department level was used further in the hypotheses testing':'.
11 Most studies within the interorganizationalliterature measure centralization and formalization at the
interorganizationallevel (e.g. Haugland and Reve, 1993, Haugland 1999).
12 However, I acknowledge the difficulty for informants to distinguish between the buyer group level and the
organizationallevel (Rousseau, 1985). Additionally, organizational size may influence the relevance of
distinguishing the two levels.
13 This is because I had to reduce the number ofvariables to run the models. Further, there were no large
differences between the two measures with respect to effects and correlations with the other variables.
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Formalization and centralization
Formalization taps the degree to which written plans, rules, policies, and procedures are
clearly stated and followed by an organizational member. At the departmental level
formalization is operationalized as the perceived degree to which tasks (e.g. buying tasks) are
formally prescribed by rules, policies and procedures required (Lau, Goh and Phua, 1999).
Centralization refers to the distribution of formal control and power within an
organization. At the departmental level centralization is operationalized as the degree to
which decisions with respect to tasks (e.g. buying tasks) are controlled and made by few
organizational members within higher hierarchical positions in the firm. The two scales were
adapted from Spekman and Stem (1979), McCabe (1987), and Lau, Goh and Phua (1999).
Only buyer firm perceptions with respect to formalization and centralization were measured
in the study. The multi-item scales consist of 4 items (anchors: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 =
strongly agree). A pretest of the questionnaire recommended a change in the formulation of
the two reversed items. Below are the items of the scales.
Formalization scale
1. In this department tasks are described by formal rules and written documents.
2. In this department we follow standard procedures when performing work activities.
3. In this department we follow standard operating procedures when making decisions.
4. In this department we follow written andlor verbal instructions in our work.
Centralization scale
1. In this department approval from someone higher in the organization is required for making
decisions.
2. In this department we follow instructions from someone higher in the organization when existing
rules and procedures are not adequate to make decisions.
3. In this department individuals (alone or a few together) cannot make decisions without consulting
members higher in the organization.
4. In this department individuals (alone or a few together) cannot resolve problems without consulting
members higher in the organization.
History with organization
History taps the length of time a company has done business with the current supplier firm. A
number of studies within the interorganizational field have investigated the theoretical
construct history. History has been measured in a similar way by Anderson and Weitz (1989),
Ping (1995), and Doney and Cannon (1997), by asking key informants to report on the length
oftime the company had done business with the current supplier. In my study I choose Ping's
(1995) wording with an open-ended question: How many years have you done business with
your supplier? The measure history with boundary spanner was equally included in the
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questionnaire'". The measure was however not included in data analysis since the formulation
ofmoderator hypotheses does not include moderator effects ofhistory with boundary spanner.
Levels of inclusiveness
Levels of inclusiveness refer H ••• to the proportion of the activity of a unit dedicated to or
involved in those of another unit" (House, Rousseau and Thomas-Hunt, 1995:89). More,
specifically, in my study levels of inclusiveness refer to the degree to which a boundary
spanner is dedicated to or involved in activities performed by other members in the
organization. To my knowledge the construct levels of inclusiveness have not been measured
in an empirical study, therefore a scale was developed for this study. The purpose of the scale
was to measure to what extent the purchasing agent is involved in other activities relevant for
the focal firm. The following activities were found relevant for the study: processing, product-
development and logistics. Further, key-informants were asked to indicate how often (1 =
never to 7 = always) they are involved with the abovementioned activities. The measure,
levels of inclusiveness, was measured with respect to buyer reps involvement only in the
buyer organization 15.
Size of organization
Various aspects of size of an organization can be relevant when the purpose is to measure an
organization's overall size, such as market share, position within an industry, business sales,
reputation, number of employees etc, (Singh, 1986, Doney and Cannon, 1997, Kuk, 2004). In
this study, size of organization refers to an organization's overall size, indicated by business
sales and the number of employees (e.g. Singh, 1986, Kuk, 2004). Key-informants were asked
to report on the number of employees, both full time and part-time employees, as well as the
buyer firms' business sales last year. In the study the two indicators of size were found to
correlate (.626**). Only the number of employees'? was used in further data analysis.
7.7 Control variables
In this research we controlled for dependence and overall satisfaction with supplier firm
performance. With regard to the phenomenon of dependence, buyer firm' s dependence on
14 With respect to history with boundary spanner we use the wording for the item by Doney and Cannon (1997):
For how many years have you been doing business with this supplier representative?
15 This restriction was done because the informant (buyer rep) is not expected to possess detailed knowledge
with respect to supplier rep's involvement in supplier firm activities.
16 Ex post data collection, we combined the number of part-time and full time employees in a new variable.
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their partner was assumed to create lock in situations where buyers may be forced to remain
in relationships despite recurrent problems. When buyer firms have invested substantially in
specific investments in a partner, they may be reluctant to leave because of the potentialloss
of resources invested in the relationship. The constructs availability of alternative partners
and switching costs reflect dependence in relationships between firms. These variables have
been found to affect business firms' probability to leave their current partners (ping, 1993,
Prim-Allaz, 2000). Buyers having few alternative suppliers would be reluctant to terminate
current supplier relationships because they are concerned about future supplies. Switching
costs also affect whether buyer firms are liable to leave their partners (Gassenheimer, Houston
and Davis, 1998).Dependence on a partner firm therefore causes buyer firms to remain in the
relationship, despite potential conflicts and dissatisfaction.
Moreover, buyer firm overall satisfaction with supplier firm performance is likely to
influence buyer firm exit intentions. In business dyads partners may be satisfied with some
aspects of the relationship, while dissatisfied with other aspects. Usually buyers evaluate the
overall satisfaction with supplier firm performance when making decisions whether to remain
in the current relationship or whether to search for a new supplier (ping and Dwyer, 1992,
Giller and Matear, 2001). Therefore, dissatisfaction with one aspect of the relationship does
not necessarily lead to termination. Consequently, buyers' perception of the overall
satisfaction with supplier firm performance is assumed to affect their decisions of leaving a
partner firm. Below, we present control measures employed in the research.
Availability of alternative supplier firms
The availability of alternative suppliers scale taps the degree to which a buying firm has
alternative sources of supply (Ladegård, 1997, Cannon and Perrault, 1999). In the study we
employed a one-item scale, and the wording of the item was adapted from Ladegård (1997): If
this supplier relationship is dissolved other firms can deliver what we buy from this supplier
(anchors: 1 = not true at all-7 = perfectly true). Moreover, I added a second question
concerning the number of alternative suppliers (given in 5 different categories: 1-2, 3-4, 5-9,
10-15 and 16-20). The two measures were correlated (.278**). In further data analysis only
the secondmeasure (with 5 categories) was used.
Switching costs
Switching costs refer to the cost of changing to an alternative partner. The operational
definition is the perceived cost and loss that would be required to terminate the current
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relationship and secure an alternative relationship (Heide and John, 1988, Ping, 1993, Ping,
1999). In the study we employed a global measure adapted from Ping (1999) including all
kinds of switching cost by means of a single item: Considering everything, the costs to stop
doing business with the current supplier and start up with the alternative supplier would be
high (anchors: 1 = strongly disagree - 7 = strongly agree).
Overall satisfaction with supplier firm performance
Supplier performance refers to how well a supplier firm carries out a number of activities. In
the study we measured buyer firms' perceived overall satisfaction with supplier performance.
Empirical studies have focused on different performance aspects and employed various
measures (e.g. Doney and Cannon, 1997, Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998, Cannon and
Perrault, 1999). In the study we included relevant supplier firm activities and supplier firm
related aspects, such as providing product quality, delivery, the management and workers, and
after sale services (anchors: 1 = needs improvement -7 = executes superior performance). The
four-item scale was adapted from Stump and Heide (1996) and Cannon and Perrault (1999).
T bl 71 S d tual d. fl .f" if t ta e . ources an conceptua e tmttons o eons rue s
Construct Conceptual definition
Exit intention Exit intention refers to the degree of intention to
Adapted fromPing (1993, 1994, 1995, 1999) discontinue the relationship with the current
partner
Tolerance of conflict
New, conceptual dimensions drawn from Lusch (1976a, Tolerance of conflict is defined as the degree of
Lusch (1979), Wilkinson (1981), and Keaveny (1995) intention to discontinue the relationship with the
current partner depending upon various conflict
situations
Extendedness of a relationship Extendedness of a relationship is defined as the
Adapted from Lusch and Brown (1996) degree to which the parties anticipate the
relationship will continue into the future with an
indeterminate end _point
Product adaptation
Developed and adapted from Anderson and Weitz (1992), Product adaptations refer to the degree to which
Haugland and Reve (1994), Pettersen ( 1998), Haugland, the product is adapted to a specific firm
(1999), Jap and Ganesan, (2000), and Produits de la Mer17
Human asset specificity Human asset specificity describes the degree of
Adapted from Heide and John (1990), Weitz (1992), and specific knowledge necessary for handling the
Haugland (1999). business relationship with a specific partner firm
Logistic adaptation Logistic adaptation describes the extent to which
Developed and adapted from Pettersen (1998), Haugland the logistic is adapted to the partner firm
(1999), Cannon and Perrault (1999), Buvik and John
(2000), and Jap and Ganesan (2000)
Cultural knowledge Cultural knowledge taps the degree ofknowledge
New, conceptual dimensions were drawn from Kale and about French society, culture and language
Barnes (1991), Thomas (1998), Bhawuk, Dharm and
Brislin (2000), Nakata and Sivakumar (2001).
17 French business newspaper dealing with the seafood industry
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Cultural adaptation Cultural adaptation taps the degree of capability
New, conceptual dimensions were drawn from Peterson, and willingness to adapt culturally
Kameda and Shimada (1981), Kale and Barnes (1991),
Simintiras and Thomas (1998), Schults, Evans and Good,
(1999), Mintu- Wimsatt and Gassenheimer (2000),
Bhawuk, Dharm and Brislin (2000), Nakata and
Sivakumar (2001).
Two-way communication Communication refers to the degree of capability
Adapted from Anderson and Weitz (1992) and Doney and and willingness for a two-way communication
Cannon (1997).
Formalization (department level) Formalization is defined as the degree to which
Adapted from Spekman and Stern (1979), McCabe (1987), written plans, rules, policies, and procedures are
and Lau, Goh and Phua (1999). clearly stated and followed by an organizational
member
Centralization (department level) Centralization refers to the distribution of formal
Adapted from Spekman and Stem (1979), McCabe (1987), control and power within an organization
and Lau, Goh and Phua (1999).
History with organization History with organization refers to the length of
Adapted from Ping (1995) time a company has done business with a partner
firm
Levels of inclusiveness Levels of inclusiveness are defined as the
New, conceptual idea from House, Rousseau and Thomas- proportion of the activity ofa unit dedicated to or
Hunt (1995) involved in those of another unit
Size of organization Size of organization refers to an organization's
Adapted from Singh, (1986) Kuk (2004). overall size, indicated by the number of
employees
Availability of alternative partners Availability of alternative partners taps the degree
Adapted from Ladegård (1997), Cannon and Perrault to which firms have alternative sources of supply
(1999)
Switching costs Switching costs refer to the cost of changing to an
Adapted from Ping (1999) alternative partner firm
Overall satisfaction with supplier firm performance Overall satisfaction with supplier firm
Adapted from Stump and Heide (1996) and Cannon and performance refers to how well a supplier firm
Perrault (1999) carries out a number of exchange activities
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8. Measure validation
Construct validity is the most fundamental form ofvalidity (Cook and Campbell, 1979, Reve,
1985). In this research project, mainly multi-item measures were employed, which allowed
construct validity to be tested by analyzing convergent and discriminant validity. Convergent
validity refers to whether there is a correspondence between multiple measures and methods.
Discriminant validity concerns the extent to which a construct differs from another construct
(cf. Chapter 6). In this study, factor analysis was used to assess convergent and discriminant
validity of measures. Further, Cronbach's Alpha was utilized to assess the reliability and
convergent validity of the construct measures.
8.1 Reliability
Reliability refers to the extent to which a variable or a set of variables is consistent in what it
intends to measure. When multiple measures are taken, measures that are consistent in their
values are reliable. Contrary to validity, reliability relates to the consistency of the measures,
whereas validity is concerned with how well the concept is defined by the measures (Hair,
Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1998). Three basic methods can be used to assess the reliability
of measurement scales: test-retest, internal consistency and alternative forms (Carmines and
Zeller, 1979). In this study, the normal procedure to assess internal consistency by using
Cronbach's alpha was employed. Cronbach's alpha is a measure ofreliability that ranges from
Oto 1, with values of 0.60 to 0.70 deemed the lower limit of acceptability (Hair et al., 1998).
To validate the measures, reliability analysis was run to estimate the item-to-total
correlation. To delete items we relied on low-item-to-total correlation, and related indications
of increased Cronbach' s Alpha after deletion. The exclusion of items was in addition
evaluated based on conceptual evaluations. All measurement scales, except levels of
inclusiveness (Cronbach's alpha of O, 6), exhibited satisfactory internal consistency with
Cronbach's alpha of above .76. The measure that described levels of inclusiveness has
however the character of being a causal or formative indicator, i.e. the correlations of items
was explained by factors outside the model. For this reason there were no recommendations
for the magnitude of correlations' (Bollen and Lennox, 1991). In the table below, Cronbach's
alpha for all measures is presented.
1 This measure is therefore not included in the factor analysis.
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Table 8.1: Reliability analysis
Measures Cronbach's Measures Cronbach's
Alpha Alpha
Supplier firm product 0.88 Buyer rep cultural 0.91
adaptation (ff) adaptation
Supplier firm product 0.84 Supplier rep two-way 0.85
adaptation (wf) communication
Buyer firm product 0.83 Buyer rep two-way 0.85
adaptation communication
Supplier firm human 0.87 Formalization 0.82
asset specificity
Buyer firm human asset 0.86 Centralization 0.93
specificity
Supplier firm logistical 0.88 Overall satisfaction 0.76
adaptation with supplier firm
performance
Buyer firm logistical 0.86 Intention to exit 0.84
adaptation
Supplier rep cultural 0.89 Extendedness of 0.88
knowledge relationship
Supplier rep cultural 0.86 Tolerance of conflict 0.80
adal'tation
ff= farmed fish, wf=wild fish
8.2 Procedures
We employed factor analysis to test for convergent and discriminant validity. To test for
discriminant validity, or in other words item-of-different-constructs divergence, several
analyses of groups ofvariables were run. Factor analysis was run for groups ofvariables. The
following procedures and specifications were done: 1) Alpha factoring", 2) varimax (the
method of orthogonal rotation'), and 3) replace with mean. Additionally, we ran factor
analysis with promax (the method of oblique rotation") to compare factor structures. In Alpha
factoring the number of factors that are retained was concluded by the criterion that the
associated eigenvalues shouldbe greater than 1 (Kim and Mueller, 1978:27).
First, the factor structure was examined by specification of eigenvalues'', thus adopting an
exploratory approach, i.e. we did not set any a priori constraints with regard to the number of
2 This method is based on the principle that factor loadings are determined in such a way that the common
factors extracted have maximum correlations with corresponding common factors assumed to exist in the
universe (Kaiser and Caffrey, 1965:5)
3 This is a factor rotation in which the factors are extracted so that their axes are maintained at 90 degrees. Each
factor is independent of, or orthogonal to, all other factors. The correlation between the factors is determined to
be O (Hair et al., 1998: 90).
4 This is factor rotation computes so that the extracted factors are correlated. Rather than arbitrarily constraining
the factor rotation to an orthogonal solution, the oblique rotation identifies the extent to which each of the factors
are correlated (Hair et al., 1998: 89).
S Criteria for addressing the number of factors that retain factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 when the
correlation (not adjusted) matrix is decomposed. (Kim and Mueller, 1978:43)
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factors extracted. Second, common factors were specified according to pnor theoretical
considerations, thus adopting a more confirmatory approach. We then compared the resulting
two pattern matrixes, and evaluated eventual differences (Kim and Mueller, 1978, Hair et al.,
1998). Exploratory and confirmatory approaches produced the same factor structure for all
groups of variables. Additionally, the orthogonal and oblique method produced the same
factor structure. In this chapter we only present the orthogonal (varimax) rotation method in
tables, while factor matrixes for the oblique method (promax) are included in Appendix D. In
the sections that follow we first examine independent variables, then dependent variables,
moderators and control variables.
8.3 Independent variables and factor structure
First, independent variables referring to various relationship-specific investments were tested
for discriminant validity. In the study, buyer reports on both supplier and buyer relationship-
specific investments were included. However, paired constructs, such as supplier and buyer
relationship-specific investments on the same phenomena typically correlated in dyads. This
is because reciprocity with respect to behavior is a common phenomenon in business
relationships (Macneil, 1980). For instance, when supplier reps make substantial investments
in the focal business relationship, expectations with regard to buyer rep investments naturally
would increase. Correlation analysis supported the assumption of reciprocity for the paired
constructs. Correlation analysis showed significant correlations for cultural adaptation
(.608**), two-way communication (.738**), product adaptation (.440**), human asset
specificity (.711 **), and logistical adaptation (.348**).
Because of expectations of reciprocity related to the empirical phenomenon and actual high
correlations between paired constructs we ran separate factor analysis for supplier and buyer
constructs respectively. First, however, we account for differences in symmetries (high cross-
construct factor loadings) between the paired constructs, and discuss eventual redundancy of
constructs.
Paired constructs and degrees of symmetry
Factor analysis revealed that some paired constructs exhibit higher symmetry than others.
When running factor analysis, some constructs loaded on the same factor and statistically
came out as the same construct, while others came out as distinct constructs, i.e. load on two
factors. Two-way communication and human asset specificity loaded on the same factor and
thus came out as the same construct (statistically), thus showing high symmetry. The other
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paired constructs appeared as distinct constructs, thus showing moderate and low symmetry.
One explanation for differences in symmetries may be that the measures two-way
communication and human asset specificity have identical items for both the supplier and
buyer side of the dyad. With the exception of cultural adaptation, product adaptation and
logistical adaptation had dissimilar items for supplier and buyer firm because of their different
positions in the value chain and related activities and responsibilities.
Additionally, dyadic partners may expect higher reciprocity with respect to some phenomena
compared to others. Discussions with key informants supported this presumption. Reciprocity
in e.g. communication is considered crucial, while there is lower expectation of reciprocity
with regard to e.g. product adaptation and logistical adaptation.
With regard to the measures two-way communication and human asset specificity
factor analysis provides empirical indications with regard to redundancy of construct
evaluations. According to Singh (1991) redundancy between two or more constructs has to be
evaluated from both conceptual and empirical perspectives. Within the conceptual perspective
a theoretically sound justification is required, i.e. to state that the constructs in question are
logically distinct conceptualizations or not. From the empirical perspective, empirical
observations, such as tests of discriminant validity, can indicate whether the constructs factor
analyzed are different constructs (Kim and Mueller, 1978, Singh, 1991). In accord with the
above recommendations, we kept human asset specificity (supplier and buyer firm) as two
distinct constructs, since conceptual evaluations and results from data analysis (Chapters 9
and 10) indicated these to be distinct constructs. Two-way communication (supplier and buyer
side) will be treated as one construct in further analysis (regression analysis in Chapters 9 and
10), since the communication between supplier and buyer rep can be seen conceptually as one
construct.
8.3.1 Factor structure and supplier variables
In Table 8.2 below we present all independent variables related to buyer perception of
supplier rep investments and supplier firm investments, including product adaptation", human
asset specificity, logistical adaptation, cultural knowledge, cultural adaptation and two-way
communication. The aforementioned procedures for factor analysis were employed and the
6 In the questionnaire two separate measures for product adaptation were included, for wild fish and farmed fish
respectively. In the sample I obtained only 18 questionnaires dealing with farmed fish. This fact constituted a
problem when running the factor analysis and therefore the measure product adaptations for farmed fish was
excluded in the factor analysis. The two measures are combined in further regression analysis.
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factor matrix with varimax rotation method is presented in tables. The pattern matrix
I
demonstratesa 6-factor solution, which is in accord with theoretical expectations.
Table 8.2: Factor structure and/actor loadings - independent variables - supplier
Measures Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6
Product Two-way Human asset Logistical Cultural Cultural
adaptation Communication specificity adaptation adaptation knowledge
ProwSal .671 .084 .251 .102 -.006 .107
ProwSa2 .779 .132 .084 .123 .001 -.087
ProwSa3 .712 -.060 .153 .093 -.074 .181
ProwSa4 .737 -.013 .218 .078 -.026 .125
ProwSaS .839 -.044 .233 .131 .054 .148
ProwSa6 .793 .097 -.129 .137 .127 -.122
ProwSa7 .727 .267 -.141 .166 .216 -.048
Ass6a1 .256 -.074 .621 .034 .062 .091
Ass6a2 .146 .411 .578 .313 .176 -.094
Ass6a3 .150 .195 .676 .216 .106 -.052
Ass6a4 .014 .226 .786 .292 .212 -.089
Ass6aS .082 .274 .654 .343 .211 -.162
Log7a1 .160 -.080 .186 .740 .163 .095
Log7a2 .153 .082 .399 .681 .063 .126
Log7a3 .217 .106 .254 .716 .242 .108
Log7a4 .258 .026 .116 .748 .286 .053
Frcu8al .083 .197 .017 .112 .132 .920
Frcu8a2 -.005 .304 -.136 .184 .067 .777
Frcu8a3 .107 .045 .008 .012 .106 .716
Cuad8bl -.054 .224 .157 .054 .825 .124
Cuad8b2 .024 .371 .161 .191 .673 .063
Cuad8b3 .101 .154 .175 .336 .694 .169
Cuad8b4 .107 .269 .120 .305 .725 .068
Com9a1 .103 .598 .083 .182 .210 .141
Com9a2 .086 .793 .126 .053 .170 .086
Com9a3 .081 .780 .254 -.040 .190 .187
Com9a4 .018 .676 .064 -.094 .185 .137
Extraction method: Alpha factoring
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization
In the factor matrix above, items belonging to specific constructs were found to load on the
same factor. Items belonging to product adaptation (wild fish) loaded on factor 1, human asset
specificity on factor 3, logistical adaptation on factor 4, cultural knowledge on factor 6,
cultural adaptation on factor 5, and two-way communication on factor 2, and all items-of-
same-construct exhibited high factor loadings. The 6-factor solution is satisfactory, and
discriminant validity of the 6 constructs is supported in the factor analysis. Additionally, the
factor analysis supports our conceptually-based specifications of relationship-specific
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investments at inter-organizational and interpersonal levels, since these measures appear as
distinct constructs.
8.3.2 Factor structure - buyer variables
In Table 8.3 below we present all independent variables related to buyer perception of buyer
rep investments and buyer firm investments, including product adaptation, human asset
specificity, logistical adaptation, cultural adaptation and two-way communication. The
aforementioned procedures for factor analysis were employed and the factor matrix with
varimax rotation method is presented in tables. The pattern matrix demonstrates a 5-factor
solution, which is in accord with theoretical expectations. In the factor matrix below items
belonging to the same construct were found to load on the same factor. Items belonging to
product adaptation loaded on factor 2, human asset specificity on factor 5, logistical
adaptation on factor 3, cultural adaptation on factor 1, and two-way communication on factor
4, and all items-of-same-construct exhibited high factor loadings. The 5-factor solution is
satisfactory, and discriminant validity of the 5 constructs is supported in the factor analysis.
Furthermore, measures at inter-organizational and interpersonal levels came out as distinct
constructs.
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Table 8.3: Factor structure and/actor loadings - independent variables buyer
Measures Factor 1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor 5
Cultural Product Logistical Two-way Human asset
adaptation adaptation adaptation Communication specificity
Pr05bl -.109 .639 .142 .035 .276
Pr05b2 .059 .769 .097 .057 .016
ProSb3 -.040 .848 .114 .025 .143
ProSb4 .150 .583 .223 .012 .184
ProSbS .130 .576 .127 -.039 .012
ProSb6 .388 .528 .143 .085 .143
Ass6b2 .309 .254 .181 .251 .579
Ass6b3 .279 .199 .081 .082 .791
Ass6b4 .405 .136 .168 .114 .755
Ass6bS .505 .241 .130 .156 .562
Log7bl .051 .272 .469 .070 .308
Log7b2 .082 .282 .836 .095 .025
Log7b3 .251 .281 .818 .051 -.003
Log7b4 .027 .071 .864 .092 .216
Adap8cl .755 .063 .009 .214 .346
Adap8c2 .785 .072 .003 .264 .208
Adap8c3 .773 .087 .161 .331 .245
Adap8c4 .660 .045 .252 .222 .179
Com9bl .309 .188 -.062 .684 -.040
Com9b2 .158 .016 .148 .669 .122
Com9b3 .116 -.056 .045 .909 .136
Com9b4 .256 -.020 .120 .694 .135
Extraction method: Alpha factoring
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization
8.3.3 Factor structure - dependent variables, moderators and control variable
Last we assess discriminant validity with regard to the dependent variables: tolerance of
conflict, exit intention, extendedness of relationship, and the moderator variables:
formalization and centralization, and last the control variable: overall satisfaction with
supplier firm performance. In the pattern matrix in Table 8.4 below, the expected 6-factor
structure assumed by theory was supported. Items belonging to extendedness of relationship
loaded on factor 1, centralization on factor 2, exit intention loaded on factor 3, formalization
on factor 4, tolerance of conflict on factor 5, overall satisfaction with supplier firm
performance on factor 6, and all items have high own-construct loadings. The factor analysis
indicates satisfactory discriminant validity for the constructs.
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Table 8.4: Factor structure and/actor loadings - dependent, control and moderator variables
Measures Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor 5 Factor 6
Extended - Centrali Exit Formalizat Tolerance Overall
ness of zation intention ion of conflict satisfaction of
relationship supplier firm
performance
Form13aI -.005 .134 .114 .646 .091 -.097
Form13a2 -.087 .064 -.022 .854 .050 .096
FormI3a3 -.007 .012 .023 .704 -.037 .070
Form 13a4 .155 .157 -.102 .740 -.000 .055
Cent13bI -.036 .913 -.024 .110 -.009 .125
Cent13b2 -.002 .798 .051 .175 -.067 .010
Cent13b3 .055 .935 .057 .064 .006 -.000
CentI3b4 .041 .864 .102 .039 -.072 .004
Exit18.l -.369 .056 .636 .129 .165 -.067
Exit18.2 -.235 .071 .728 .136 .135 .026
Exit18.3 -.288 .037 .615 -.050 .297 -.180
Exit18.4 -.169 .072 .814 -.160 .161 -.097
PerfI2.l .502 .001 -.133 .065 -.005 .445
PerfI2.2 .267 .121 -.052 -.197 -.082 .424
PerfI2.3 .153 -.049 -.008 .174 -.033 .688
PerfI2.4 .424 .143 -.166 .054 .054 .743
Exte19.l .857 .036 -.316 .055 -.042 .167
Exte19.2 .592 .039 -.128 -.108 -.089 .189
Exte19.3 .914 -.002 -.347 .064 -.038 .154
Exte19.4 .780 -.002 -.134 .061 -.083 .176
Tolc20.l -.179 -.084 .244 .016 .668 -.015
Tolc20.5 .004 -.167 .181 .080 .565 -.030
Tolc20.6 -.091 -.003 .090 .012 .620 .014
Tolc20.7 .047 .098 .018 -.009 .829 -.041
Extraction method: Alpha factoring
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization
Summary
Analysis of construct validity showed satisfying results. Reliability analysis revealed
satisfactory internal consistency for all measures with Cronbach's Alpha well above the
acceptable lower limit of 0,70. Factor analysis demonstrated discriminant validity for all
measures, with the exception of two-way communication and human asset specificity (cf.
8.3). In this chapter convergent and discriminant validity has been assessed, and the results
indicate high reliability and convergent validity for the included measures.
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9 Data analysis - Direct effects
In this chapter we present the hypotheses and test the direct effects of interpersonal and
interorganizational variables on the dependent variables. Multiple regression analysis is run to
test the hypotheses. In order to test the hypotheses we estimate separate models for
respectively interpersonal variables and interorganizational variables. Furthermore, the effect
of the independent variables is tested in separate models for each of the dependent variables
tolerance of conflict, exit intention and extendedness of relationship. Moreover, the findings
resulting from multiple regressions are presented and commented. Below, we formulate
hypothesespostulating direct effects.
9.1 Hypotheses postulating direct effects
Interpersonal variables
HI: Supplier rep cultural knowledge is 1) positively related to buyer firm tolerance of
conflict (HIa), 2) negatively related to buyer firm exit intention (Hlb), and 3)
positively related to buyer firm extendedness of relationship (H1c).
H2: Supplier rep cultural adaptation is 1) positively related to buyer firm tolerance of
conflict (H2a), 2) negatively related to buyer firm exit intention (H2b), and 3)
positively related to buyer firm extendedness of relationship (H2c).
H3: Buyer rep cultural adaptation is 1) positively related to buyer firm tolerance of
conflict (H3a), 2) negatively related to buyer firm exit intention (H3b), and 3)
positively related to buyer firm extendedness of relationship (H3c).
H4: Two-way communication' is 1) positively related to buyer firm tolerance of conflict
(H4a), 2) negatively related to buyer firm exit intention (H4b), and 3) positively
related to buyer firm extendedness of relationship (H4c).
Interorganizational variables
H5: Supplier firm product adaptation is 1) positively related to buyer firm tolerance of
conflict (H5a), 2) negatively related to buyer firm exit intention (H5b), and 3)
positively related to buyer firm extendedness of relationship (H5c).
1 This measure is a combination of supplier rep and buyer rep two-way communication (cf Chapter 8) and we
refer to this measure as two-way communication.
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H6: Buyer firm product adaptation is 1) positively related to buyer firm tolerance of
conflict (H6a), 2) negatively related to buyer firm exit intention (H6b), and 3)
positively related to buyer firm extendedness of relationship (H6c).
H7: Supplier firm human asset specificity is 1) positively related to buyer firm tolerance of
conflict (H7a), 2) negatively related to buyer firm exit intention (H7b), and 3)
positively related to buyer firm extendedness ofrelationship (H7c).
H8: Buyer firm human asset specificity is 1) positively related to buyer firm tolerance of
conflict (H8a), 2) negatively related to buyer firm exit intention (H8b), and 3)
positively related to buyer firm extendedness of relationship (H8c).
H9: Supplier firm logistical adaptation is 1) positively related to buyer firm tolerance of
conflict (H9a), 2) negatively related to buyer firm exit intention (H9b), and 3)
positively related to buyer firm extendedness of relationship (H9c).
HIO: Buyer firm logistical adaptation is 1) positively related to buyer firm tolerance of
conflict (HIOa), 2) negatively related to buyer firm exit intention (HlOb), and 3)
positively related to buyer firm extendedness ofrelationship (HlOc).
9.2 Interpersonal variables and direct effects
In order to test the hypotheses we estimated three models, one for each of the dependent
variables, Model 1 (Ml) for tolerance of conflict, Model 2 (M2) for exit intention and Model
3 (M3) for extendedness of relationship. Further, we conducted multiple regression analysis
to test the postulated relationships. In Table 9.1 below, the estimated coefficients and levels of
significance are presented. Collinearity diagnostics is given for each model (cf Chapter 10).
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Table 9.1: Interpersonal variables and direct effects
Dependent variables
Modell Model2 Model3
Tolerance of Exit intention' Extendedness of
conflict' relationship'
Beta (Sie. T) Beta (Sie. T) Beta (sie. T)
Independent variables
Supplier rep cultural -.165(.074)* .178(.065)* .034(.380)
knowledge
Supplier rep cultural .069(.309) -.165(.126)d .376(.004)***
adaptation
Buyer rep cultural -.035(.399) .256(.036)** -.200(.073)*
adaptation
Twoway .374(.001)*** -.210(.049)** .122(.l58)d
communication
R-squared .141 .063 .138
R-squared (adj.) .100 .019 .097
F 3.485 1.447 3.399
Sig (F) .005*** .113d .006***
*** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.10 (one-tailed)
Directional support: p>O.lOand p<O.l6
The overall goodness of fit for model Ml and M3 is satisfactory, while model M2 is
satisfactory within the directional support criteria. The explained variance is however lower
than we would expect with regard to M2. In accordance with postulated hypotheses, all
interpersonal variables are assumed to be positive with regard to tolerance of coriflict,
negative with regard to exit intention and positive with regard to extendedness of relationship.
In the following sections the effects of interpersonal variables upon the dependent variables
are presented and commented.
9.2.1 Direct effects of cultural knowledge
The fmdings showed that supplier rep cultural knowledge had a negative and significant effect
upon tolerance of conflict. This result is contrary to our expectations, and HIa received no
empirical support. Further, statistics demonstrate that this variable exerted a positive and
significant effect upon exit intention, which was equally contrary to our expectations since a
negative effect was postulated. Supplier rep cultural knowledge therefore demonstrated no
2 VIF values from 1.258 to 1.879, Tolerance values from .532 to .795
3 VIF values from 1.240 to 1.880, Tolerance values from .532 to .806
4 VIF values from 1.223 to 1.890, Tolerance values from .529 to .817
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positive impact upon exit intention, and HIb was not empirically supported. In consequence,
statistics in Ml and M2 indicate that supplier reps having low cultural knowledge are more
likely to be met by high tolerance of conflict and lower exit intention than supplier reps
possessing high cultural knowledge. With regard to M3 and extendedness of relationship,
supplier rep cultural knowledge showed a positive, but weak effect. Consequently, Hlc had
no empirical support. This finding indicates that the effect of supplier rep cultural knowledge
was minor compared to the other independent variables with regard to extendedness of
relationship.
9.2.2 Direct effects of supplier rep cultural adaptation
Supplier rep cultural adaptationhad a positive, but weak effect on tolerance of conflict (Ml).
Hypothesis H2a was therefore not empirically supported. The weak effect of this variable in
Ml may be due to multicollinearity problems and is explained in section 9.4. Further, supplier
rep cultural adaptation had a considerably high, negative effect with regard to exit intention
(M2). This indicates that high levels of supplier rep cultural adaptation lowered buyer firm
exit intention. The effect is in harmony with theory and H2b received directional support.' In
line with our expectations, supplier rep cultural adaptation demonstrated a positive and
significant effect on extendedness of relationship (M3), and H2c had empirical support. The
findings in M2 and M3 therefore underpin our theory, which postulates that supplier rep
cultural adaptation has a positive impact on the continuity of the dyad.
9.2.3 Direct effects of buyer rep cultural adaptation
Buyer rep cultural adaptation displayed a negative and weak effect on tolerance of conflict
(Ml). In addition to being weak, the effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation was contrary to
our directional expectations. H3a was therefore not empirically supported. The weak effect of
this variable in Ml may be due to multicollinearity problems and is explained in section 9.4.
Further, buyer rep cultural adaptation showed a positive and significant effect with
regard to exit intention (M2). This result is contrary to our expectations and H3b was not
empirically supported. In opposition to our predictions, buyer rep cultural adaptation had a
negative and significant effect on extendedness of relationship (M3). H3c therefore had no
empirical support. Statistics in M2 and M3 indicate that high levels of buyer rep cultural
adaptation had no positive impact on exit intention and extendedness of relationship. Rather
5 Variables with effects within the range ofp> 0, 10 and p<O, 16 are specified to have directional support in the
analysis.
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high efforts to adapt culturally, contributed to heighten buyers' exit intentions and to lower
relationship continuity. In Ml the effect of this variable is equally in the opposite direction
although the effect was weak. One explanation for the above results could be that buyer reps
that make substantial effort typically deal with problematical relationships. Hence, relatively
high transaction costs may be associated with maintenance in these business relationships. In
consequence, if buyer reps associate high levels of cultural adaptation with frustration and
unbalanced efforts, it is logical that this variable would neither contribute to heighten
tolerance of conflict nor lower exit intention. Some scholars have addressed this possibility
(e.g. Gassenheimer, Houston, and Davis, 1998, Vaaland, Haugland and Purchase, 2004).
However, this explanation does not harmonize with the above results showing that
supplier reps cultural adaptation efforts had a positive impact on relationship outcome. We
postulated a priori that efforts by both supplier reps and buyer reps would affect relationship
outcome positively. Correlation analysis equally showed that the two measures correlated
(0,608**), which is logical because of the typical norm of reciprocity in business
relationships. We are not aware of research that suggests divergence between supplier reps
efforts and buyer reps efforts. In Chapter 11.4 we discuss this issue in greater detail based on
qualitative data from the personal interviews.
9.2.4 Direct effects of two-way communication
In harmony with our postulated theory, results showed that two-way communication had a
positive and significant effect upon tolerance of conflict (Ml), and H4a had empirical support.
The measure tolerance of conflict included a number of critical events economic actors
typically confront in on-going supplier relationships, leading the informants to think in terms
of conflict solving with the current supplier firm. With respect to these critical events, two-
way communication is considered crucial, which was supported by the above statistics.
Further, two-way communication had a negative and significant effect upon exit
intention, and H4b was empirically supported. This finding indicates that high levels of two-
way communication lowered buyer firm exit intentions. With regard to extendedness of
relationship, two-way communication showed a positive effect. The effect is in harmony with
the expected direction, and H4c had directional support. This finding indicates that dyadic
communication has a lower impact on extendedness of relationship vis-å-vis exit intention
and tolerance of conflict.
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9.2.5 Summary
Supplier rep cultural knowledge demonstrated no positive impact on the dependent variables,
rather the opposite. High levels of cultural knowledge were negatively related to tolerance of
conflict and positively related to exit intention (significant effects in the opposite direction)
(Ml and M2). With regard to extendedness of relationship (M3), supplier rep cultural
knowledge displayed a weak effect. In Chapter 11.3 we develop an alternative model to
address effects of cultural knowledge.
Supplier reps' ability and willingness to adapt culturally had a positive impact on both
exit intention (M2) and extendedness of relationship (M3), while the variable displayed a
positive, but weak effect toward tolerance of conflict (Ml). These findings harmonize with
prior theorizing that proposed cultural adaptation efforts to increase the mutual understanding
between boundary spanners, thereby improving the functioning of the dyad. In consequence,
cultural adaptation lowered buyer exit intentions and increased relationship continuance.
Contrary to the postulated theory, buyer rep cultural adaptation showed no positive
impact on exit intention (M2) and extendedness of relationship (M3), while the effect with
regard to tolerance of conflict (Ml) was negative and weak. The statistics indicate that high
levels of buyer rep cultural adaptations efforts enhanced exit intentions and reduced
extendedness of relationship. To explain this result we propose this effort to be associated
with high transaction cost and possibly problematic relationships, which could increase exit
intention. However, further investigation is needed to explain the disparity in effect between
supplier and buyer reps efforts on the dependent variables. Additionally, the above
speculation regarding buyer rep efforts is equally contrary to central ideas in Transaction Cost
theory that predict buyers' (or buyer reps') own investments or efforts to create exit barriers.
In Chapter 11we discuss these issues further.
Results from all models (Ml, M2 and M3) show that two-way communication had a
strong and positive impact on the dependent variables. These findings indicate that supplier
rep and buyer rep ability and willingness for a two-way communication is crucial in cross-
cultural dyads. Further, the results showed that the effect of two-way communication was
strongly related to tolerance of conflict and exit intention. Statistics therefore underpinned
prior theoretical outlines apropos the conceptual closeness of tolerance of conflict and exit
intentions, i.e. responses to critical events and the ability and willingness to resolve conflicts
were highly associated to perceptions with regard to relationship dissolution.
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9.3 Control variables
In the models below we controlled for switching cost, availability of alternative supplier firms
and overall satisfaction with supplier firm performance. In Table 9.2, statistics show that the
overall goodness for all models increased." The explained variance (R-squared and R-squared
adjusted) increased for MIC (Ml and control variables), M2C and M3C. Further, the
significance level of M2C increased. Thus, the inclusion of the control variables increased the
explained variance of all models notably. Below, we inspect and comment changes in Beta-
coefficients for each model respectively.
Table 9.2: Direct effects of Interpersonal and control variables
Dependent variables
ModeilC Model2C Model3C
Tolerance of Exit intention" Extendedness of
conflict' relationship''
Beta (Si2. T) Beta (Si2. T) Beta (si2. T)
Independent variables
Supplier rep cultural -.287(.008)*** .215(.042)** -.066(.272)
knowledge
Supplier rep cultural .238(.061)* -.094(.279) .153(.142)d
adaptation
Buyer rep cultural adaptation -.038(.393) .157(.142) -.010(.469)
Two way communication .372(.003)*** -.191(.078)* .007(.478)
Switching cost -.027(.408) .071(.279) .052(.313)
Availability of alternative .081(.237) -.074(.265) .073(.244)
supplier firms
Overall satisfaction with -.103(.203) -.223(.045)** .513(.000)***
supplier firm performance
R-squared .210 .120 .320
R-squared (adj.) .135 .038 .256
F 2.811 1.468 4.979
Sig (F) .006*** .096* .000***
*** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.10 (one-tailed)
6 The exception is Ml C which had a minor reduction in significance level.
7 VIF values from 1.190 to 2.164, Tolerance values from .462 to .840
8 VIF values from 1.183 to 2.165, Tolerance values from .462 to .846
9 VIF values from 1.182 to 2.188, Tolerance values from .457 to .846
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Changes in MIC - Tolerance of' conflict
The negative effect of supplier rep cultural knowledge increased in significance level, yet, the
effect is still opposite to the theory. Further, the positive effect of supplier rep cultural
adaptation increased and became significant and H2a had empirical support. With regard to
direct effects of control variables on the dependent variable and directional expectations, we
expected switching cost to be positively related, availability of alternative supplier firms to be
negatively related and overall satisfaction with supplier firm to be positively related.
Direct effects of switching cost were low and negative, thus the direction was opposite
of what we would expect. Further, availability of alternative supplier firms had a low and
positive effect, which was as well the opposite of our directional expectations. Thus, negative
levels in switching costs and a large number of available supplier firms produced higher
tolerance of conflict among buyer firms, which was opposite to our theoretical expectations.
Last, overall satisfaction with supplier firm performance reduced buyer firms' tolerance of
conflict, which was equally opposite to what we would expect.
Changes in M2C- Exit intention
The positive effect of supplier rep cultural knowledge increased in significance level,
nevertheless, the effect remained opposite to theory. The negative effect of supplier rep
cultural adaptation was reduced and the effect no longer had directional support. The positive,
opposite effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation decreased and was within the directional
support criteria, yet showed an opposite directional effect. The negative effect of two-way
communication decreased in significance level but remained significant.
With regard to direct effects of control variables on the dependent variable and
directional expectations, we expected switching cost to be negatively related, availability of
alternative supplier firms to be positively related and overall satisfaction with supplier firm to
be negatively related. Both dependence variables showed low and opposite effects with regard
to exit intention, while overall satisfaction with supplier firm performance showed a negative
and significant effect, which was in harmony with expectations.
Changes in M3C- Extendedness of relationship
The effect of supplier rep cultural knowledge turned to a low and negative effect, contrary to
directional expectations. Further, the effect of supplier rep cultural adaptation decreased for
directional support. The negative and significant effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation
decreased to approach a zero-effect. Likewise, the effect of two-way communication changed
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from a positive effect that had directional support to a zero-effect. H4c therefore had no
empirical support in M3C.
With regard to direct effects of control variables on the dependent variable and
directional expectations, we expected switching cost to be positively related, availability of
alternative supplier firms to be negatively related and overall satisfaction with supplier firm to
be positively related. The statistics showed that switching cost had a weak and positive effect,
which was in harmony with expectations, while availability of alternative supplier firms had a
weak and positive effect, which was contrary to our expectations. Last, overall satisfaction
with supplier firm had a positive and significant effect on extendedness of relationship. This
finding indicates that this control variable had the greatest impact on extendedness of
relationship compared to the other independent variables.
Summary
Compared to the findings in Ml, M2 and M3 we observe some changes in effect levels. H2a
has empirical support in Ml C, compared to no empirical support in MI. H2b has no empirical
support in M2C compared to empirical support in M2. H2c has directional support in M3C
compared to empirical support in M3. Last, H4c has no empirical support in M3C while H4c
has directional support in M3. Overall, the inclusion of control variables contributed to
reductions in significance levels of the interpersonal variables.
With regard to the effects of control variables, switching cost and availability of
alternative supplier firms reflecting dependence in the business relationships, weak effects on
the dependent variables were revealed. The statistics therefore indicate that buyer firms'
perceived dependence toward the supplier firm had low impact on relationship outcome. In
Chapter 11.2 we offer alternative explanations for the observed weak effects of the
dependence variables. Overall satisfaction with supplier firm performance demonstrated a
positive impact (significant effects) on exit intention and extendedness of relationship. These
results indicate that supplier firms' general performance based on more general investments'?
was of great importance in these business relationships. General versus relationship specific
investments are discussed further in Chapter 11.2.
In Table 9.3 we present an overview of the findings of direct effects of interpersonal
variables and control variables on the dependent variables.
lOWecan infer this because the overall satisfaction with supplier firm performance measure included general
performance dimensions such as product quality and logistics, and not the extent to which these dimensions were
tailored to the specific customer.
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Table 9.3: Overview of findings - direct effects of interpersonal variables and control
variables
Dependent variables
ModellC Model2C Model3C
Tolerance of Exit intention Extendedness of
conflict relationship
Independent variables
Interpersonal variables
Supplier rep cultural HIa Hlb Hlc
knowledge No empirical No empirical No empirical
support support support
Sig. Sig.
Supplier rep cultural H2a H2b H2c
adaptation Empirical No empirical Directional
support support support
Buyer rep cultural H3a H3b H3c
adaptation No empirical No empirical No empirical
support support support
Twoway H4a H4b H4c
communication Empirical Empirical No empirical
support support support
Empirical support: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 (one-tailed)
Directional support: p>O.l Oand p<0.16 (one-tailed)
Sig. = Significant moderating effects contrary to expectations with regard to direction
9.4 Multicollinearity problems
Multicollinearity is likely to represent a problem in the models presented, although
collinearity diagnostics displayed acceptable tolerance measures. Direct effects of
independent variables on the dependent variables may be concealed because of
multicollinearity. In this research, the interpersonal variables were correlated to various
degrees. Correlation statistics showed that supplier rep cultural knowledge!' had a positive
and significant correlation with regard to supplier rep cultural adaptation (.274**12),and two-
way communication (.275**). Supplier rep cultural adaptation was highly correlated with
buyer rep cultural adaptation (.608**), and moderately with two-way communication
(.408**). Buyer rep cultural adaptation was significantly correlated to two-way
communication (.462**).
11 It is not logically sound that supplier rep knowledge correlates with buyer rep cultural adaptation, which is
supported by statistics (-.047).
12 One-tailed. Likewise for all correlation statistics presented in the analysis chapters.
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Besides, in this research we use the paired constructs supplier and buyer rep cultural
adaptation, which in accord with theory (e.g. Macneil, 1980) is presumed to correlate because
of the norm of reciprocity. Prior examination of these constructs (cf .. Chapter 8), however,
recommended us to treat them as distinct constructs. Parallel to the inspection of results, we
equally checked for multicollinearity problems. In the section below we check for and reveal
concealed effects in the multiple regressions.
Supplier rep cultural knowledge
With regard to Ml and tolerance of conflict, bivariate regression analysis revealed a positive,
but weak effect of supplier rep cultural knowledge on tolerance of conflict (t= .137, p>O.l O).
With regard to M2 and exit intention, bivariate regression analysis showed equallyapositive,
but weak effect of supplier rep cultural knowledge upon exit intention (t=.362, p>O, 10).
Bivariate regression analysis therefore did not reveal notably concealed effects that could
support our theory. In M3, bivariate regression analysis showed that cultural knowledge had a
positive and significant effect upon extendedness of relationship (t= 2.105, p<O, 05). Thus,
multiple regression analysis did to some extent conceal the direct effect of supplier rep
cultural knowledge, but only with regard to extendedness of relationship.
Supplier rep, buyer rep cultural adaptation and two-way communication
With regard to tolerance of conflict (Ml), multiple regression analysis revealed weak effects
of supplier rep and buyer rep cultural adaptation. First, we ran two separate multiple
regressions with supplier rep cultural adaptation and buyer rep cultural adaptation
respectively. Nevertheless, the effect of these variables did not increase with regard to
tolerance of conflict. When running bivariate regression analysis however, both supplier rep
cultural adaptation and buyer rep cultural adaptation revealed positive and significant effects
upon tolerance of conflict (t =1.580, p< 0.10, t =1.626, p< 0.10). Hence, in Ml, the effect of
supplier and buyer rep cultural adaptation on tolerance of conflict was to a large degree
concealed because ofmulticollinearity.
Bivariate regression analysis run for all interpersonal variables showed weak, non-
significant results with regard to exit intention (M2), demonstrating that all variables in the
multiple regression added explanatory power in the model.
With regard to extendedness of relationship (M3), bivariate regression analysis
showed a weak and positive effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation (t= .560, p> O.lO), which
was in accord with our directional expectations. Further, bivariate regression showed that
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two-way communication had a positive and significant effect on extendedness of relationship
(t= 2.173. p<O.OS), while in the multiple regression the effect of two-way communication
only lay within the directional support criteria.
To conclude, some effects were concealed in the multiple regressions. However,
multicollinearity is not equally problematic for all interpersonal variables and all models. On
the other hand, problems of multicollinearity may be difficult to avoid completely in business
relationship research. Constructs we deal with will naturally to some degree be conceptually
related since they all are associated with the empirical phenomenon we investigate. It is
however likely that multicollinearity problems arise when paired constructs are used in
multiple regression models, since these are highly correlated a priori. Conceptual cause-effect
associations between the independent variables are equally likely to produce multicollinearity.
In Chapter 11.3 we develop an alternative model to explore cause-effect relationships between
the interpersonal variables.
9.5 Interorganizational variables and direct effects
In this chapter we test direct effects of the interorganizional variables on the dependent
variables. In order to test the hypotheses we estimated three models, one for each of the
dependent variables, Model 4 for tolerance of conflict, Model 5 for exit intention and Model 6
for extendedness of relationship. Multiple regression analysis was conducted to test the
postulated relationships. In Table 9.4, the estimated coefficients and levels of significance are
presented.
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Dependent variables
Model4 ModelS Model6
Tolerance of Exit intention" Extendedness of
conflict" relationship"
Beta (Sie. T) Beta (Sie. T) Beta (sie. T)
Independent variables
Supplier finn product -.012(.464) .101(.224) -.005(.486)
adaptation
Buyer finn product -.102(.229) .020(.442) -.191(.074)*
adaptation
Supplier finn human asset .229(.104)d -.091(.306) -.105(.271)
specificity
Buyer firm human asset -.053(.372) .180(.135) -.070(.327)
se_ecificity
Supplier finn logistical -.046(.371) -.046(.369) .326(.008)***
adaptation
Buyer finn logistical -.026(.423) -.030(.410) -.108(.197)
adaptation
R-squared .027 .029 .1lS
R-squared (adj.) -.042 -.040 .051
F .392 .418 1.805
Sig (F) .441 .433 .054*
*** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.10 (one-tailed)
Directional support: p>0.10 and p<0.16 (one-tailed)
The overall goodness of fit for models M4 and MS was not satisfactory, while modelM6 was
satisfactory. Further, the explained variance was very low (R-squared) for M4 and MS.
Additionally, R-squared adjusted was negative in M4 and MS. The explained variance (R-
squared) was higher for M6, while R-squared adjusted was positive for this model. These
findings indicate that interorganizational variables exerted a lower impact on the dependent
variables than interpersonal variables, and this was particularly true with regard to tolerance
of conflict (M4) and exit intention (MS). In the following sections the results in each of the
models are presented and explained. In accordance with postulated hypotheses, all
interorganizational variables were assumed to be positive with regard to tolerance of conflict,
negativewith regard to exit intention and positive with regard to extendedness of relationship.
13 VIF values from 1.469 to 2.790, Tolerance values from .358 to .681
14 VIF values from 1.469 to 2.790, Tolerance values from .358 to .681
15 VIF values from 1.482 to 2.782, Tolerance values from .360 to .675
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9.5.1 Direct effects of supplier and buyer firm product adaptation
Supplier firm product adaptation showed a weak effect that approached a zero effect upon
tolerance of conflict (M4) and extendedness of relationship (M6). Further, this variable
exerted a moderate, positive effect on exit intention (MS), which was opposite to directional
expectations. Consequently, HSa, HSb and HSc had no empirical support.
Buyer firm product adaptation had a moderate and negative effect on tolerance of
conflict (M4), a weak effect on exit intention (MS) and a negative, significant effect on
extendedness of relationship (M6). The effect of this variable in both M4 and M6 was in the
opposite direction and thus contrary to our theory a priori. The presented effects ofbuyer firm
product adaptation therefore imply that H6a, H6b and H6c had no empirical support.
9.5.2 Direct effects of supplier and buyer firm human asset specificity
Supplier firm human asset specificity demonstrated a positive effect on tolerance of conflict
(M4), which was within the directional support criteria. Hence, H7a had directional support.
The same variable had a moderate, negative effect on exit intention (MS), showing the same
tendency as in M4, but the effect was not within the directional support criteria. With regard
to extendedness of relationship, the effect of supplier firm human asset specificity was
moderate, but positive, thus showing opposite effects. In consequence, H7b and H7c had no
empirical support.
Buyer firm human asset specificity had a negative and low effect on tolerance of
conflict (M4), a positive and moderate effect on exit intention (MS) and a negative, low effect
on extendedness of relationship (M6). Thus, the effect of this variable was in the opposed
direction with regard to all dependent variables. Hence, H8a, H8b, and H8c were not
empirically supported.
9.5.3 Direct effects of supplier and buyer firm logistical adaptation
Supplier firm logistical adaptation showed a negative, weak effect on tolerance of conflict
(M4) and exit intention (MS), while the effect was positive and significant with regard to
extendedness of relationship (M6). Thus, H9a and H9b had no empirical support, while H9c
had empirical support.
The effect of buyer firm logistical adaptation was negative and weak toward tolerance
of conflict (M4) and exit intention. Further, the effect of this variable was negative and
moderate toward extendedness ofrelationship, and hence opposite to our expectations. HIOa,
HIOb and HIOc therefore had no empirical support.
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9.5.4 Summary
The above presentation of results revealed few significant effects on the dependent variables.
We equally checked for multicollinearity in the models, since the independent variables
correlated to some degree. Nonetheless, bivariate regressions did not reveal any noteworthy
concealed effects. All interorganizationalvariables therefore seemed to add explanation in the
models.
Only supplier firm human asset specificity showed substantial positive impact upon
tolerance of conflict. The reason for this may be that the human dimension is inherent in this
variable. With respect to the resolution of conflicts the human dimension is presumed to be
important. Supplier firm human asset specificity had equally a positive, but lower impact
upon exit intention (MS). The similar tendency of this variable in M4 and MS may indicate
that the human dimension is important with regard to both tolerance of conflict and exit
intention.
Comparing Ml and M4, the results indicate that tolerance of conflict was to a greater
extent affected by interpersonal variables, specifically boundary spanners' communication
efforts. This is logical since the handling of critical events requires high levels of
communication. Further, the measure supplier firm human asset specificity had some
similarities with communication since the measure encompassed one item with respect to
'establishing satisfying communicationprocedures'. Further, the other items include: learning
about the buyer firm, becoming familiar with the partner, and developing procedures and
routines dedicated to the relationship. These efforts can be considered important when trying
to resolve disagreements and conflicts in the current relationship. It is therefore logically
sound that supplier firm human asset specificity exerted positive impact on tolerance of
conflict. Correlation analysis equally showed positive associations between supplier firm
human asset specificity and two-way communication (.38S**). Further, both variables were
positive with regard to tolerance of conflict, but only two-way communication displayed a
significant relationship (.3S2**), while supplier firm human asset specificity showed a non-
significant relationship (.099).
None of the interorganizational variables displayed substantial effects to reduce buyer
firm exit intention (MS). Only supplier firm human asset specificity showed a tendency in this
respect. Thus, high levels of specific investments compared to low levels of specific
investments did not seem to affect this dependent variable. In Chapter 11.2 we offer
alternative explanations of the low variation with respect to buyer firm exit intention.
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Only supplier firm logistical adaptation showed a positive and significant effect with regard to
extendedness of relationship. This result implies that supplier firm logistical adaptation is
crucial related to relationship continuity. Informants' accounts supported this result and
explained that supplier logistical adaptation is critical in particular for the delivery of fresh
fish. Dealingwith fresh fish increased the need for adaptations because fresh fish is perishable
and needs to be handled rapidly, either to be processed or to be sold quickly to customers.
Inferior logistical organization led to customer dissatisfaction and decreased profits.
Buyer firm logistical adaptation, on the other hand, showed an important negative
effect with regard to extendedness of relationship, which is opposed to our theoretical
postulations. This result indicates that supplier firms' efforts related to logistics were more
important than buyer firms' efforts. The reason for this can be due to supplier and buyer
firms' different positions in the value chain and thereby different activities and
responsibilities. In the seafood industry the supplier firm is typically in charge of the logistics,
although the buyer firm, or more correctly the buyer rep, is heavily involved in the planning
and coordination of the logistics. The levels of logistical adaptation are therefore likely to be
higher for supplier firms than for buyer firms, which were equally supported by mean
statistics. Statistics showed that the mean and standard deviation was: 14, 79 (7, 80) for
supplier firms, while the mean for buyer firms was: 10, 29 (7, 19). On the other hand, the
negative effect of buyer firm logistical adaptation can be due to (likewise as for buyer rep
cultural adaptation, cf. 9.2.3) problematic relationship and high adaptation cost but uncertain
outcomes (Gassenheimer, Houston and Davis, 1998).
To conclude, the above findings presented imply that interorganizational variables
exerted low positive impact on the dependent variables. The overall goodness of fit for
models 4 and 5 (tolerance of conflict and exit intention) was not satisfactory, while the fit was
satisfactory for model 6 (extendedness of relationship). Few significant effects were found.
Supplier firm human asset specificity had directional support with regard to tolerance of
conflict (M4), and supplier firm logistical adaptation had a significant effect with respect to
extendedness of relationship (M6). Below, we include control variables in the models.
9.6 Control variables
In Table 9.5, statistics showed that the explained variance (R-squared) increased for M4C,
MSC and M6C. However, despite the rise in explained variance, M4C and M5C remained
non-significant, while the significance level of M6C increased. Thus, the overall goodness of
fit for M6C was satisfactory, while the overall goodness of fit for M4C and M5C remained
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unsatisfactory. Below, we present and interpret changes In Beta-coefficients for
interorganizational variables and control variables.
T bl 9 5 D' t ifj ifL I d I . bla e . : tree e ects o nterorganizationa an contro vana es
Dependent variables
Model4C Model5C Model6C
Tolerance of Exit intention'" Extendedness of
conflict" relationship"
Beta (Sie;. T) Beta (Sie;. T) Beta (sie;. T)
Independent variables
Supplier firm product -.175(.112) .135(.172) -.099(.208)
adaptation
Buyer firm product -.064(.329) .014(.462) -.171(.083)*
adaptation
Supplier firm human asset .280(.069)* -.071(.353) -.142(.188)
specificity
Buyer firm human asset -.011(.474) .113(.252) .034(.407)
specificity
Supplier firm logistical -.068(.339) -.061(.354) .223(.058)*
adaptation
Buyer firm logistical -.007(.481) -.033(.405) -.034(.386)
adaptation
Switching cost .145(.131) .054(.338) .056(.304)
Availability of alternative .044(.364) -.031(.402) .015(.446)
suppliers
Overall satisfaction with .051(.348) -.148(.129) .474(.000)***
supplier performance
R-squared .064 .062 .326
R-squared (adj.) -.050 -.052 .243
F .561 .544 3.932
Sig (F) .412 .419 .000***
*** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * p < 0.10 (one-tailed)
Directional support: O, 10 to O, 16
Interorganizational variables and changes in effects in M4C, M5C and M6C
Supplier and buyer firm product adaptation increased substantially toward tolerance of
conflict (M4C). Yet, the effect remained in the opposite direction to our hypothesis. Supplier
firm human asset specificity showed an increase in Beta, and H7a had empirical support. In
M5C (exit intention), the effect of supplier firm product adaptation was lightly increased, but
16 VIF values from 1.244 to 2.768, Tolerance values from .361 to .804
17 VIF values from 1.244 to 2.768, Tolerance values from .361 to .804
18 VIF values from 1.257 to 2.761, Tolerance values from .362 to .796
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remained contrary to theory. With regard to M6C (extendedness ofrelationship), the negative
effect of supplier firm product adaptation and supplier firm human asset specificity increased,
and remained opposite to our expectations. The effect of buyer firm asset specificity became
positive, but was still weak. The positive effect of supplier firm logistical adaptation
decreased, but remained significant (lower significance level), and empirically supported H9c.
In M4, M5 and M6, moderate to large, opposed effects were observed. The inclusion
of controls additionally contributed to produce stronger opposing effects related to a number
of variables. The opposed effects of supplier firm product adaptation increased in all models.
Further, the opposed effect of buyer firm product adaptation remained quite large in both
M4C and M6C. Supplier firm human asset specificity had a stronger, negative effect in M6C.
Last, buyer firm human asset specificity remained considerable in M5C, while it increased in
M6C. To explain all the abovementioned opposed effects is difficult. InChapter 11.4 we offer
alternative explanations of the opposed findings of supplier firm product adaptation.
Summary
Besides raising the significance level of supplier firm human asset specificity in M4C, the
inclusion of control variables did not contribute to great changes in Beta relevant for the
support of our hypotheses. Overall, the presentation of the results reveals that the
interorganizational variables exerted low impact on the dependent variables. The overall
goodness of fit for models 4 and 5 (tolerance of conflict and exit intention) was not
satisfactory, while the fit was satisfactory for model6 (extendedness ofrelationship). Further,
the findings display few significant effects. Supplier firm human asset specificity had
empirical support with regard to tolerance of conflict, while supplier firm logistical adaptation
had empirical support with respect to extendedness of relationship. Hence, only two of 16
hypothesized relationships received empirical support. These weak findings require further
speculation. In Chapter 11.2 we present additional and alternative explanations. An overview
ofthe findings is given in the Table 9.6 below.
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Dependent variables
Model4 ModelS Model6
Tolerance of Exit intention Extendedness of
conflict relationship
Independent variables
Supplier firm product H5a H5b H5c
adaptation No empirical No empirical No empirical
support support support
Buyer firm product H6a H6b H6c
adaptation No empirical No empirical No empirical
support support support
Supplier firm human asset H7a H7b H7c
specificity Empirical No empirical No empirical
support support support
Buyer firm human asset H8a H8b H8c
specificity No empirical No empirical No empirical
sU0'0rt sUI>l'_ort su_pport
Supplier firm logistical H9a H9b H9c
adaptation No empirical No empirical Empirical
support support support
Buyer firm logistical HIOa HIOb HIOc
adaptation No empirical No empirical No empirical
support support support
*** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.10 (one-tailed)
Directional support: O, 10 to O, 16
9.7 General discussion of findings
Direct effects - interpersonal and interorganizational variables
Supplier rep cultural adaptation efforts showed significant impact on both exit intention and
extendedness of relationship in the model without control variables, while the same variable
exhibited a significant effect toward tolerance of conflict, a negative, moderate effect with
regard to exit intention, and a positive effect within the directional support criteria toward
extendedness of relationship in the models with controls. Even though not all effects were
significant they were in accord with the postulated direction. Hence, supplier reps' cultural
adaptation efforts are important in the cross-national dyads, since they contribute to increase
tolerance of conflict, reduce exit intention and enhance extendedness of relationship.
This result suggests that supplier reps' efforts by adapting to the cultural foreign
partner reps' psychological mind set, values and beliefs, way of negotiating and the handling
of disagreement played a role in these dyads. By adapting culturally, supplier reps
demonstrated their empathy and understanding with the partner rep and showed cultural
flexibility. This adaptability with respect to the partner rep is presumed to increase their cross-
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cultural coping skills, and thereby improve the functioning of the dyad. According to the
results, interpersonal relationships and investments therefore can represent a counterforce to
cross-national differences in dyads (Luo, 2001). In consequence, culture can be considered a
dynamic phenomenon that can be dealt with by individuals' efforts (Kim, 1988, Thomas,
1998,Bhawuk, Dharm and Brislin, 2000).
Further, this finding indicates that supplier rep cultural adaptation efforts were of
greater importance than buyer rep cultural adaptation (cf. below). This can be explained by
the fact that supplier firms export seafood products to the French market and in consequence
need to learn from and adapt to the French partner, who possesses expertise on specificities
concerning the French market and customer requirements. Supplier reps ability and
willingness to adapt therefore is presumed to increase market and customer product
adjustments. Further, according to the results, buyer firms appraised the cultural adaptation
efforts undertaken by supplier reps in the sense that these efforts affect their long-term
orientation (affect positively the dependent variables).
Two-way communication showed significant effects toward tolerance of conflict and
exit intention. This result supported our contention that these dependent variables are
conceptually close, i.e. responses to current conflicts are presumed highly associated to
intentions with regard to relationship exit. Further, in accord with the literature the findings
indicated that communication is central with regard to conflict resolution (Borisoff and
Victor, 1998). In order to resolve conflicts communication is fundamental with regard to
assessment of the conflict, such as obtaining an understanding of the nature of and cause of
the conflict, as well as to find creative solutions for the problem, such as the appropriate
conflict-handling behavior. High levels of two-way communication therefore facilitate the
resolution of disagreements and disputes, such as the creation and search for remedies and
positive outcomes for both partners (Shapiro, 1988, Anderson and Weitz, 1992, Borisoff and
Victor, 1998).
Supplier rep cultural knowledge showed significant, opposite effects, in particular
toward tolerance of conflict and exit intention. This finding indicates that cultural knowledge
had no positive impact on the dependent variables. Even though this variable was highly
correlated with supplier rep cultural knowledge and two-way communication, notable
multicollinearity problems was only found with regard to extendedness of relationship (cf.
9.4). Cultural knowledge could however playa role in these dyads, but within an alternative
cause-effectmodel. In Chapter 11.3we run exploratory data analysis.
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Buyer rep cultural adaptation showed significant, opposed effects with regard to exit
intention and extendedness of relationship in the models without control variables. In the
models with controls, the variable showed important, opposed effect only toward exit
intention. Hence, this variable showed either weak or opposed effects. Buyer reps' cultural
adaptation efforts hence showed no positive impact in the cross-national dyads. Further, this
finding indicates that the effect of supplier rep versus buyer reps cultural adaptation efforts
diverged. Possible explanations for this finding are elaborated upon in Chapter 11.4.2.
Overall, interorganizational variables showed weak effects. Only two variables,
supplier firm human asset specificity and supplier firm logistical adaptation exhibited
significant effects in accord with theory, respectively toward tolerance of conflict and toward
extendedness of relationship. Further, some important, opposed effects were observed.
Supplier firm product adaptation showed notable, opposed effects toward all dependent
variables. Additionally, buyer firm product adaptation (significant effect) and supplier firm
human asset specificity exhibited effects contrary to theory. These opposed effects may be
due to confounding effects related to heterogeneity in the sample. In Chapter 11.4.3 we try to
explain some of these opposed findings.
The overall findings from the analysis of direct effects suggest that supplier rep
cultural adaptation and two-way communication had the strongest impact on the dependent
variables. Further, the above findings imply that specific investments at the inter-firm level
were of less importance in the investigated dyads. In Chapter 11.1 and 11.2 we discuss and
analyze further why interpersonal ties are important and why structural ties are less important.
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10. Data analysis - Moderating effects
10.1 Moderator analysis - procedures
Multiple regression analysis was conducted in order to test the hypothesized relationships
between the variables. In this chapter we aim to test the effect of moderators. A moderator
variable is presumed to affect the strength or the direction of the relationship between the
dependent and the independent variable (Baron and Kenny, 1986). The figure below
illustrates the method we used to analyze moderating effects. A variable is found to have
moderating effects if the relationship reflected by arrow c is significant.
Independent variable
Dependent variable
Moderator variable
Independent variable x
Moderator variable
Figure 10.1: Moderator analysis (Baron and Kenny, 1986)
We centered the scales of the variables entering the interaction terms, in order to reduce
collinearity problems (Cronbach, 1986). Collinearity diagnostics displayed acceptable
tolerance values and VIF values (variance inflation factor) for all variables.' Tolerance and
VIF values were given associated to each model. In order to test moderating effects of
organizational and interorganizational dimensions we ran separate analyses for interpersonal
and interorganizational variables respectively. Further, several multiple regressions were
conducted with regard to moderators (group of moderators or one moderator). Later on in this
chapter we test moderating effects of organizational and interorganizationaldimensions on the
relationship between independent variables and the dependent variables and present the
findings, but first we explain conditions for empirical support of the moderator hypotheses.
l VIF and tolerance values indicate the degree ofmulticollinearity. The usual threshold for VIF values is 10.0
which corresponds to a tolerance value of 10%, i.e. collinearity does not explain more than 10 % of any
independent variable's variance. Tolerance values that approaches zero indicate that the variable is highly
predicted (collinear) with the other predictor variables. Further, the threshold for condition indices is usually in a
range ofl5 to 30, with 30 as the most commonly used value (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1998:220).
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10.2 The moderator hypotheses and conditions for empirical support
In a split file analysis' we explored whether interorganizational and interpersonal variables
exhibited differences in Beta-coefficientswith respect to direction and strength related to the
dependent variables in subsamples of the sample, i.e. in small versus large organizations,
young versus old business relationships, etc. This examination is critical before testing the
moderator hypotheses in multiple regressions since an implicit presumption lies behind the
formulation ofthe moderator hypotheses: interpersonal and interorganizational variables have
to exert a positive impact upon the dependent variables, i.e. increase tolerance of conflict,
reduce exit intention and increase extendedness of relationship. In the wording of the
hypotheses only the expected strength is explicitly postulated, whereas the expected direction,
negative or positive relationships is implicitly presumed. This basic assumption is critical with
regard to the interpretation of the statistics and consequently the theoretical implications of
the findings. Thus, when independent variables showed a negative impact with regard to
dependent variables in both subsamples, there was no theoretical meaning to include these
variables in the moderator analysis, even if the Beta-coefficients exhibited significant
differences in the subsamples.
In Chapter 9 we observed that a number of the independent variables displayed a
negative impact with regard to the dependent variables. It is therefore crucial to conduct a
systematic examination of independent variables and their effects in respectively small and
large organizations; low degreeversus high degree of formalization, etc. (each subsample), to
ensure that only independent variables that exhibited a positive impact with regard to the
dependent variables would be included in further analysis. More specifically, this examination
was done by dividing the sample into two subsamples and further to estimate the regression
model for each of the subsamples, including the estimation of Beta-coefficients and directions
as well as significant differences between Beta-coefficients in subsamples. The eventual
exclusion of independent variables from further analysis, multiple regressions where we test
the moderator hypotheses, is explained related to the statistics presented in each of the tables.
The inspection of the effect of independent variables in subsamples revealed significant
differences in Beta-coefficients for the majority of variables. However, a number of
independent variables showed a negative impact either in both or one of the subsamples.
Based on this inspection, variables that displayed a negative impact were excluded. Based on
this inspection of statistics, we formulated moderator hypotheses that included variables
2 This split file analysis is documented in Appendix F.
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showing a positive impact.' The inspection of independent variables and their effect III
subsamples is presented and discussed in Appendix F.
10.3 Hypotheses postulating moderating effects
Interpersonal variables and Organizational dimensions
HIl: The positive effect ofbuyer rep cultural adaptation on buyer firm tolerance of conflict
is stronger when 1) organization size is small (Hlla), 2) formalization is low (Hllb),
and 3) centralization is low (Hl le)
H12: The negative effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation on buyer firm exit intention is
strongerwhen 1) formalization is low (H12b), and 2) centralization is low (H12c)
H13: The positive effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation on buyer firm extendedness of
relationship is stronger when 1) organization size is small (H13a), 2) formalization is
low (H13b), and 3) centralization is low (H13c)
H14: The positive effect of two-way communication on buyer firm tolerance of conflict is
stronger when 1) organization size is small (HI4a), 2) formalization is low (H14b),
and 3) centralization is low (HI4c)
H15: The negative effect of two-way communication on buyer firm exit intention IS
stronger when 1) organization size is small (HISa), 2) formalization is low (HISb),
and 3) centralization is low (HISe)
H16: The positive effect of two-way communication on buyer firm extendedness of
relationship is stronger when 1) organization size is small (HI6a), 2) formalization is
low (HI6b), and 3) centralization is low (HI6c)
Interpersonal variables and History with organization
H17: The positive effect of 1) supplier rep cultural adaptation (HI7a), 2) buyer rep cultural
adaptation (HI7b), and two-way communication (HI7c) on tolerance of conflict is
strongerwhen history with organization is short.
H18: The negative effect of 1) supplier rep cultural knowledge (HI8a), 2) supplier rep
cultural adaptation (HI8b), buyer rep cultural adaptation (HI8c) and two-way
communication (HI8d) on exit intention is stronger when history with organization is
short.
3 In consequence the number of moderator hypotheses is lower than we expected ex ante data analysis. This is
particularly true for moderator hypotheses that include interorganizational variables.
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H19: The positive effect of 1) supplier rep cultural knowledge (HI9a), 2) supplier rep
cultural adaptation (HI9b), buyer rep cultural adaptation (HI9c) and two-way
communication (H19d) on extendedness of relationship is stronger when history with
organization is short.
Interorganizational variables and Organizational dimensions
H20: The positive effect of buyer firm product adaptation on buyer firm tolerance of
conflict is stronger when I) formalization is high (H20b)
H21: The negative effect of buyer firm product adaptation on buyer firm exit intention is
stronger when 1) organization size is large (H21a), formalization is high (H21b)
H22: The positive effect of buyer firm asset specificity on buyer firm tolerance of
conflict is stronger when 1) organization size is large (H22a) and 2) centralization is
high (H22c)
H23: The negative effect of buyer firm asset specificity on buyer firm exit intention is
stronger when 1) formalization is high (H23a)
H24: The positive effect of buyer firm logistical adaptation on buyer firm tolerance of
conflict is stronger when I) organization size is large (H24a)
H25: The negative effect of buyer firm logistical adaptation on buyer firm exit intention is
stronger when 1) organization size is large (H25a), formalization is high (H25b) and 3)
centralization is high (H25c)
Levels of inclusiveness
H26: The positive effect of I) buyer firm product adaptation (H26a), 2) buyer firm human
asset specificity (H26b) and 3) buyer firm logistical adaptation (H26c) on buyer firm
tolerance of conflict is stronger when levels of inclusiveness are high
H27: The positive effect of 1) buyer firm human asset specificity (H27b) on buyer firm
extendedness of relationship is stronger when levels of inclusiveness are high
History with organization
H28: The positive effect of 1) buyer firm human asset specificity (H28b) and 2) supplier
firm logistical adaptation (H28c) on buyer firm tolerance of conflict is stronger when
history with organization is long
H29: The negative effect of I) supplier firm product adaptation (H29a), 2) buyer firm
human asset specificity (H29b) and 3) buyer firm logistical adaptation (H29d) on
buyer firm exit intention is stronger when history with organization is long
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H30: The positive effect of l) supplier firm product adaptation (H30a), 2) supplier firm
logistical adaptation (H30c) on buyer firm extendedness of relationship is stronger
when history with organization is long
10.4 Interpersonal variables and moderating effects of organizational
dimensions
In order to test the postulated moderator hypotheses we ran separate multiple regressions for
moderating effects of organizational dimensions: organization size, formalization and
centralization and the interorganizational dimension history with supplier firm. Further, we
ran three separate models for each category; organizational dimensions (M7a, M7b, and M7c)
and history with supplier firm (M8a, M8b, M8c) to test the effect on the dependent variables:
tolerance of conflict, exit intention and extendedness of relationship. Furthermore we ran
models to control for overall satisfaction with supplier firm performance and the dependence
variables, switching cost and availability of alternative supplier firms. In the sections that
follow we present and discuss findings for all models.
The organizational dimensions are associated with buyer firms only. Further,
dimensions related to the buyer firms (degree of formalization, degree of centralization and
organization size) are presumed to moderate the effect of interpersonal variables (buyer rep
cultural adaptation and two-way communication") on the dependent variables. In accord with
previous outline and the postulated hypotheses, we expect the effect of buyer rep cultural
adaptation and two-way communication to be stronger when: 1) organization size is small, 2)
formalization is low, and 3) centralization is low.
In Table 10.1 below, the estimated coefficients and levels of significance are
presented. The overall goodness offit for M7a and M7c was satisfactory, while the fit was not
satisfactory for M7b. This is similar compared to results from data analysis testing the direct
effects of interpersonal variables (Ml, M2, and M3). The explained variance in M7a, M7b
and M7c (both R-squared and R-squared adjusted) increased compared to Ml, M2 and M3.
Thus, by including the interaction terms we raise the explanatory power of the models. The
presentation and discussion of findings are organized according to each of the tested models.
4 In this study we do not presume buyer firm organizational dimensions to moderate the effect of supplier rep
adaptations. Two-way communication, however, technically includes both supplier and buyer rep
communication efforts.
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Dependent variables
Model7a Model7b Model7c
Tolerance of Exit intention" Extendedness of
conflict' relationship'
Beta iSig. T) Beta (Sig. Tl Beta (sig. T)
Independent variables
Supplier rep cultural -.133(.110)d .189(.056)* .067(.279)
knowledge
Supplier rep cultural .041(.384) -.142(.177) .376(.007)***
adaptation
Buyer rep cultural adaptation -.044(.371) .231(.058)* -.199(.084)*
Two-way communication .454(.000)*** -.290(.023)** .070(.308)
Organization size -.211(.020)** -.I13( .150)d -.066(.268)
Buyer rep cultural adaptation .255(.007)*** -.082(.227)
x Organization size
Two-way communication x -.003(.488) -.006(.480) -.112(.152)d
Organization size
Formalization .010(.463) .070(.271) .036(.375)
Buyer rep cultural adaptation -.200(.056)* .129(.171) .010(.472)
x Formalization
Two-way communication x .305(.008)* ** -.154(.134)d -.059(.330)
Formalization
Centralization -.053(.309) .194(.051 )* -.051(.327)
Buyer rep cultural adaptation -.123(.137)d -.196(.052)* .272(.013)**
x Centralization
Two-way communication x -.106(.183) .097(.217) -.184(.070)*
Centralization
R-squared .325 .157 .229
R-squared (adj.) .209 .028 .097
F 2.814 1.213 1.734
Sig (F) .001*** .145d .036**
*** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.10 (one-tailed)
Directional support: p>0.10 and p<0.16 (one-tailed)
S VIF values from 1.137 to 2.035, Tolerance values from .465 to .876
6 VIF values from 1.088 to 2.144, Tolerance values from .466 to .919
7 VIF values from 1.117 to 2.176, Tolerance values from .459 to .895
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Moderating effects of organizational dimensions with regard to tolerance of conflict (M7a)
Statistics showed that size of the organization moderates the effect of buyer rep cultural
adaptation on tolerance of conflict, i.e. the effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation is higher in
large organizations than in small organizations. This effect was positive and significant, but
contrary to our expectations, and HIla had no empirical support. Further, organization size
did not exhibit significant moderating effects of two-way communication on tolerance of
conflict; therefore H14a had no empirical support.
Further, the results show that formalization moderated the effect of buyer rep cultural
adaptation on tolerance of conflict, i.e. the effect of this variable is higher in organizations
having low degree of formalization than within organizations having high degree of
formalization. The effect was negative and significant, and Hllb had empirical support.
Moreover, the effect of two-way communication on tolerance of conflict was found to be
stronger in buyer firms having high degree of formalization compared to low formalized
firms. The effect was positive and significant, but contrary to our findings, thus HI4b had no
empirical support.
Moreover, the effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation on tolerance of conflict was
found to be higher in organizations having low degree of centralization than within
organizations having high degree of centralization. The effect was negative and Hllc had
directional support. Further, the results showed no significant moderator effect of two-way
communication on tolerance of conflict, although the effect had the expected direction and
approached the directional support criteria. HI4c therefore was not empirically supported.
To conclude, organization size, formalization and centralization moderated the effect
of buyer rep cultural adaptation with regard to tolerance of conflict. Further, only
formalization moderated the effect of two-way communication upon tolerance of conflict.
Formalization and centralization moderated buyer rep cultural adaptation in accord with our
expectations, while organization size moderated in disharmony with the postulated
hypotheses. Furthermore, formalization moderated two-way communication contrary to
directional expectations. In Chapter 11.4we discuss opposed findings and suggest alternative
explanations.
Moderating effects of organizational dimensions with regard to exit intention (M7b)
Statistics display that organization size did not moderate the effect of two-way
communication on exit intention. Therefore HI5a had no empirical support. The findings
showed that formalization did not moderate the effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation upon
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this dependent variable; therefore H12b had no empirical support. The direction of the effect
was however in accord with hypotheses, i.e. the effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation was
higher when levels of formalization were low. Further, formalization moderated the effect of
two-way communication, i.e. two-way communication exhibited stronger effects in highly
formalized firms. The effect was negative and contrary to our findings", and H15b had no
empirical support.
Furthermore, centralization was found to moderate the effect of buyer rep cultural
adaptation, and the effect was negative and significant. This finding indicates that the effect of
buyer rep cultural adaptation on exit intention was stronger in highly centralized
organizations. This result was contrary to our expectations and H12c had no empirical
support. The results showed no significant interaction effect between centralization and two-
way communication upon exit intention, thus H15c had no empirical support.
To close, centralization exhibited moderating effects with respect to the effect ofbuyer
rep cultural adaptation on exit intention, however, the effect was contrary to directional
expectations. Formalization moderated the effect of two-way communication, but opposed to
our hypotheses. The opposed findings are discussed ingreater detail in Chapter 11.4.
Moderating effects of organizational dimensions with regard to extendedness of
relationship (M7c)
The results showed that organization size did not moderate the effect of buyer rep cultural
adaptation on extendedness of relationship, thus H13a had no empirical support. Further,
organization size had moderating effects with regard to two-way communication, i.e. the
effect of two-way communication was stronger in small organizations than in larger
organizations.The effect was negative and H16ahad directional support.
Further, formalization exhibited no moderating effects with regard to buyer rep
cultural adaptation and two-way communication upon extendedness of relationship, thus
H13b and H16bwere not empirically supported.
Furthermore, the effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation on extendedness of
relationship was stronger in highly centralized organizations. The effect was positive and
significant, but contrary to our hypothesis and H13c had no empirical support. Last, the effect
of two-way communication on extendedness of relationship was found to be higher in
organizations with low degree of centralization. The effect was negative and significant and
H16chad empirical support.
8 The effect is within the directional support criteria but not in accord with expected direction.
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To close, organization size and centralization moderated two-way communication in
accord with our expectations, while centralization moderated the effect of buyer rep cultural
adaptation in disharmony with our hypothesis. Formalization did not moderate the effect of
buyer rep cultural adaptation and two-way communication.
10.4.1 Control variables
In Table 10.2 below, results from multiple regression analyses including the control variables
are shown. The results show that the goodness of fit for all models: M7aC, M7bC and M7cC
was satisfactory. M7bC (exit intention) became significant and satisfactory compared to M7b.
The explained variance in the models with control variables (both R-squared and R-squared
adjusted) increased compared to the models without control variables. Thus, including
dependence and overall satisfaction with supplier firm performance heightened the
explanatory power of the models. Below, we discuss changes in Beta-coefficients", and focus
the discussion on significant moderator effects in the following models with control variables
compared to previous models without control variables. Moreover, significant effects of
moderator variables on the dependent variables are discussed.
Model M7aC - tolerance of conflict
The significant moderating effect of organization size on the relationship between buyer rep
cultural adaptation and tolerance of conflict was subject to a minor reduction, but remained
significant. Moreover, the significant effect of the interaction term between buyer rep cultural
adaptation and formalization and two-way communication and formalization respectively was
strengthened. The interaction term between centralization and two-way communication (not
significant) was reduced and the negative, direct effect of centralization became significant.
Although correlation analysis showed a positive and significant correlation between
centralization and respectively buyer rep cultural adaptation (.224*) and two-way
communication (.345**), this moderator variable had a negative, direct effect on the
dependent variables in all models (M7aC, M7bC and M7cC). That is to say, centralization
reduced tolerance of conflict, heightened exit intention and reduced extendedness of
relationship. The theoretical associations between centralization and the interpersonal
variables and the outcome variables respectively are therefore not easy to understand. All
control variables revealed weak effects on tolerance of conflict.
9 Beta-coefficients showing minor to zero changes are not discussed.
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Table 10.2: Moderating effects of organizational dimensions - interpersonal variables and
control variables
Dependent variables
Model7aC Model7bC Mode17cC
Tolerance of Exit intention" Extendedness of
conflict" relationship'f
Beta (Si2. T) Beta (Si2. T) Beta (si2. T)
Independent variables
Supplier rep cultural -.259(.013)** .251 (.024)** -.047(.341)
knowledge
Supplier rep cultural .158(.152)d -.152(.183) .221(.089)*
adaptation
Buyer rep cultural adaptation -.011(.468) .153(.149)d -.028(.421)
Two-way communication .471(.000)*** -.352(.010)** .017(.452)
Organization size -.196(.037)** -.112(.166) -.034(.376)
Buyer rep cultural adaptation .247(.010)** -.052(.312)
x Organization size
Two-way communication x -.059(.298) -.017(.443) -.134(.1 08)d
Organization size
Formalization .023(.416) .094(.208) .023(.416)
Buyer rep cultural adaptation -.278(.015)** .155(.129)d .008(.474)
x Formalization
Two-way communication x .323(.007)*** -.169(.114)d -.084(.258)
Formalization
Centralization -.166(.077)* .257(.023)** -.117(.158)d
Buyer rep cultural adaptation -.125(.141)d -.229(.033)** .182(.064)*
x Centralization
Two-way communication x -.013(.456) .041(.371) -.069(.280)
Centralization
Switching cost -.050(.329) .114(.180) .019(.434)
Availability of alternative .058(.302) -.120(.165) .128(.129)d
supplier firms
Overall satisfaction with -.043(.364) -.156(.12l)d .427(.000)***
supplier firm performance
R-squared .394 .249 .383
R-squared (adj.) .245 .081 .231
F 2.640 1.483 2.520
Sig (F) .002*** .069* .003***
*** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * p < 0.10 (one-tailed), DIrectional support: p>0.10 and p<0.16 (one-tailed)
10 VIF values from l.l42 to 2.497, Tolerance values from .400 to .875
Il VIF values from 1.177 to 2.494, Tolerance values from .401 to .850
12 VIF values from l.l72 to 2.603, Tolerance values from .384 to .853
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Model M7bC - exit intention
The moderating effect of formalization with respect to buyer rep cultural adaptation increased
and H12b had directional support. Moreover, the moderating effect of centralization related to
buyer rep cultural adaptation heightened, and the significance level increased. Switching cost
showed a positive, but not significant effect on exit intention, while availability of alternative
supplier firms had a negative effect (not significant). These findings indicate that high
switching costs raised buyer firms exit intentions, whereas a large number of available
supplier firms reduced exit intention, whereas the theory proposed the opposite. Transaction
Cost theory predicts that high switching costs and few alternative partners would create
barriers to exiting (cf. Chapter 5). In Chapter 11.2 we discuss the phenomenon of dependence
in the seafood industry. Overall satisfaction with supplier firm performance had a negative
and significant effect on exit intention, which was in accord with our expectations.
Model M7cC - extendedness of relationship
The moderating effect of organization size with reference to two-way communication
increased, but remained within the directional support criteria. Further, the moderating effect
of centralization with regard to buyer rep cultural adaptation was reduced but remained
significant at a lower significance level, while with respect to two-way communication the
effect became not significant. Switching cost had a weak effect on the dependent variable.
Availability of alternative supplier firms had a positive effect on extendedness of relationship,
which was contrary to theory. Last, overall satisfaction with supplier firm performance had a
positive and significant effect on the dependent variable, which was in harmony with what our
expectations.
10.4.2 Summary
The above-presented findings revealed a number of moderating effects, but few of the
postulated moderator hypotheses received empirical support. In Table 10.3 we offer an
overview of the findings and empirical support of the hypotheses. Of a total of 17 postulated
moderating relationships, only 3 hypotheses received directional support and 1 had empirical
support. Further, we found opposed, significant moderating effects for 4 hypotheses, while 1
exhibited opposite tendency. Eight of the hypotheses had no empirical support, which
indicates that the effect of the interpersonal variables on the dependent variables was not
moderated by organizational dimensions.
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Table 10.3: Overview of findings - Moderating effects of organizational dimensions -
interpersonal variables and control variables
Dependent variables
Tolerance of Exit intention Extendedness of
conflict relationship
Independent variables
Interpersonal variables
Buyer rep cultural HUa R13a
adaptation x Organization No empirical No empirical
size support support
Sig.
Two way communication Hl4a RISa H16a
x Organization size No empirical No empirical Directional
support support support
Buyer rep cultural H11b H12b R13b
adaptation x Formalization Empirical Directional No empirical
support support support
Two way communication Hl4b RISb RI6b
x Formalization No empirical No empirical No empirical
support support support
Sig. Opposite tendency
Buyer rep cultural H11e R12c R13c
adaptation x Centralization Directional No empirical No empirical
support support support
Sig. Sig.
Two way communication Hl4c RISc RI6c
x Centralization No empirical No empirical No empirical
support support support
Empirical support: *** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * p < 0.10 (one-tailed)
Directional support: p>O.IOand p<0.16 (one-tailed)
Sig. = Significantmoderating effects contrary to expectations with regard to direction
Opposite tendency= effect contrary to expectations with regard to direction, but within the directional
support criteria
The above-presented findings indicate that the effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation was
stronger in large organizations than in small organizations, at least with regard to tolerance of
conflict. This finding was opposite to theoretical predictions. Further, organization size did
not moderate the effect of two-way communication with respect to tolerance of conflict and
exit intention, while moderating effect was found with regard to extendedness of relationship.
The effect of two-way communication therefore seemed to be equally important in both large
and small organizations, at least with respect to tolerance of conflict and exit intention. The
direct effect of two-way communication was equally large and significant with regard to
tolerance of conflict and exit intentions (cf. 9.2.4)
Furthermore, formalization moderated the effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation in
accord with hypotheses with regard to tolerance of conflict and exit intention. That is to say,
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when the buying process was less formalized the need and in consequence the effect of
interpersonal ties was stronger. These results indicated that formalized procedures in the
buying process to a certain extent substituted the need for interpersonal adaptations, which is
logic since a stronger emphasis on formalized procedures and written documents probably to
some extent weakens the need for interpersonal relationships. When the buying process is
formalized there is less need for continuous, reciprocal interpersonal adaptations including
relational norms. The theoretical implications of these findings are consistent with
aforementioned theory (cf .. chapter 4 and 5) proposing that formalized procedures are likely
to replace the coordination ofinterorganizational activities through personal contact (e.g. Luo,
2001).
Formalization was equally found to moderate the effect of two-way communication
with regard to tolerance of conflict and exit intention. The effect was however opposed to our
directional expectations, since we expected the effect of two-way communication to be
stronger in less formalized settings. With regard to extendedness of relationship, formalization
had no moderating effect.
The findings related to centralization and its moderating effects exhibited low
consistency. With respect to tolerance of conflict, the moderator effects of centralization were
in accord with directional expectations, indicating that interpersonal adaptations and two-way
communication were more important when degree of centralization was low. With regard to
exit intention and extendedness of relationship, the results indicated that interpersonal
adaptations were more critical when degree of centralization was high. Furthermore,
centralization moderated the effect of two-way communication upon extendedness of
relationship in accord with our hypothesis. This finding implies that interpersonal
communication had greater effect on relationship continuance when there was low degree of
centralization. These findings exhibited low consistency with respect to the moderating
effects of centralization. In Chapter 11.4 we discuss opposed effects and inconsistent effects.
10.5 Interpersonal variables and moderating effects of history
With regard to this moderator we presumed history with supplier firm to affect both supplier
rep and buyer rep variables. Therefore, we included supplier rep cultural knowledge, supplier
rep and buyer rep cultural adaptation and two-way communication in the interaction terms.
Further, in accord with the postulated hypotheses we expected the effect of interpersonal
variables to be stronger when history was short. In Table 10.4 below, the estimated
coefficients and levels of significance are presented. The overall goodness of fit for Model
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M8a, M8b and M8c was satisfactory. Hence, the goodness of fit increased with respect to exit
intention and compared to M2 (direct effects). The explained variance increased (both R-
squared and R-squared adjusted) compared to Ml, M2, and M3. Thus, including the
interaction terms contributed to raise the explained variance in the models. Below, we present
the results and focus the discussion on moderating effects.
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Dependent variables
Model8a Model8b Model8c
Tolerance of Exit intention" Extendedness of
conflict':' relationship"
Beta (Sig. T) Beta (Sig. T) Beta (sig. T)
Independent variables
Supplier rep cultural -.174(.064)* .139(.114) .052(.325)
knowledge
Supplier rep cultural .050(.364) -.090(.270) .313(.018)**
adaptation
Buyer rep cultural .105(.232) .254(.039)** -.183(.101)
adaptation
Two way communication .263(.027)** -.210(.061)* .156(.125)d
History with organization -.112(.223) -.223(.069)* .236(.059)*
Supplier rep cultural -.395(.005)*** -.017(.454)
knowledge x History with
organization
Supplier rep cultural -.082(.294) .690(.000)*** -.278(.079)*
adaptation x History with
organization
Buyer rep cultural .269(.032)** -.368(.007)*** .048(.371)
adaptation x History with
organization
Two way communication x -.336(.006)*** -.010(.471) .002(.495)
History with organization
R-squared .218 .200 .202
R-squared (adj.) .141 .111 .112
F 2.828 2.244 2.246
Sig (F) .004*** .014** .014**
*** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.10 (one-tailed)
Directional support: p>O.1Oand p<0.16 (one-tailed)
13 VIF values from 1.317 to 2.341, Tolerance values from .427 to .759
14 VIF values from 1.323 to 3.810, Tolerance values from .262 to .756
15 VIF values from 1.303 to 3.807, Tolerance values from .263 to .768
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Moderating effects with regard to tolerance of conflict - M8a
History did not moderate the effect of supplier rep cultural adaptation on tolerance of conflict,
and HI7a had no empirical support. Further, statistics showed that the effect of buyer rep
cultural adaptation on tolerance of conflict was higher when history with supplier firm was
long than when history with supplier firm was short. In our hypothesis we postulated the
opposite, i.e. the effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation was expected to be stronger in young
business relationships. Hence, HI7b had no empirical support. This finding however added
new insights since buyer rep cultural adaptation with regard to all dependent variables
demonstrated directional opposite effects in all models testing direct effects (cf. Table 9.1).
The moderating effect of history therefore displayed that buyer rep cultural adaptation had a
positive and significant effect in relationships that have lasted for some time. We also
observed that the direct effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation increased and became positive
in M8a, compared to Ml, where the effect of this variable was weak and negative. Thus,
history had a positive effect on this variable.
Furthermore, history moderated the effect of two-way communication on tolerance of
conflict, i.e. the effect of two-way communication was stronger when history was short and
HI7c had empirical support. This finding indicated that two-way communication was of
critical importance in the early phases of relationship building.
Moderating effects with regard to exit intention- M8b
The results showed that the effect of supplier rep cultural knowledge was stronger when
relationships were old. This finding is contrary to our expectations, and HI8a had no
empirical support. The finding is however of interest since the direct effect of supplier rep
cultural knowledge was still positive with regard to exit intention (a negative effect was
expected). Further, in the models where we tested for direct effects (cf. Table 9.1), cultural
knowledge exhibited opposed effects with regard to both tolerance of conflict and exit
intention. In this moderator analysis, we revealed that the effect of supplier rep cultural
knowledge had a negative impact (reduces exit intention), but only when relationships have
lasted for some time. Hence, the moderator analysis enhanced our knowledge related to the
effect of cultural knowledge.
History was found to moderate the effect of supplier rep cultural adaptation, i.e. the
effect of this variable was higher in young relationships, and HI8b had empirical support.
Further, buyer rep cultural adaptation had stronger effects when relationships have lasted for
some time. This finding was contrary to our expectations, but likewise as in M8a, and HI8c
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had no empirical support. No significant moderating effect of history was found for two-way
communication, thus H18d had no empirical support.
Moderating effects with regard to extendedness of relationships - M8c
History did not moderate the effect of supplier rep cultural knowledge, thus H19a had no
empirical support. Further, significant moderating effects were found for supplier rep cultural
adaptation, i.e. the effect of this variable was stronger when relationships were young. Our
postulated hypothesis, H19b therefore had empirical support. No significant moderating
effects were found with regard to the effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation and two-way
communication, thus H19c and H19d had no empirical support.
10.5.1 Control variables
In Table 10.5 below, the statistics showed that the goodness of fit was satisfactory for all
models: M8aC, M8bC and M8cC. Compared to M8a, M8b and M8c (without control
variables) the goodness of fit increased for all models. The explained variance was
strengthened (both R-squared and R-squared adjusted) for all models. Below, we discuss
changes in Beta-coefficients with respect to moderator effects, and direct effects of
moderators on the dependent variables.
M8aC - Tolerance of conflict
Moderating effects of history with regard to buyer rep cultural adaptation and two-way
communication increased slightly. Inclusion of the control variables therefore did not weaken
moderating effects. The negative, direct effect of history was strengthened and became
significant. Further, the dependence measures exhibited low and opposite, directional effects.
Furthermore, overall satisfaction with supplier firm performance showed a quite large
negative effect (within the directional support criteria), contrary to what we would expect.
According to theoretical expectations, history, switching cost, low availability of alternative
partners and overall satisfaction with supplier firm should raise buyers firms' tolerance of
conflict. We are not aware that there is a plausible explanation for these presented statistics.
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Table 10.5: Moderating effects of history with supplier firm - Interpersonal variables and
control variables
Dependent variables
Model8aC Model8bC Model8cC
Tolerance of Exit intention" Extendedness of
conflict!6 relationship"
Beta (Sig. T) Beta (Sig. T) Beta (sig. T)
Independent variables
Supplier rep cultural -.327(.004)*** .107(.199) -.011(.464)
knowledge
Supplier rep cultural .260(.048)** .078(.318) .071(.326)
adaptation
Buyer rep cultural .086(.275) .135(.174) -.009(.474)
adaptation
Two-way communication .280(.023)** -.l24(.183) -.001(.498)
History with organization -.202(.098)* -.264(.053)* .254(.049)**
Supplier rep cultural -.555(.002)*** .081(.324)
knowledge x History with
organization
Supplier rep cultural -.053(.370) .887(.000)*** -.410(.037)**
adaptation x History with
organization
Buyer rep cultural .293(.021)** -.405(.003)*** .072(.296)
adaptation x History with
organization
Two-way communication x -.345(.006)*** -.044(.373) .099(.219)
History with organization
Switching cost -.076(.250) .033(.388) .074(.247)
Availability with alternative .093(.204) -.070(.270) .025(.408)
supplier firms
Overall satisfaction with -.129(.l45) -.312(.008)*** .540(.000)***
supplier firm
R-squared .307 .283 .375
R-squared (adj.) .198 .160 .266
F 2.814 2.298 3.451
Sig (F) .002*** .008*** .000***
*** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * p < 0.l0 (one-tailed)
16 VIF values from 1.262 to 2.517, Tolerance values from .397 to .792
I? VIF values from 1.255 to 5.578, Tolerance values from .179 to .797
18 VIF values from 1.255 to 5.578, Tolerance values from .179 to .797
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M8bC - Exit intention
The moderating effect of history with regard to supplier rep cultural knowledge, supplier rep
cultural adaptation and buyer rep cultural adaptation displayed an important increase. The
negative, direct effect of history on exit intention was further strengthened. This result
indicates that history reduced buyer firm exit intentions, and was logically consistent with the
aforementioned theory (cf. Chapter 5). The dependence measures exhibited low and opposite
directional effects, while overall satisfaction with supplier firm performance had a negative,
significant effect, in harmony with our expectations.
M8cC - Extendedness of relationship
The moderating effect of history with regard to supplier rep cultural adaptation increased,
while the other interaction terms remained non-significant. The direct effect of history on the
outcome variable was positive, significant and in harmony with expectations. The dependence
measures exhibited low effect and only switching cost revealed directional effect in accord
with our expectations. Last, overall satisfaction with supplier firm performance demonstrated
a positive and significant effect, which was in harmony with expectations.
10.5.2 Summary
With regard to exit intention the effect of supplier rep cultural knowledge was found to be
stronger when relationships had lasted for some while. This opposite finding indicates that
buyer firm's valued cultural knowledge to a greater extent when business relationships had
lasted for some time. To our knowledge there is no adequate alternative explanation for this
result. Further, supplier rep cultural adaptation demonstrated larger effects in young business
relationships at least with regard to exit intention and extendedness of relationship, which is in
accord with earlier presented theory. Conversely, buyer rep cultural adaptation demonstrated
higher effects when relationships were old. This finding is hence opposite to our theoretical
predictions. In 11.4 we discuss opposed findings thoroughly.
Two-way communication displayed equal effects in both short and long business
relationships with regard to exit intention and extendedness of relationship. With regard to
tolerance of conflict the fmding indicates that there was a greater need for two-way
communication in the early phases of business relationship with regard to increasing tolerance
of conflict. This finding is therefore in harmony with theory presented earlier. The test of
direct effects oftwo-way communication in prior analysis (cf. Table 9.1) equally showed that
communication is critical with regard to tolerance of conflict.
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With regard to direct effects of history on exit intention and extendedness of
relationship, we found results in harmony with expectations, i.e. history reduced exit intention
and increased the extendedness of relationship, and both effects were significant. With regard
to tolerance of conflict, history had a negative effect, i.e. reduced tolerance of conflict. An
overview of the findings is presented in Table 10.6.
Table 10.6: Overview of findings - Moderating effects of history with supplier firm -
l . bl d control vari blinterpersona varta es an ta es
Model8a Model8b Model8c
Tolerance of Exit intention Extendedness
conflict of relationship
Independent variables
Interpersonal variables
Supplier rep cultural Hl8a HI9a
knowledge x History No empirical No empirical
support support
Sig.
Supplier rep cultural Hl7a 818b H19b
adaptation x History No empirical Empirical Empirical
sUPQ_ort support support
Buyer rep cultural Hl7b Hl8c Hl9c
adaptation x History No empirical No empirical No empirical
support support support
Sig. Sig.
Two way communication 817c Hl8d Hl9d
x History Empirical No empirical No empirical
support support support
Empirical support: *** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.10 (one-tailed)
Sig. = Significant moderating effects contrary to expectations with regard to direction
Of a total of eleven postulated hypotheses only 3 received empirical support, 3 interaction
terms were significant but opposed to theory, and 5 displayed no significant moderating
effects. The findings suggest that the importance of supplier rep and buyer rep respectively,
cultural adaptation varied according to phases in the business relationships. Further the
moderator analysis showed that supplier rep cultural knowledge and buyer rep cultural
adaptation exerted positive effects when relationships had lasted for some time. These
findings add new insights with regard to these variables and their effect on the outcome
variables. However, additional theory as well as exploratory research is needed to fully
comprehend the opposed moderating effects. In Chapter 11.6 we make suggestions for future
research.
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10.6 Interorganizational variables and moderating effects of organizational
dimensions
In order to test the moderator hypotheses we ran separate regression analysis for the
respective organizational dimensions: organization size, formalization and centralization,
levels of inclusiveness and history with supplier firm. In this section the following models
were run to test the moderator hypotheses. Two models were run to test moderating effects of
organizational dimensions (M9a and M9b), levels of inclusiveness (M10a and M10c) and
three models were run to test moderating effects of history (MUa, Mllb, Mllc). The
presentation of the findings is structured with reference to the moderators: organizational
dimensions, levels of inclusiveness and history.
The organizational dimensions were associated to buyer firm only." Further, these
dimensions were presumed to moderate the effect of buyer firm product adaptation, buyer
firm human asset specificity and buyer firm logistical adaptation upon the dependent
variables. In accord with previous outline and formulated hypotheses, we expected the effect
of buyer firm product adaptation, buyer firm human asset specificity and buyer firm logistical
adaptation to be stronger when: 1) organization size is large, 2) degree of formalization is
high, and 3) degree of centralization is high.
In Table 10.7 below, the statistics are presented. The overall goodness of fit was not
satisfactory for M9a and M9b. This result was likewise for M4 and MS (cf. Table 9.4). Thus,
including the interaction terms did not raise the goodness offit for the models, although the F-
value increased in M9a. The explained variance (R-squared) rose significantly for both
models. Further, R-squared adjusted was positive for tolerance of conflict, while R-squared
adjusted remained negative for exit intention. Below, the results are presented and discussed
for each model respectively.
19 In this study we do not presume buyer firm organizational dimensions to moderate the effect ofsupplier firm
product adaptation, human asset specificity and logistical adaptation.
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De_pendent variables
Model9a Model9b
Tolerance of Exit intention"
conflicro Beta (Sig. T)
Beta (Si2. T)
Independent variables
Supplier firm product adaptation .056(.345) .115(.200)
Buyer firm product adaptation -.020(.448) -.013(.470)
Supplier firm human asset specificity .279(.066)* -.090(.321 )
Buyer firm human asset specificity -.103(.278) .064(.364)
Supplier firm logistical adaptation -.106(.220) -.034(.405)
Buyer firm logistical adaptation -.042(.381) -.080(.297)
Organization size -.129(.160) -.279(.022)**
Buyer firm product adaptation x -.219( .072)*
Organization size
Buyer firm human asset specificity x .299(.013)**
Organization size
Buyer firm logistical adaptation x -.041(.392) -.140(.181)
Organization size
Formalization -.089(.258) .304(.020)**
Buyer firm product adaptation x -.152(.146)d .229(.108)
Formalization
Buyer firm human asset specificity x .022(.441)
Formalization
Buyer firm logistical adaptation x -.007(.480)
Formalization
Centralization .157(.096)* .062(.312)
Buyer firm human asset specificity x -.118(.156)d
Centralization
Buyer firm logistical adaptation x .020(.437)
Centralization
R-squared .164 .135
R-squared (adj.) .023 -.038
F 1.162 .778
Sig (F) .162 .349
*** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.10 (one-tailed)
Directional support: p>O.1Oand p<0.16 (one-tailed)
20 VIF values from 1.236 to 3.091, Tolerance values from .324 to .809
21 VIF values from 1.366 to 3.177, Tolerance values from .315 to .732
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Moderating effects oj organizational dimensions - M9a -tolerance oj conflict
The effect of buyer firm asset specificity on tolerance of conflict was found to be higher in
larger firms than in small firms. This result was in harmony with theory and H22a was
empirically supported. In accordwith prior analysis and discussions this fmding indicates that
buyer human asset specificity, which involves the human dimension, was critical with regard
to tolerance of conflict and consequently the resolution of conflicts in larger firms.
Organization size did not moderate the effect of buyer firm logistical adaptation, and H23a
had no empirical support.
Further, the effect of buyer firm product adaptation was higher when degree of
formalization was low, the effect was however not significant but within the directional
support criteria. This result was not in accord with theory, and H20b had no empirical
support. In Chapter 11.4 we discuss alternative explanations that may shed light on this
finding.
The effect of buyer firm human asset specificity was higher when centralization was
low, although the effect was not significant, but within the directional support criteria. The
result was not in accord with theory, sincewe expected the effect ofthis variable to be higher
in centralized firms; H22c had no empirical support.
Moderating effects oj organizational dimensions - M9b -exit intention
The effect of buyer firm product adaptation on exit intention was found to be higher in large
firms than in small firms. This finding was in accord with our expectations, the effect was
significant and H21a had empirical support. The effect of buyer firm logistical adaptation was
also higher in large firms, but the effect was not significant, and H24a had no empirical
support. Further, formalization moderated the effect of buyer firm product adaptation, but in
the opposite direction, and the effect was within the directional support criteria. This same
tendency in statistics was equally observed with regard to M9a, tolerance of conflict, and
H21b had no empirical support. We discuss alternative explanations in Chapter 11.4.
Formalization did not moderate the effect ofbuyer firm human asset specificity, or buyer firm
logistical adaptation. Therefore, H23a andH25b had no empirical support. Last, centralization
did not moderate the effect of buyer firm logistical adaptation, thus H25c had no empirical
support. Below, we include the control variables in the models.
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10.6.1 Control variables
Below, estimated Beta coefficients and significance levels are presented in Table 10.8. The
goodness of fit for M9aC andM9bCwas not satisfactory. The explained variance (R-squared)
increased for both models compared to M9a and M9b, whereas R-squared adjusted was
reduced for M9aC and remained negative for M9bC. Thus, controlling for dependence and
supplier firm performance heightened R-squared adjusted for both models, but the models
remained unsatisfactory. We focus the discussion on changes in moderating effects compared
to M9a and M9b.
Moderating effects of interorganizational variables and control variables - M9aC
The inclusion of control variables slightly changed the level of moderating effects in M9aC,
but no changes in significance levels were observed. Further, switching cost displayed a
positive effect, although not significant on tolerance of conflict, i.e. high switching cost raised
buyer firm's tolerance of conflict in harmony with theory. Availability of alternative supplier
firms showed an opposite and weak effect, while supplier performance had a positive and
weak effect on tolerance of conflict.
Moderating effects of interorganizational variables and control variables - M9bC
The moderating effect of formalizationwith regard to buyer firm product adaptation increased
and became significant, but still opposite to our theoretical expectations. Controlling for
dependence and supplier firm performance only contributed to minor changes for the other
interaction terms. The dependence measures exhibited weak and opposite effects on exit
intention, contrary to what we would expect. Overall satisfaction with supplier firm
performance had a negative and significant effect on the dependent variable, which was in
accord with our expectations.
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Table 10.8: Moderating effects and organizational dimensions - Interorganizational
variables and control variables
Dependent variables
Model9aC Model9bC
Tolerance of Exit intention"
conflictr'
Beta (Si2. T) Beta (Si2. T)
Independent variables
Supplier firm product adaptation -.073(.315) .154(.144)
Buyer firm product adaptation .014(.467) -.060(.367)
Supplier firm human asset specificity .316(.052)* -.077(.351)
Buyer firm human asset specificity -.055(.381) -.008(.484)
Supplier firm logistical adaptation -.108(.251) -.034(.419)_
Buyer fIrm logistical adaptation -.040(.393) -.106(.250)
Organization size -.136(.164) -.263(.035)**
Buyer firm product adaptation x -.237(.067)*
Organization size
Buyer firm human asset specificity x .298(.017)**
Organization size
Buyer firm logistical adaptation x -.029(.427) -.152(.176)
Organization size
Formalization -.039(.391) .344(.012)**
Buyer firm product adaptation x -.186(.116)d .284(.075)*
Formalization
Buyer firm human asset specificity x .008(.480)
Formalization
Buyer firm logistical adaptation x .029(.424)
Formalization
Centralization .133(.154)d .079(.286)
Buyer firm human asset specificity x -.140(.128)d
Centralization
Buyer firm logistical adaptation x .024(.430)
Centralization
Switching cost .080(.269) .052(.352)
Availability of alternative partners .047(.357) -.068(.301)
Overall satisfaction with supplier firm .046(.364) -.201(.074)*
performance
R-squared .199 .191
R-squared (adj.) .008 -.033
F 1.040 .852
Sig (F) .214 .317
*** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.10 (one-tailed)
d = Directional support: p>0.10 and p<0.16 (one-tailed)
22 VIF values from 1.239 to 3.066, Tolerance values from .326 to .807
23 VIF values from 1.359 to 3.170, Tolerance values from .315 to .736
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10.6.2 Summary
In Table 10.9 below we present an overview of the findings. Of a total of 10 hypotheses, 2
received empirical support, 3 had large, opposed moderating effects and 6 received no
empirical support. Buyer firm product adaptation demonstrated stronger effect with regard to
exit intention, while buyer firm human asset specificity had stronger effect with regard to
tolerance of conflict in larger firms than in small firms, and H2la and H22a had empirical
support. Further, 3 large, opposed, moderating effects were found. The effect of buyer firm
product adaptation was found to be stronger with regard to tolerance of conflict (directional)
and with regard to exit intention (significant) by low levels of formalization. These findings
were contrary to the postulated theory. Further, buyer firm human asset specificitywas found
to be stronger with regard to tolerance of conflict (directional) by low levels of centralization.
The other hypotheses had no empirical support. Hence, of a total of 10, large, moderating
effects were found for 5 hypotheses, but 3 of these were in opposed directions. In Chapter
11.4 we discuss these limited and opposed findings and relate them to limitations in the
research.
Considerable, direct effects of the moderators revealed that organizational dimensions
did have an impact on the dependent variables. However, with regard to direct effects of
moderators on the outcome variables, no theory was postulated a priori. In Table 10.8 we
observe mixed findings related to directions of effects, i.e. positive or negative impact on
respectively tolerance of conflict and exit intention. Additional knowledge of the causal
mechanisms operating between the included moderators and the outcome variable is therefore
needed.
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Table 10.9: Overview of Findings - Moderating effects of organizational dimensions -
L l . blnterorganizattona varta es
Dependent variables
Model9aC Model9bC
Tolerance of Exit intention
conflict
Independent variables
Interorganizational variables
Buyer firm product adaptation x H21a
Organization size Empirical
support
Buyer firm human asset specificity x H22a
Organization size Empirical support
Buyer firm logistical adaptation x H23a H24a
Organization size No empirical No empirical
support support
Buyer firm product adaptation x H20b H21b
Formalization No empirical No empirical
support support
Opposite tendency Sig.
Buyer firm human asset specificity x H23a
Formalization No empirical
support
Buyer firm logistical adaptation x H25b
Formalization No empirical
support
Buyer firm human asset specificity x H22c
Centralization No empirical
support
Opposite tendency
Buyer firm logistical adaptation x H25c
Centralization No empirical
support
Empirical support: *** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.10 (one-tailed)
Directional support: p>0.10 and p<0.16 (one-tailed)
Sig. = Significant moderating effects contrary to expectations with regard to direction
Opposite tendency = effect contrary to expectations with regard to direction, but within the directional
support criteria
10.7 Interorganizational variables and moderating effects of levels of
inclusiveness
In Table 10.10 the statistics are shown. The goodness of fit was not satisfactory for MIOa
while the fit was satisfactory for MIOb. This was likewise for the models: M4 and M6. The
explained variance R-squared increased for both models; while R-squared adjusted increased
for MIOb, it was still negative for MIOa. Thus, the inclusion of the interaction terms
heightened the explained variance of the model, while this was not the case with regard to the
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goodness of fit. Below, we present the results and discuss significant moderator effects in the
table.
T bl 1010 At d ifl I if l onal variablesa e . : o erating e eets o eve s o inc usiveness - nterorf(anizati
Dependent variables
ModellOa ModellOb
Tolerance of Extendedness
conflict" of
Beta (Sig. T) relationship"
Beta (si1!.T)
Independent variables
Supplier firm product adaptation .022(.436) .060(.324)
Buyer firm product adaptation -.134(.170) -.229(.041)**
Supplier firm human asset specificity .193(.146)d -.151(.189)
Buyer firm human asset specificity -.034(.417) -.065(.337)
Supplier firm logistical adaptation -.040(.386) .311(.009)***
Buyer firm logistical adaptation -.008(.477) -.101(.215)
Levels of inclusiveness -.064(.322) .077(.261)
Buyer firm product adaptation x .055(.347)
Levels of inclusiveness
Buyer firm human asset specificity x .l92(.072)* .251(.015)**
Levels of inclusiveness
Buyer firm logistical adaptation x .053(.345)
Levels of inclusiveness
R-squared .l06 .l66
R-squared (adj.) -.006 .084
F .950 2.017
Sig (F) .247 .028**
*** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * p < 0.10 (one-tailed)
Directional support (d): p>0.10 and p<0.16 (one-tailed)
Moderating effects of levels of inclusiveness - MlOa and MlOb
No significant moderator effects of levels of inclusiveness were found with regard to the
effect of buyer firm product adaptation on tolerance of conflict. Thus, H26a was not
empirically supported. Significant moderator effects of levels of inclusiveness were found
with regard to the effect of buyer firm human asset specificity on tolerance of conflict.
24 VIF values from 1.502 to 2.941, Tolerance values from .340 to .666
25 VIF values fro 1.259 to 2.824, Tolerance values from .354 to .794
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According to the findings, the positive effect of buyer firm human asset specificity was found
to be higher when levels of inclusiveness were high. This was likewise with regard to
extendedness of relationship. The results were in harmony with theory and H26b and H27b
were empirically supported. Further, no significant moderator effect was found with regard to
the effect of buyer firm logistical adaptation on tolerance of conflict, consequently H26c had
no empirical support. These findings indicate that the phenomenon of inclusiveness needed to
be considered when examining the effect of structural bonds, such as human asset specificity.
With regard to product adaptation and logistical adaptation, however, the results indicate that
levels of inclusiveness were less relevant.
10.7.1 Control variables
In Table 10.11 we present the findings when control variables are included in the models. The
goodness of fit was not satisfactory for MlOaC, while the fit was satisfactory for MIObC.
Compared to MIOa the significance level increased in MIObC as well as the explained
variance (both R-squared and R-squared adjusted). For MlOaC the explained variance (R-
squared) increased, while the goodness of fit was reduced.
MIOaC and MIObC
Significance levels remained the same with regard to the interaction term between buyer
human asset specificity and levels of inclusiveness. Further, the moderating effect of levels of
inclusiveness was increased with regard to buyer firm logistical adaptation, the effect was
positive and H26c had directional support.
Switching cost had a positive and significant effect upon tolerance of conflict, i.e. high
switching costs raised buyer firms' tolerance of conflict, which was in accord with theory.
The control variables: availability of alternative supplier firms and overall satisfaction with
supplier firm performance, exhibited weak effects on the dependent variable.
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Table 10.11: Moderating effects a/levels a/inclusiveness and - Interorganizational variables
and control variables
Dependent variables
ModellOaC ModellObC
Tolerance of Extendedness
conflicr6 of
Beta (Sig. T) lati h· 27re anons lp
Beta (sig. TJ
Independent variables
Supplier firm product adaptation -.124(.197) -.060(.318)
Buyer firm product adaptation -.113(.221) -.195(.059)*
Supplier firm human asset specificity .236(.1 08)d -.185(.128)
Buyer firm human asset specificity -.002(.496) -.031(.415)
Supplier firm logistical adaptation -.030( .427) .243(.044)**
Buyer firm logistical adaptation -.047(.376) -.032(.397)
Levels of inclusiveness -.019(.448) .012(.457)
Buyer firm product adaptation x .054(.355)
Levels of inclusiveness
Buyer firm human asset specificity x .192(.078)* .163(.071)**
Levels of inclusiveness
Buyer firm logistical adaptation x .147(.149)d
Levels of inclusiveness
Switching cost .163(.099)* .060(.292)
Availability of alternative partners .023(.426) .009(.465)
Overall satisfaction with supplier firm -.013(.461) .444(.000)
performance
R-squared .155 .349
R-squared (adj.) -.002 .248
F .987 3.460
Sig (F) .472 .000***
*** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.10 (one-tailed)
Directional support (d): p>O.1Oand p<0.16 (one-tailed)
Summary
The above presentation shows that the moderator levels of inclusiveness moderated the effect
of human asset specificity with regard to tolerance of conflict and extendedness of
relationship, as well as moderated the effect of logistical adaptations with regard to tolerance
26 VIF values from 1.243 to 2.969, Tolerance values from .337 to .796
27 VIF values from 1.258 to 2.844, Tolerance values from .352 to .795
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of conflict. Of a total of 4 hypotheses, 2 received empirical support and 1 directional support.
We therefore conclude that levels of inclusiveness should be considered when investigating
the effect of specific investments, such as human asset specificity. Below in Table 10.12, we
present an overview of findings.
Table 10.12: Overview of Findings - Moderating effects of levels of inclusiveness-
t. I . blnterorganizationa vana es
Dependent variables
ModellOaC ModellObC
Tolerance of Extendedness
conflict of relationship
Independent variables
Interorganizational variables
Buyer firm product adaptation x H26a
Levels of inclusiveness No empirical
support
Buyer firm human asset specificity x H26b H27b
Levels of inclusiveness Empirical Empirical
support support
Buyer firm logistical adaptation x H26c
Levels of inclusiveness Directional
support
Empirical support: *** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * p < 0.10 (one-tailed)
Directional support: p>O.1Oand p<0.16 (one-tailed)
10.8 Interorganizational variables and moderating effects ofhistory
In Table 10.13 below, we present the results from the analysis testing the moderating effects
of history. The goodness of fit for Mllb (exit intention) and Mllc (extendedness of
relationship) was satisfactory, while the fit was not satisfactory for MIla. Thus, compared to
MS and test of direct effects on exit intention, the inclusion of the interaction terms increased
the goodness of fit with regard to this outcome variable. Compared to M4, MS and M6, the
explained variance (R-squared and R-squared adjusted) increased for all models. Below, we
present the findings and discuss significant moderator effects.
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Dependent variables
Modeilla Modelllb Modelllc
Tolerance of Exit intention" Extendedness
conflict" of
Beta (Sig. T) Beta (Sig. T) relationship"
Beta (sie. T)
Independent variables
Supplier firm product adaptation -.004(.488) .121(.174) .018(.443)
Buyer firm product adaptation -.163(.123)d .092(.244) -.161(.1l7)d
Supplier firm human asset specificity .l88(.157)d -.026(.441) -.179(.157)d
Buyer firm human asset specificity -.006(.485) .057(.364) -.033(.421)
Supplier firm logistical adaptation .039(.396) -.198(.082)* .281(.025)**
Buyer firm logistical adaptation .052(.351) -.052(.344) -.181(.088)*
History with supplier firm .056(.359) -.109( .222) .147(.121)d
Supplier firm product adaptation x -.152(.088)* .157(.109)d
History with supplier firm
Buyer firm human asset specificity x .269(.036)** -.343(.011)**
History with supplier firm
Supplier firm logistical adaptation x .093(.229) -.235(.051 )*
History with supplier firm
Buyer firm logistical adaptation x -.207(.037)**
History with supplier firm
R-squared .078 .170 .150
R-squared (adj.) -.025 .066 .054
F .759 1.634 1.565
Sig (F) .327 .056* .070*
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 (one-tailed)
Directional support (d): p>O.IO and p<0.16 (one-tailed)
Moderating effects - MIl a - Tolerance o/ conflict
History was found to moderate the effect of buyer firm human asset specificity, i.e. these
investments had stronger effects when relationships had lasted for some time. This finding
was in accord with theory and H28b had empirical support. Further, the effect of supplier firm
logistical adaptation was in the expected direction, but the effect was not significant. Thus,
H28c had no empirical support.
28 VIF values from 1.368 to 3.008, Tolerance values from .332 to .731
29 VIF values from 1.196 to 2.968, Tolerance values from .337 to .836
30 VIF values from 1.461 to 2.945, Tolerance values from .340 to .684
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Moderating effects - MIl b - Exit intention
The effect of supplier firm product adaptation, buyer firm human asset specificity and buyer
firm logistical adaptation was stronger when business relationships had lasted for some time,
the effects were significant and in accord with expectations and H28a, H28b and H28d had
empirical support. These findings indicate that interorganizational investments represented a
barrier that reduced exit intentions in old relationships. In young relationships, however, these
kinds of investments had less impact on buyer firms exit intentions. Thus, the moderator
analysis added new insights with regard to specific investments and effects on outcome
variables.
Moderating effects - MIle - Extendedness of relationship
The effect of supplier firm product adaptation was higher when relationships had lasted for
some time, and the effect was in accord with directional expectations, thus H30a had
directional support. Further, the effect of supplier firm logistical adaptation was higher in
young business relationships. The result was contrary to our directional expectation, and H30c
had no empirical support. This finding indicates that supplier firms' efforts in making
logistical adaptations were critical early in relationships, which can be considered logical in
the seafood industry. Ones these adaptations are established, only maintenance and
coordination remain in the daily handling of exchange.
10.8.1Control variables
In Table 10.14 below, we present the statistics. The goodness of fit for M11aC was not
satisfactory, while the goodness of fit was satisfactory for M11bC and MIlcC. Thus,
compared to models without the control variables, M11aC remained unsatisfactory; the
goodness of fit for MllbC remained roughly the same, while the fit for M11cC increased.
The explained variance (R-squared) increased for all models, whereas R-squared adjusted
heightened substantially forMIlcC. Below, we discuss the findings and focus on moderating
effects.
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Table 10.14: Moderating effects of history with supplier firm - Interorganizational variables
and control variables
Dependent variables
Modeilla Modelllb Modeille
Tolerance of Exit intention" Extendedness of
conflict" relationship"
Beta {Sig. T) Beta (Sig. T) Beta (sig. T)
Inde)!_endent variables
Supplier firm product adaptation -.157(.146)d .l 16(.201) -.077(.268)
Buyer firm product adaptation -.128(.l95) .117(.202) -.153(.l16)d
Supplier firm human asset specificity .258(.092)* -.066(.359) -.174(.145)d
Buyer firm human asset specificity .040(.410) -.009(.480) .061(.348)
Supplier firm logistical adaptation .003(.493) -.168(.147)d .159(.147)d
Buyer firm logistical adaptation .071(.313) -.073(.295) -.086(.249)
History with supplier firm .046(.388) -.068(.320) .101(.196)
Supplier firm product adaptation x -.210(.038)** .157(.132)d
History with sl!2ll_lierfirm
Buyer firm human asset specificity x .212(.086)** -.339(.014)**
History with s~lier firm
Supplier firm logistical adaptation x .130(.168) -.196(.104)d
History with supplier firm
Buyer firm logistical adaptation x -.216(.039)**
History with supplier firm
Switching cost .124(.171) .068(.287) .070(.265)
Availability of alternative .062(.313) -.132(.140)d .044(.348)
supplier firms
Overall satisfaction with supplier firm .051(.349) -.l37(.137)d .467(.000)***
performance
R-squared .105 .216 .344
R-squared (adj.) -.046 .070 .232
F .696 1.482 3.064
Sig (F) .375 .073* .001 ***
*** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * p < 0.10 (one-tailed)
d = Directional support: p>O.l Oand p<0.16 (one-tailed)
31 VIF values from 1.317to 2.930, Tolerance values from .341 to 789
32 VIF values from 1.213to 2.925, Tolerance values from .342 to .824
33 VIF values from 1.313 to 2.842, Tolerance values from .352 to .762
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Moderating effects - MllaC - Tolerance of conflict
The moderating effect of history decreased slightly with regard to the effect of buyer firm
human asset specificity, although significance levels remained the same. The interaction term
between history and supplier logistical adaptation increased, but it remained not significant.
With reference to direct effects of control variables, switching cost showed a positive, but not
significant effect. Further, availability of alternative supplier firms and overall satisfaction
with supplier performance displayed weak effects upon the dependent variable.
Moderating effects - Ml1bC - Exit intention
The moderating effect of history on the effect of supplier firm product adaptation increased in
significance level, and strengthened. There were only minor changes in the moderating effects
of history with respect to buyer firm human asset specificity and buyer firm logistical
adaptation, and the significance levels remained the same. Switching cost had a positive and
weak effect, while availability of alternative supplier firms showed a negative effect within
the directional support criteria. Both effects were contrary to theoretical expectations. Overall
satisfaction with supplier firm performance had a negative effect within the criteria of
directional support, and the effect was in accord with our expectations.
Moderating effects - MllcC - Extendedness of relationship
The interaction term between history and supplier firm product adaptation remained within
the directional support criteria. The moderating effect of history with respect to supplier firm
human logistical adaptation decreased, and the effect was within the directional support
criteria. The effect was however still opposed to theory. The dependence measures exhibited
positive and weak effects with regard to the dependent variable, while overall satisfaction
with supplier firm performance demonstrated a positive and significant effect, which was in
accord with expectations.
10.8.2 Summary of findings
The moderator analysis revealed that some specific investments at interorganizational levels
had stronger effects when business relationships had lasted for some time. Of a total of 7
hypotheses, 4 received empirical support, while 1 had directional support. Two hypotheses
had no empirical support, and one of these showed an opposed tendency in the effect. Hence
history was found to moderate the effect of specific investments, and should be considered in
future studies. With the exception of the opposite moderating effect of supplier firm logistical
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adaptation on extendedness of relationship, all interaction terms showed effects in the
expected direction. These findings from the moderator analysis therefore represent additional
knowledge compared to the findings found in the analysis of direct effects. Further,
correlation analysis between history and interorganizational variables revealed only one
positive, significant correlation between history and supplier firm logistical adaptation
(.306**). Correlation analysis therefore did not reflect any linear, positive relationship
between history and the amount of investments actors make.
Table 10.15: Overview of Findings - Moderating effects a/history - Interorganizational
variables and control variables
Dependent variables
ModelllaC ModelllbC ModelllcC
Tolerance of Exit intention Extendedness of
conflict relationship
Independent variables
Interorzanizational variables
Supplier firm product H29a H30a
adaptation x Empirical Directional
History support support
Buyer firm human asset H28b H29b
specificity x Empirical Empirical
History support support
Supplier firm logistical H28c H30c
adaptation x No empirical No empirical
History support support
Opposite tendency
Buyer firm logistical H29d
adaptation x Empirical
History support..Empirical support: ***p < 0.01, **P < 0.05, * P < 0.10 (one-tailed)
Directional support: p>O.lO and p<0.16 (one-tailed)
Opposite tendency = effect contrary to expectations with regard to direction, but within the directional
support criteria
10.9 General discussion - moderator analysis and findings
The examination of the effect of independent variables in subsamples referred to m 10.2
revealed significant differences in Beta-coefficients for the majority of variables. These
findings indicate that organizational and interorganizational dimensions moderated the
relationship between independent variables and the outcome variables. The moderator
analysis however offered a mixed result with respect to empirical support of the postulated
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hypotheses. Additionally, a great number of the interaction terms were not significant. Below
we summarize the findings from the moderator analysis.
Organizational dimensions - interpersonal variables
Organization size moderated the effect of two-way communication (directional) toward
extendedness of relationship in accord with theory, while organization size moderated the
effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation with regard to tolerance of conflict in the opposite
direction. Organization size did not moderate the effect of two-way communication toward
tolerance of conflict and exit intention.
Formalization moderated the effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation with regard to
tolerance of conflict and exit intention in accord with theory. Moreover, formalization
moderated the effect of two-way communication with regard to the same variables in
direction contrary to theory. With regard to extendedness of relationship, no moderating
effects were found.
Centralization moderated the effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation toward tolerance
of conflict in accord with theory, while it moderated the same variable with regard to exit
intention and extendedness of relationship in direction opposite to predictions. Centralization
did not moderate the effect of two-way communication.
To close, the above findings offered mixed results with respect to theoretical
implications. Two-way communication was to a lesser degree affected by organizational
dimensions than buyer rep cultural adaptation." This may indicate that dyadic communication
was critical in all buyer firms despite the size of the firm, degree of formalization and
centralization.Moreover, the results suggest that formalization and centralization processes or
mechanisms could to a lesser degree be a substitute for the dynamics of interpersonal
communication.
History with supplier firm - interpersonal variables
History moderated supplier rep cultural knowledge in the opposed direction with regard to
exit intention. The effect of supplier rep cultural adaptation was moderated by history toward
exit intention and extendedness of relationship. Further, significant opposed effect of buyer
rep cultural adaptation was found with regard to tolerance of conflict and exit intention.
History moderated the effect of two-way communication toward tolerance of conflict. Five
34 Only 3 of 9 interaction terms were significant or within the directional criteria, while for buyer rep cultural
adaptation, 6 of 8 interaction terms were significant or within the directional criteria.
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interaction terms showed non-significant effects. The results indicate that supplier rep cultural
knowledge and buyer rep cultural adaptation had stronger effects in relationships that had
lasted for some while, whereas supplier rep cultural adaptation and two-way communication
had stronger effects in young relationships. Hence, the results were mixed with respect to a
priori theory. The results therefore indicate that the role and effect of cultural adaptation on
respectively supplier and buyer side of the dyad differed dependent on relationship length.
Organizational dimensions - interorganizational variables
Organization size moderated the effect of buyer firm product adaptation toward exit intention
and buyer firm human asset specificity toward tolerance of conflict, whereas logistical
adaptation was not moderated by organization size. Formalization moderated buyer firm
product adaptation, but in the opposite direction. In Chapter 11.4we discuss plausible reasons
for this. Further, formalization did not moderate buyer firm human asset specificity or buyer
firm logistical adaptation. Centralization moderated (directional) buyer firm human asset
specificity, but the effect was contrary to directional expectations. Centralization did not
moderate the effect of logistical adaptation.
To conclude, the effect of logistical adaptations was generally not affected by
organizational dimensions. Further, organization size proved to moderate interfirm specific
investments in accord with theory, whereas formalization and centralization moderated
specific investments in the opposed direction.
Levels of inclusiveness - interorganizational variables
Levels of inclusiveness moderated the effect of buyer firm asset specificity with regard to
tolerance of conflict and extendedness of relationship, whereas the moderator variable
moderated the effect of buyer firm logistical adaptation toward tolerance of conflict. No
moderating effect was found for buyer firm product adaptation. These findings suggest that
buyer reps involvement with other activities and departments in the buyer firm strongly
influenced the effect of these investments. The finding supported prior theorizing (cf. Chapter
5).
History with supplier firm - interorganizational variables
History moderated the effect of supplier firm product adaptation with regard to exit intention
and extendedness of relationship in accord with theory. Further, the effect of buyer firm
human asset specificity was moderated by history toward tolerance of conflict and exit
intention. History moderated buyer firm logistical adaptation with respect to exit intention,
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while the opposite tendency was found for supplier firm logistical adaptation. Hence, specific
inter-firm investments had stronger effects in mature relationships, which was in harmony
with prior theorizing (cf. Chapter 5).
Summary of moderator analysis
Moderator analysis including the organizational dimensions, organization size, formalization
and centralization showed inconsistent results, in the sense that these dimensions moderated
in accord with theory and contrary to theory as well as showed no moderating effects. These
results may be due to several factors, such as industry specific factors, weaknesses in research
design and measurement-instrument, and are elaborated in Chapter 11. Despite the
inconsistent findings, we contend the above moderators play a role in business relationships.
Boundary spanners are organizational members, in consequence they are influenced by
organizational structure, procedures, norms and the like (cf. Chapters 3, 4 and 5).
Organizations therefore should not be treated as 'black boxes' in interorganizational research.
The rich stream of organization research should therefore be considered when investigating
these relationships.
History or the length of relationships proved to moderate the effect of specific
investments. The moderator analysis provided additional knowledge on the effect of various
interpersonal investments dependent on relationship length. Interorganizational investments
proved to have stronger effects in relationships that had lasted for some while. Twelve of 18
interaction terms were found significant (in directions opposed and in accord with theory).
History therefore should be considered when examining effects of specific investments, since
some investments may play a greater role in early phases while others may have stronger
impact in later phases.
Levels of inclusiveness showed an influence on the effect of buyer firm human asset
specificity specifically. These findings support the idea that boundary spanners' degree of
involvement (or levels of inclusiveness) with the organizations had consequences for the
effect of inter-firm specific investments.
Even though we did not receive empirical support with respect to all moderator
hypotheses, we argue that organizational and interorganizational dimensions should be
considered when examining the effect of interpersonal and interorganizational investments.
Yet, exploratory research is required to fully comprehend underlying causal mechanisms of
the organizational and interorganizational moderators included (cf. Chapter 11).
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11 - Discussions and implications
In this part of the thesis we discuss findings and theoretical implications. In Chapter 11.1we
offer additional and alternative explanations to the presented findings in Chapters 9 and 10.
An alternative model to show effects of cultural knowledge is offered in Chapter 11.3.
Further, we discuss limitations of the chosen research method and design in Chapter 11.4.
Furthermore, we discuss theoretical perspectives, empirical support and contribution of the
doctoral research in Chapter 11.5. We then propose future studies. Last, managerial
implications are suggested.
As aforementioned (Chapter 6) we adopted a hypothetic deductive approach to
conduct this research. This approach builds on existing research in order to develop the
conceptual model and hypotheses. To test the hypotheses we employed a structured
questionnaire that provided us with quantitative data. Besides the survey method, the research
provided us with qualitative data collected during the personal interviews (cf. 6.4). In this part
of thesis we mainly resort to qualitative data collected in the personal interviews (n=96) to
offer additional and alternative explanations of findings. The collection of qualitative data had
a more exploratory character, and hence can be referred to as an inductive approach.' Ex post
data analysis (regression analysis) these qualitative data were systematically and minutely
analyzed to search for meaning in the statistics, in particular with regard to weak and opposed
effects. More specifically, I experienced the research process as a circular process involving a
priori theory, inspection and analysis of statistics and analysis of qualitative data. This
process can be referred to as a continuous back and forth switching between the "context of
discovery" and "the context of justification" (Troye, 1994). Through this process I acquired
new insights into the phenomena of interest, which resulted in additional and alternative
explanations. Furthermore, this process released new thoughts with respect to a priori theory
and logic.
We argue that the clarification offered in this part of thesis provide an additional, more
nuanced and multifaceted explanation of the findings as well as of the empirical phenomena
in question? Yet, this elucidation is not part of an attempt to verify our theoretical
lWe are aware ofPopper's argument that induction logically is not possible (Troye, 1994). During the process
of observation we are unavoidably influenced by perceptions and theories that guide our observations. Related to
the discussion above, the term induction rather refers to a more exploratory and open approach to observations
compared to the initial deductive approach.
2 Some researchers may reply that I risk undermining the statistical findings as well as the adopted research
design by providing these alternative explanations. Nevertheless, in my thesis I stand by the hypothetic deductive
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perspectives, such as by offering ad-hoc explanations. The purpose of these clarifications is
rather to address important explanatory variables that were not integrated into our a priori
theoretical perspectives. Further, these variables are proposed to define (or restrict) the
external validity of the postulated theories. We equally suggest that the new explanatory
variables contribute to extend the a priori theoretical perspectives to comprise more realistic
and complex set of explanatory variables. Hence, while we stand by the principle of
falsification, we recognize that theories within the social sciences rarelyoffer complete
explanations of empirical phenomena. In consequence, neither verification nor falsification
can provide proofthat a theory is not true (Troye, 1994).
11. 1 Discussion of findings - Why are interpersonal ties important?
Findings in Chapters 9 and 10demonstrate that interpersonalvariables to a larger degree were
associated with the dependent variables compared to the interorganizational variables. In this
chapter we draw on qualitative data to explain why interpersonal ties are important in the
seafood industry.
Interpersonal adaptations are by nature relationshlp-specific
Throughout out the fieldwork I learned that some activities are more predisposed to
standardization, while other activities more naturallyare relationship-specific. Key-
informants were more liable to be satisfied with general investments with regard to some
activities or exchange aspects, such as general standards for product quality. With regard to
other dyadic activities, such as cultural adaptation, informants expected these to be partner-
specific. This is because some activities hy nature are difficult to standardize. With the
exception of cultural knowledge, which we consider market-specific and not customer-
specific, interpersonal variables in the form of cultural adaptation and two-way
communication are difficult to standardize and we argue they by nature are partner-specific.
Thus, inherent liabilities associated with various dyadic activities affect the appropriateness of
standardization processes. These differences further affect the relevance and effect of
exchange activities presumed to be partner-specific. The above conclusion is consistent with
previous research (e.g. Seabright et al., 1992). They found that attachment of individuals
reduced the likelihood of switching in the context of auditor-client relationships. Further, they
explain this result by proposing that in the specific context H... the substitutability of
method, but exhibit transparency with regard to the research process. Having access to qualitative data permits a
combination ofa deductive and inductive research method that I argue heightens the quality ofmy research.
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individuals for structural mechanisms is limited, either because of difficulties in standardizing
interpersonal activities or the need to maintain flexibility in the coordination
pro cess "(Seabright et al., 1992: 154).
Relational norms are realized through interpersonal relationships
Relational norms, such as flexibility, solidarity, reciprocity and trust (Macneil, 1980) were
emphasized by informants as important governance mechanisms in the dyad. High
fluctuations in resources and markets created the need for continuous adaptations and
negotiations on various matters, such as price. Disagreements and negotiations about product
quality, logistical performance as well as price had to be dealt with on a frequent basis.
According to the buyer reps, these current critical events were managed through relational
conflict solving and rarely through third parties. The interpersonal relationships therefore
contributed to smooth conflict solving and thereby reduced the likelihood of relationship
termination.
Relational norms therefore were important because of difficulties in specifying
completed contracts ex ante, and because the dyadic partners were obliged to agree upon
substantial adjustments during the buying process. To manage the various adjustments
relational norms were activated, and according to informants these were materialized through
interpersonal relationships. Thus, the development and realization of relational norms were
contingent upon interpersonal relationships. Relational norms therefore were not subject to
standardization, formalization or institutionalization, but were developed and cultivated
through human contact. The below quotes illustrate this point. The number attached to each
quote refers to one of the 96 buyer companies. The original French quotes are given in
footnotes. All quotes exemplify the activation of flexibility, solidarity and reciprocity through
personal contact.
"Jf I have a personal relationship with a supplier, I know I can rely on his help and he can
rely on mine. Other suppliers, with whom you don't have a personal relationship, won't give
you any leeway.:" (31)
3 "Sij'ai une relation personnelle avec unfournisseur je sais qu 'il va m 'aider et I 'inverse. Avec d'autres jamais,
il n y apas de souplesse. " (31 ).The French term "foumisseur" was used in discussions to refer to both the person
and to the firm. Informants did not always distinguish between these two in the informal discussions. However,
with respect to the questionnaire they were obliged to distinguish between the levels, and reported corresponding
to the level. Thus, informants were forced through the items to separate the two levels, which they analytically
managed to do. When informants specifically meant the company and only this level they used the French term
"societe" .
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"Ifyou know each other you can solve problems smoothly. " 4(56)
Interpersonal relationships embody the contract
Further, interpersonal relationships are needed in order to compensate for the lack of formal
contracts in the industry. Personalizing interpersonal contact is crucial in order to obtain
supplies as well as to maintain the business relationship. The quotes that follow illustrate this
position further.
"We spend a lot of time getting to know each other, meeting each other'sfamily,forging
bonds, building trust so that we can be sure of the supplier. The relational aspect is important
in order to develop privileged relationships. " 5(65)
"Impersonal relationships don 't work very well in the seafood industry. If I don 't have a
personal relationship with the suppliers they tend to forget us. We have a demand for seafood
products so we have to establish personal relationships - focus on the human dimension - in
order to get the products, especially when there 's a market shortage. ,,6 (40)
The phenomenon of boundary spanner turnover connection
In harmony with the above explanations it is not surprising that the phenomenon of boundary
spanner turnover connection (e.g. Lovett, Harrison and Virick, 1997, Rokkan, 1999) is
common within this industry. This phenomenon came up quite frequently in interviews,
because informants were forced to analytically distinguish between the individual (supplier
rep) relationship and the supplier firm relationship. For instance when I asked them to report
on relationship length related to the individual as well as to the firm,7 they sometimes reported
higher length with respect to the individual. The reason for this was prior business contact
with this person when he or she worked in another company. This indicates that the
interpersonal relationships were critical to the extent that buyer reps are willing to follow the
supplier rep when he or she leaves an organization. The below quotes exemplify this
phenomenon.
4 "Si deux personnes se connaissent on peut resoudre les problemes avec soupless.e" (56)
5 "On passe beaucoup de temps cl se connaitre, voir la famille, tisser des liens et båtir la confiance pour etre sur
du fournisseur. L' aspect relationnel est important pour avoir des liens privilegies. " (65)
6 " Depersonnaliser les relations ne marche pas tres bien dans la filiere peche. Si je n 'ai pas des relations
personnalisees avec les fournisseurs - ils ont tendance cl nous oublier. On est demandeur des produits de la mer,
done on est oblige de personnaliser les relations - cultiver I 'aspect humain - pour avoir Ie poisson, surtout
~uand il y a un marche de penurie. " (40)
In the thesis the measure history with boundary spanner is not included in data analysis, mainly because of
space limitations. The two measures: history with boundary spanner and history with organization are
nonetheless highly correlated (.854**).
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"In this industry, building relationships is of utmost importance, because once the quality is
acceptable, the rest depends on your relationship with the supplier. Trust is very important,
and we often follow the supplier when he moves to a new company, provided that the new
company can offer products of the same quality. " 8 (21)
"We knew this supplier already when she worked for another company. When she changed
companies, we followed her. In this industry, trust between people is important, so we tend to
follow the person. ,,9 (50)
The phenomenon of boundary spanner turnover connection is however contingent upon a set
of conditions in order to occur. The boundary spanner typically has to enjoy discretion in his
work, such as making buying decisions autonomously. Nonetheless, isomorphism related to
perceived importance of personal relationships across hierarchical levels could equally
produce this phenomenon (cf.. 11.4.4). Further, the products and quality of the products that
are offered in the various firms ought to be quite similar. Furthermore, requirements of large
specific investments at the interorganizational level are not compatible with this phenomenon
(e.g. Joskow and his study on coal suppliers and electric utilities, 1987). Conversely, the
phenomenon of boundary spanner turnover connection is likely to occur in dyads where
interpersonal relationships and adaptations, such as interpersonal trust, knowledge of each
other idiosyncrasies, relational norms and two-way communication are critical in order to
maintain dyadic exchange. Consequently, the major investment and competence in these
businessrelationships is bound in individuals and not in firms.
11.2 Discussion of fin dings - Why are structural ties less important?
In this chapter we elaborate first on plausible industry-specific explanations such as the
practice of multi-sourcing, the informal industry practices related to tolerance of switching
and restriction of the exit option and the supra dyadic related dependence phenomenon.
Second, we discuss general investments versus relationship-specific investments and why
general investments often are sufficient in a buyer firm perspective. The main purpose of
these alternative explanations is to explain the low effect of the interorganizational variables
(relationshipspecific investments at the interorganizationallevel) on the dependent variables.
Additionally,we aim to clarify the low association between interorganizational variables and
8 "Dans cette industrie le relationnel est tres important paree que des que la qualite de produit est acceptable -
le reste c 'est le relationnel. La confiance est tres important et on suit souvent le representant quand il change de
societe il condition que la nouvelle societe puisse offrir la meme qualite de produit. " (21)
9" Le representant, on la connait depuis qu 'elle travaillait dans une autre societe. Lorsqu 'elle a change de
societe on l'a suivi. Dans eette industrie la confiance entre personnes est tres important - done on a tendance il
suivre la personne. "(50)
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the dependence measures, and the overall weak effects of the dependence measures on the
dependent variables. Furthermore, we aim to elucidate the low variation in exit intention.
11.2.1 Rules of exchange in the seafood industry
The practice of multi-sourcing
Interorganizational arrangements, such as "monogamous" or "polygamous" relationships may
diverge in time as well as across business contexts (Baker, Faulkner, and Fisher, 1998).
Different causes lie behind these practices or norms, such as legal restrictions (e.g. Levinthal
and Fichman, 1988). Further, there exist institutionalized rules of exchange or cultural norms
that guide the rules with regard to "...who can transact with whom and the conditions under
which transactions are carried out" (Baker et al., 1998:150). These rules of exchange also
guide buyer and sellers firms' use of the 'exit option' and the right to switch among available
partners. Further, the various informal practices are expected to be interlinked within
industrial contexts.
In the seafood industry the practice of multi-sourcing is typical. In interviews key-
informants emphasized the practice of using several supplier firms in order to ensure supply
of specific fish species. This practice was necessary to ensure stability in supplies, because
available seafood resources typically fluctuate and vary across supplier firms, regions and
countries. In addition, buyer firms were not sure of getting the required supply from one
specific supplier firm, because these firms occasionally would prefer other markets or
customers when higher prices were offered. Because ofthis uncertainty, the majority ofbuyer
firms were always in search for new supplier firms, although they emphasized they had no
intention to supplant the existent partner. The quotes that follow illustrate the above outline.
"Even though we 're talking about farmed fish, there are fluctuations in the market, so that 's
why they don 't always use the same suppliers and the supplier doesn 't always sell to the same
customers. It 's a spot market and price is everything. But we like to have stable business
relationships. ,,10 (1)
"In this industry you usually have a number of suppliers and you always have to be prepared
to establish and maintain relationships with new anes. "Il (2)
10 "Meme si c 'est une espece d'elevage il y a des fluctuation dans le marche, done a cause de ce phenomene la-
ils n 'achetent pas toujours chez le meme fournisseur - et le fournisseur ne vend pas toujours aux memes clients.
C 'est un marche de spot, et les prix dictent. Mais, c 'est souhaitable d'avoir des relations commerciales stables. "
(1)
11 "C'est normal dans ce metier d'avoir un bon nombre defournisseurs - et de toujours etre pret a etablir et
maintenir des relations avec d'autres," (2)
158
"We need as many supplier firms as possible to be sure to get the volumes we need. ,,12 (36)
The practice of multi-sourcing therefore allows buyer firms to be tolerant vis-å-vis switching,
because they can obtain a supply elsewhere. Furthermore, key-informants emphasized that
tolerance of switching was contingent upon relational norms such as flexibility, solidarity and
reciprocity. If the partner firm was in desperate need of buying or selling, actors naturally
activated the abovementioned relational norms and set aside strict profit thinking for the
specific transaction. Equally, if the actors for different reasons could not buy or sell, the
partner firm expressed no bad feelings.
In conjunction with the tolerance of switching rule, there were restrictions upon buyer
firms' decisions to resort to exit (terminate the relationship). According to informants'
accounts there was a prevailing norm of exhibiting high tolerance toward critical events (e.g.
occasionally lower product quality, late delivery etc.) and consequently keeping existing
supplier firm-relationships. The majority of informants reported that they preferred relational
conflict solving to resolve these critical events, and no one reported that they resorted to third
parties. Furthermore, demonstrating low tolerance when dealing with critical events could
produce a bad reputation within the business setting. The quotes below illustrate the above
explanations.
"We try to solve problems in the best possible way for the suppliers and ourselves. If we send
back trucks two or three times, we 'Il never see a truck here again. " 13(29)
"We never break off relationships, but sometimes we have enough supplies and we don 't need
more volume, andthere are no hard feelingst''" (4)
"We can punish themfor a while ifthere have been serious problems, but then we start
accepting deliveries again. ,,15 (23)
"I've never broken off a relationship with a supplier firm. There would have to be very
serious problems for me to do that. " 16 (16)
12 "On a besoin d'avoir un maximum de fournisseurs pour pouvoir toujours avoir des volumes." (36)
13 "On essaye de resoudre les problemes au mieux pour le fournisseur et pour nous. Si on renvoi des camions 2-3
fois, c 'est qu 'on ne verra plus des camions ici. " (29)
14 "Il n y a jamais de rupture, mais des fois on est charge et on n 'a pas besoin des volumes, et il n y a pas de
rem ords. " (4)
15" On peut les punir pendant une certaine periode, si il a eu des problemes graves, mais apres on accepte des
livraisons" (23)
16 "Je n 'ai jamais quitte un foumisseur. Il faut qu 'il ait des problemes tres graves. " (16)
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Thus, based on the above outline and quotes, it is not surprising that there was low variation
among the firms with regard to exit intention. Thus, regardless of the level of relationship-
specific investments (interorganizational level), buyer firms typically reported low exit
intentions 17.
Further, the practice of multi-sourcing has additional effects, in the sense that it to
some degree reduces the appropriateness of making high relationship-specific investments in
dyads. Thus, the high number of supplier firms a buyer firm relates to, precludes to some
extent the possibility of making costly and comprehensive investments with respect to one
specific relationship ". Since only relationship-specific investments are presumed to bind
actors and create immobility in dyads (e.g. Williamson, 1979, Anderson and Weitz, 1989), the
practice of multi-sourcing therefore indirectly reduces dyadic related dependence. Statistics
support this suggestion showing that control variables reflecting dependence (dyadic related)
have low effects on dependent variables. Thus, according to the above theory, we would
expect low levels of tolerance of conflict, exit intention and extendedness of relationship since
few specific investments (at the interorganizationallevel) bind the partners. However, other
factors than inter-firm specific investments bind partners in this industrial setting.
With respect to practices such as multi-sourcing (and in this case relatively high
.number of supplier firms) this actual practice may eventually experience modifications
because of emerging market changes. In the sample there was some variation with respect to
relationship-specific investments. Buyer firms involved in private labels, own brands, specific
product qualities and the like were more concerned about relationship-specific investments.
Additionally, the increased emphasis on traceability, food safety, consumer power, and
brands19 in important seafood markets (mainly European Union, Japan and USA) would alter
buyer firms' attitudes and practices. The emerging market development could oblige buyer
firms to limit actual relationships, and thereby eventually increase the amount of relationship-
specific investments. Thus, the actual practices in the industry today may alter in accordance
with changes in markets.
To conclude, informal practices in the seafood industry, such as multi-sourcing,
tolerance of switching and restrictions in the use of the exit option influenced the amount of
17 The measure exit intention also showed the lowest standard deviation of all variables: 1,87 (0.5 item-level).
18 However, a number of informants meant that recent market demands would oblige buyer firms to limit actual
relationships, and thereby increase the possibility to know the partner better and eventually make more
adaptations. Thus, the actual practices in the industry today may change in accordance with e.g. market changes.
19 Brands include industry brands, private labels (retailer brands), ecology labels, country/region/place focused
brands, specific quality labels (label rouge) etc. That is, all kind ofbrands that market some kind ofproduct
quality, intangible assets and images that can be harmed ifthe products do not fulfill consumers' expectations.
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relationship-specific investments in the dyads, dyadic related dependence and caused low
variation with regard to exit intention.
11.2.2 Dependence at supra dyadic levels
Although statistics reflected dyadic related dependence to a small extent, key-informants were
concerned about the phenomenon of dependence in the interviews. During the research
process I gained an understanding that informants elaborated upon a kind of dependence that
was not associated with e.g. high switching cost in the dyad, but more specifically associated
to the specific market situation. Important factors that influenced buyer firms' perceived
market situation were the total amount of volume of seafood products available in the
marker'" and buyer firms' competitiveness relative to other French buyers as well as relative
to buyer firms in other national markets. A number of buyer firms explained that there
typically existed an imbalance in power between buyers and supplier firms.i' This situation
was particularly true for buyer firms that imported frozen white fish from the North Atlantic.
They further emphasized that they were more dependent upon the supplier firm than vice
versa. However, this dependence was not constant since the buyer firms explained they only
became dependent on a supplier firm given specific market situations, shortage of seafood
products ("marche de penurie"). The below quotes illustrate this form of dependence.
"When there 's a market shortage we feel dependent on them, but right now, no we don 'to"
22 (9)
"We have a demand for seafood products so we have to establish personal relationships -
focus on the human dimension - in order to get the products, especially when there 's a market
shortage. ,,23 (40)
"We have a demand - we need them more than they need us. There 's a strongfocus on price
in the French market.,,24 (25)
The last quote illustrates a second point, specifically characteristic of the French market.
20 With market they sometimes referred to the local market (e.g. Boulogne-sur-Mer, Rungis), the French market,
the European market or the global market. The relevance of each market varied according to the fish species.
21 Our ex ante argument (cf 6.3) presupposed buyers to have the power. Recent concentration processes within
the seafood industry in supplier countries may have contributed to modify power relations. The question of who
has the power seems to be context and situation specific and subject to change.
22 "Sur un marche de penurie oui, mais actuellement non, on ne se sent pas dependant. " (9)
23"On est demandeur des produits de la mer, done on est oblige de personnaliser les relations - cultiver l'aspect
humain pour avoir Iepoisson, surtout quand il y a un marche de penurie, " (40)
24"On est demandeur - on a plus besoin d'eux que I 'inverse. Le marche francais c 'est un marche de prix. " (25)
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11.2.3 French market characteristics
A number of French buyer firms characterized their market as a market with high focus on
price_25By this characteristic they meant that their customers, such as French retailing chains
and French consumers were not willing to pay high prices for seafood products. And this fact
reduced this market' s attractiveness in price-competition with other better paying markets.
The French buyer firms were obliged to operate according to an inclusive approach to the
market, i.e. in their buying strategies they included H...not only exchange but the production
and consumption of the exchanged goods ... " (Sayer, 1995:98). Additionally, in buying
decisions French buyer firms typically evaluated the rapport between quality and price (le
rapport "qualite prix,,)26. This idiom affected their way of thinking and further influenced
their sourcing strategies. The quote below underpins this proposition.
HJf the consumer has money we can say, buy quality, i.e. cod But when he doesn 't have
money we tell him to get good value for his money, i.e. buy Alaska Pollock. ,,27(Quote from
master thesis, Pettersen, 1998: 127)
The English expression "value for the money"is not semantically equivalent with the French
HIerapport qualite prix", and no French expression equates the English idiom (Villemus,
1996: 65).
Another characteristic of the French market was the openness compared to the more
conservative North European markets (Germany, Great Britain and the Nordic countries) with
regard to seafood species. This openness allows French buyer firms to execute an extensive
global sourcing, which includes a continuous search for new fish products to eventually
replace existing seafood products.i" The French buyer firms therefore have a truly global
approach to supplies, which may compensate or simply coincide with the other more negative
characteristics (high focus on price) that reduce the competitiveness of the French market in a
global seafood market perspective".
2S For instance, French actors explained that British buyers usually are willing to pay higher prices for cod than
they are. Further, French buyers had a hard time importing King Crab from Norway, because the Japanese are
willing to pay more.
26 This is an established expression in France, and was frequently used in discussions related to buying decisions.
27 "Si le eonsommateur a de l'argent on peut lui dire, aeheter de la qualite, le eabillaud. Mais au moment au il
n 'a pas d'argent done on lui dit, aeheter Ie meilleur rapport qualite prix, acheter Ie colin d'Alaska. "
28 A good example is the rapid transition from Nordic shrimps to tropical shrimps in France. The demand of
Nordic shrimps fell by 50 % in volume the last 10 years (today 5000 tons), while the demand oftropical shrimps
has risen. The total import ofvolume of shrimps today is 80 000 tons (Produits de la Mer, Nr. 83: February
!March 2004).
29 Obviously, there are French high quality niche markets that are willing to pay high prices for seafood products
as well. However, in the sample a great number of actors sold to customers that emphasize price.
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To conclude, French buyer firms accounted for asymmetries in power with regard to supplier
firms. This perceived dependence was to a greater extent associated to market situations of
shortage, and not to high dyadic switching cost. When there were less seafood products on the
market, the French market's focus on price reduced French buyer firms competitiveness
relative to better paying markets and they became the dependent party. In conjunction or in
order to compensate for this position in the global fish market, French buyer firms applied a
dynamic global sourcing strategy.
11.2.4 General investments versus relationship-specific investments
In interviews I asked informants whether low levels of supplier firm relationship-specific
investments represented a problem for their firm. A number of informants explained that they
were satisfied when supplier firms met general market requirements. They did not expect
supplier firms to make adaptations just for them, specifically when the supplier firm already
had made general adjustments to export to the European market (implementation of the
European Union norms) and in addition had adjusted to the French marker". Based on the
above outline, parties external to dyads were equally involved in the governance of business
exchange e.g. by setting the standards for production and product quality.
Kaplinsky (2000) argues that "(t)he intricacy and complexity of trade in the
globalization era requires sophisticated forms of coordination, not merely with respect to
logistics (who ships what, where and when), but also in relation to the integration of
components into the design of the final product and the quality standards with which this
integration is achieved" (Kaplinsky, 2000:124). It is therefore increasingly critical that "...key
actors in the value chain take responsibility for the inter-firm division of labor and for the
capacities of the particular participants to upgrade their activities" (Kaplinsky, 2000: 124).
This activity is termed governance (Gereffi, 1994) and can be classified into three forms of
governance (Kaplinsky, 2000: 124): 1): legislative governance, which refers to the basic rules
that define the conditions for participation in the chain, 2) judicial governance, which
includes the need to audit performance and check compliance to meet the rules, and 3)
executive governance, which provides assistance to value chain participants in meeting these
rules. With regard to these three forms of governance both internal and external parties to the
chain are typically involved.
30 French market-specific requirements included.
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For instance, European institutions may set the standards for product quality within the
European Union (legislative governance), while national institutions take responsibility to
monitor the compliance of rules (judicial governance), and last governmental industrial policy
support may be involved in upgrading supplier firms to meet the standards (executive
governance). Simultaneously, in buyer-driven chains where buyer firms are thought to play
the critical governing role," these firms are equally assumed to be involved in all three kinds
of governance as well. Thus, the involvement from an external party does not exclude the
necessity of involvement from an internal party; however, involvement from e.g. public or
specialized firms may reduce the burden and responsibility for buyer firms.
With reference to the focal dyads, buyer firms generally were satisfied with European
Union standards of production and product quality, while the logistics often were subject to
partner adjustments.r' When local institutions were not efficient in monitoring production
standards." buyer firms were obliged to followup closely ("suivre de pres"). Thus, in today's
global exchange dyadic partners are not the only actors involved in governance, and
international standards and harmonization of standards are growing."
This recent development may explain why buyer firms to a large extent relied on
supplier firm's general investments to meet e.g. established product quality standards, and
why they were less concerned with relationship-specific adaptations. In addition, the practice
of multi-sourcing and buyer firms' perceived dependence might equally explain the low
emphasis on relationship-specific investments at the interorganizationallevel.
31 Value chains in the seafood industry are in my view buyer-driven chains, among other factors, since
knowledge related to market and customer requirements is critical.
32 Statistics support this statement for supplier firm logistical adaptation in the sense that only this variable is
positively related to supplier firm performance (.225*). A plausible explanation could be that high supplier firm
performance of logistics is contingent on partner specific logistical adaptations.
33 Which was frequently the case related to supplier firms in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
34 Relevant examples are: legislations related to ensure traceability in the value chain exemplified by the new
European Regulation (effective from l. of January 2005) which aims to create a European Authority for Food
Safety. This new legislation implies measures such as; schedules, various guides to acceptable practice, HACCP
certificates, which all contain elements that help to ensure traceability. Lately, the international market ofRungis
(Paris) made investments of SOmillion Euros to satisfy European sanitary norms and to improve the seafood
pavilion with respect to standards of quality, hygiene, food safety along the whole cold food chain (finished in
2004). These are general investments aimed to satisfy requirements ofproduct quality and hence satisfy supplier
firms in general. All supplier firms that export to European markets are required to satisfy European Norms
(Produits de la Mer, 2004).
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11.3 Exploratory analysis of cultural knowledge
Findings from multiple regression analysis in Chapter 9 revealed a large and opposite effect
of supplier rep cultural knowledge in Ml and M2 (cf. 9.2.1). Further, multicollinearity
problems were to various degrees found among the interpersonal variables (cf. 9.4). We
therefore suggest that alternative models could result in better data fit. When variables are
highly correlated it is equally plausible to presume cause-effect relationships between the
variables. In the alternative model below, we propose cultural knowledge to function as a
cause or antecedent with regard to both cultural adaptation and two-way communication.
Cultural knowledge comprises competence in language as well as knowledge of the
partner's society and culture. This basic cultural competence is found to enhance boundary
spanners' ability and willingness to make cultural adaptations (Kale and Barnes, 1991,
Thomas, 1998, Bhawuk, Dharm and Brislin, 2000). Further, cultural knowledge is proposed
to affect two-way communication directly, since language competence and knowledge of
cultural traits of the other partner firm, people and society is presumed to increase the
capacity for a two-way communication (Kim, 1988, Mead, 1990). Hence, supplier rep cultural
knowledge is presumed to operate indirectly through supplier rep cultural adaptation'" and
two-way communication. InTable 11.1 below, statistics from bivariate regression analysis are
presented.
Table 11.1: Supplier rep cultural knowledge and direct effects
Dependent variables
Independent variable Supplier rep Two-way
cultural adaptation communication
Beta (sig. T) Beta (sig. T)
Supplier rep cultural
knowledge .274(.004)** .275(.004)**
R-squared .075 .076
R-squared (adj.) .065 .066
F 7.398 7.380
Sig (F) .004*** .004***
*** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.10 (one-tailed)
Statistics show that supplier rep cultural knowledge has a positive and significant effect upon
both supplier rep cultural adaptation and two-way communication. These findings support the
above theory outline that proposes cultural knowledge to affect positively individuals' ability
35 Supplier rep cultural knowledge is not expected in theoretical terms to have any effect upon buyer rep cultural
adaptation, which is also confirmedby statistics (t = -.047, p>O.lO).
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and willingness to adapt culturally and to communicate in cross-national dyads. Cultural
knowledge therefore facilitates and enhances both cultural adaptation and two-way
communication, and thereby contributes indirectly to positive relationship outcomes.f
11.4 Limitations
In this chapter we present limitations in the research. These limitations are mainly related to
the hypothetic deductive method adopted in the study, i.e. our theoretical assumptions related
to cause-effect relationships were essentially based on existing theory and not based on
induction. Our theory fundament, conceptual model and related hypotheses appeared logical
and plausible ex ante data collection and data analysis. Nevertheless, when our simple and
theoretically abstract ideas confronted the complex and real world, we experienced some
"noise".
In the sections that follow we first discuss the appropriateness of the central distinction
between general and relationship-specific investments with regard to the focal business
relationships. Second, we draw attention to problems related to heterogeneity in the sample
with respect to business actors' different rationales and strategies. This is discussed in 11.4.2
and 11.4.3. Third, we explain opposed moderating effects of organization size, formalization
and centralization. Last, we discuss generallimitations in the research.
11.4.1 Is there an obvious distinction between general and relationship-specific
investments?
In Transaction Cost theory it is central to distinguish between general and relationship-
specific adaptations or investments. Compared to general investments, only relationship-
specific investments are thought to produce exit barriers, since these investments can not be
transferred to other relationships but lose value outside the relationship. Closely related to the
phenomenon of specialized investments is actors' perception of partner dependence
(Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1991). Yet, our data generally exhibited weak associations between
specialized investments and dependent variables, such as exit intention. The dependent
variables additionally displayed weak effects on all dependent variables. The above central
principle therefore received modest support in our data. Insights acquired through discussions
36 Findings that include the cultural aspects in the cross-cultural dyads are until now treated in one empirical
article: Buyer Tolerance of Conflict in Cross National Business Relationships: An Empirical Study (in a review
process). Theory and data (quantitative and qualitative) related to cultural aspects are not integrated in this thesis,
mainly because of time and space constraints.
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with actors in the seafood industry caused a rethinking of the above theoretical thoughts. In
the sections that follow we discuss different aspects related to basic assumptions in
Transaction Cost theory.
Can the value of relationship specific investments be transferred?
During discussions related to challenges in cross-cultural dyads buyer reps sometimes referred
to prior relationship experiences. Buyer reps emphasized that earlier practice related to the
establishment and the maintenance of business relationships with firms and people from
particular parts of the world increased their knowledge and skills to deal with these
relationships. Extensive prior experience dealing with for instance West-African, Asian or
Nordic supplier firms improved their competence to deal with firms and people from these
regions according to buyer reps. 37 In consequence, even though competence and investments
associated to specific partners may not be transferred completely actors most likelyare
capable of transferring some knowledge and abilities from prior to new relationships. The
measures cultural adaptation and human asset specificity, which are both relationship specific
in character, are of specific relevance in this study." According to actors' perceptions a more
general purpose strategy may lie behind these investments in the focal business relationships.
Buyer reps explained that it was natural and evident for them to make substantial effort to get
to know the other partner. Dyadic adaptation activities were simply integral to their job.
Buyer reps adapted to the partner rep because it was considered a natural human activity and
because it was necessary to get the relationship to function. These perceptions are exemplified
in the quotes below.
"Establishing and maintaining relationships is my job. " 39(65)
"The basics of business are to adapt and communicate to make things work. ,,40 (2)
37 Related to this argument is the rough division of labor between seafood importers in the southern part of
France and in Boulogne-sur-Mer (northern France). The former is oriented and specifically competent toward
southern Europe, Asia, South America and Africa, while the latter is specialized toward the North Atlantic and
the Northern and Eastern sphere ofEurope.
38 Some may reply that potential value transfer is contingent upon the nature of the investment, such as between
intangible and tangible assets. However, results from this study indicated that the more tangible specific
investments, such as product adaptation and logistical adaptation, proved to be lesser related to dependence and
exit barriers. Further, according to other studies (e.g. Lorenz, 1988), the general purpose strategy undertaken by
actors is not less relevant in industries where physical assets, such as large machinery are central. Actors in these
industries tend equally to invest in general purpose equipment, and partner-specific machine tools are
empirically rare.
39 "C'est mon metier d'etablir et de maintenir des relations. "(65)
40 "C 'est le fond du commerce de s 'adapter et de communiquer - pour que ryamarche. " (2)
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Further, substantial efforts made in business relationships were not necessarily associated to
high switching costs or exit barriers." The weak association between specific investments,
dependence and exit barriers is logically consistent with the suggestion that investments
related to prior experiences may remain as a resource base within the individual as well as
within the firm when relationships fade away or dissolve. Hence, contrary to theory postulated
a priori, partner-specific experience and competence can to some extent be transferred to new
business relationships, and hence reduce negative immobility effects.
General and specific investments - difficult to distinguish empirically
When conducting the personal interviews, a number of informants expressed some difficulties
in distinguishing between general and specific investments, particularly with reference to
interfirm investments. According to the buyer reps, these kinds of investments typically
occurred gradually. In consequence, informants did not perceive these investments as
'planned' investments, but more like natural, continuous interfirm adaptations. Therefore
quantifying the amount of investments was sometimes difficult. When business relationships
had lasted for many years it was even harder to recall the amount or level of investments. By
discussing and explaining the meaning of relationship-specific investments versus general
investments, informants managed to fill out the questionnaire. Nevertheless, in discussions
with informants I realized that the distinction between general and specific is not that obvious
and unproblematic to make.
This is the case because it is difficult to evaluate: first, the amount of investments
(considerable time laps), second, whether the investments are general or specific (most
investments would be a combination of both), and third, whether informants would seldom
have complete information in order to evaluate the amount of investments, in particular when
one side of the dyad reports for the partner firm. Thus, while the distinction between general
and specific investments is simple to make in theory, this distinction is not easy to make with
reference to 'real' business life activities.
Nevertheless, despite the abovementioned problems with regard to evaluation of the
amount of specific investments, the phenomenon of idiosyncrasies in dyads is present and
important. Informants frequently explained that they preferred doing business with the same
41 Even though a large amount oftime and energy is used with regard to making these investments, we
acknowledge that the actual financial investment probably is lower compared to investments in costly product
equipment.
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supplier firm because they knew each other well", and because the acquired mutual
knowledge facilitated business exchange. Thus, idiosyncratic investments exist and exert an
impact on the functioning and continuance of business exchange. Nevertheless, our
interorganizational variables did not capture the relevant idiosyncrasies in this business
context, or at least variables having a large impact on the dependent variables.
Actors did not express the same problems when asked to distinguish general
investments and relationship-specific investments at the interpersonal level. This expressed
facility is logically consistent with our aforementioned proposition (11.1) that suggests
interpersonal adaptations to be inherently relationship-specific. Higher perceived relevance
associated with the interpersonal investments equally facilitated the task of reporting on these
measures.
11.4.2 Different rationales for making cultural adaptations
Data analysis in Chapter 9 revealed important opposed effects of buyer rep cultural adaptation
on the dependent variables." Informants' accounts with regard to motives or rationales behind
their cultural adaptation efforts may shed light on these opposed findings. Qualitative data
revealed considerable heterogeneity in the sample with respect to buyer reps' different
rationales related to the activity of making cultural adaptations toward the partner rep. The
below explanations reflect a limitation related to the chosen method, because we presumed a
priori that boundary spanners would have identical rationales and strategies, while in reality
they differed largely. This variation in the sample may represent a confounding factor in data
analysis. The explanations that follow offer nonetheless additional insights with regard to
underlying reasons for buyer reps' cultural adaptation efforts in cross-national dyads.
Additionally, we try to explain the opposed effects ofthis variable.
It is natural that we adapt more to culturally distant partners
A number of buyer reps explained that they usually made substantial efforts in cultural
adaptation in order to understand culturally distant partners. This effort was crucial in order to
make these dyads function with respect to a number of aspects critical in the business
exchange. Buyer reps typically invested highly to develop a mutual understanding with
respect to required product quality, packaging methods, and logistical performance as well as
42 In French: " On garde toujours les memes fournisseurs parce qu 'on se connaisse, on connait le gout et les
preferences de l'autre, c 'est plus facile ... "
43 This was specifically the case for the models without control variables (Table 9.1)
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with regard to negotiation practices and ways to resolve conflicts. Making these efforts was
perceived as natural, and integral exchange activities when dealing with cross-cultural
relationships (cf. 11.4.1) were to a lesser degree associated to exit barriers.
We adapt more because we are more dependent
Other buyers explained that they typically adapted more with respect to the partner rep,
because they were to a greater extent dependent on the partner than vice versa. This was true
when the supplier firm was a large firm relative to the buyer firm, and when the buyer firm
was a small customer relative to other customers. In these cases buyer reps typically made
more efforts than the partner. By adapting they tried to improve their position as a buyer in
competition with other buyer firms. This strategy can be seen as consistent with previous
discussions (cf. 11.1), such as the necessity and strategy to personalize supplier relationships
because of the lack of formal contracts. Because of the lack of power, these buyer reps had
minor influence with regard to decisions of relationship continuance. According to the buyer
reps, the outcome of their cultural adaptation efforts was uncertain.
Previous discussions in Chapter 11.2.2 and 11.2.3 equally address power asymmetries
between buyer firms and seafood suppliers. In our view buyer firms' perception of power
imbalances vis-å-vis supplier firms' reduces the relevance of our a priori theoretical
argument. When buyer firms have limited decision-making power with regard to termination
or continuance of relationships, specific investments are less likely to produce exit barriers.
This is because the perceived power asymmetries alter the motive with regard to adaptation
efforts as well as the eventual effect of specific investments.
Differences in expectations
Moreover, the personal interviews revealed variation among the buyer reps with respect to
attitudes and expectations related to cultural adaptation efforts in the dyad. Some buyer reps
made substantial efforts with respect to cultural adaptation because they were cognizant of the
benefits resulting from mutual adaptations. This attitude was often related to aspirations of
more close and long-term relationships thought to produce better products and profits." Yet,
the efforts undertaken by buyer reps were not always met by the same attitudes and efforts by
the partner reps. Buyer reps could therefore undertake substantial cultural adaptations despite
supplier reps' lack of willingness to adapt in equal terms. These buyer reps expressed high
44 Other buyer reps were less ambitious and expressed lower expectations with respect to the partner rep. In
consequence these buyer reps generally made less effort. Yet, this low effort did not affect their exit intention.
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frustration with respect to the partner rep, among other factors because this lack of reciprocity
lowered the products' market fit and market potential. In consequence, buyer reps' cultural
adaptation efforts did not always improve relationship outcome, because buyer reps' efforts
were not met by mutual efforts by the partner rep.
Summary
To conclude, vanous rationales underlie buyer reps' cultural adaptation efforts. These
rationales were based in various perceptions; perceived cultural distance relating to supplier
firms and supplier reps, perceived power asymmetries vis-å-vis supplier firms, as well as
buyer reps market ambitions and expectations toward the supplier rep. The results in Ml, M2
and M3 (cf. Table 9.1 and 9.2) indicate that buyer reps own efforts had no positive impact on
buyer firms' tolerance of conflict, exit intentions and extendedness of relationship.
Rationales, such as the perceived dependence may explain the low effect with
reference to the dependent variables. When buyer firms perceive low influence with regard to
decisions of continuity and dissolution, their own efforts will not necessarily increase their
decision power in the dyad. Alternative explanations suggested by other research propose that
high transaction costs related to the management of the relationship (cf. 9.2.3), which in this
research can be exemplified by buyer reps efforts, are likely to increase exit intentions
(Gassenheimer, Houston and Davis, 1998). Hence, when buyer reps relate high efforts to
frustration and unbalanced efforts, these efforts are less likely to increase buyer tolerance of
conflict, increase exit intention and enhance extendedness of relationship, rather the opposite.
This explanation is equally plausible for buyer reps having high ambitions and expectations.
These buyers invest heavily but are not met by reciprocity in their cultural adaptation efforts.
This lack of reciprocity produces frustration and is detrimental for relationship commitment.
Buyer reps cultural adaptation efforts because of cultural distance are more difficult to
explain. High investments in culturally distant supplier reps would logically strengthen
relationship commitment and raise long-term orientations. Specific industry factors discussed
in 11.2, such as multiple-sourcing strategies, French buyer firms dynamic global sourcing
practices, the French market's attractiveness in the global market, high tolerance toward
switching as well as informal barriers toward using the exit option, can however to some
degree explain the low impact of buyer reps efforts on the dependent variables.
The various rationales accounted for above, offer a more nuanced and fine-grained
picture ofthis dyadic activity. Yet, we recognize that it is difficult to offer a logical, consistent
picture that in a simple way explains the opposed effects of buyer reps' cultural adaptation.
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Nevertheless, we argue that the qualitative data offer additional insights to understand the
opposed effects of buyer rep cultural adaptation in this research.
11.4.3 Opposed effects of supplier firm product adaptation
Data analysis in Chapter 9 showed opposed effects of supplier firm product adaptation in all
models (Table 9.5). Not all the opposed effects were significant, but these were large enough
to search for alternative explanations. Heterogeneity with regard to buyer firms' strategiescan
provide someplausible explanations.
In interviews I learned that high levels of specifically supplier firm product adaptation
typically were associated with buyer firms' market requirements as well as specific
characteristics related to the product (e.g. high quality products, products sold as brands or
private labels). For instance, buyer firms' involved in high quality private labels" (often in
partnerships with French retailer chains) were obliged to ensure that supplier firms made
substantial adaptations in order to ensure the high quality of products to the customer (the
retailer). However, the specific adaptations supplier firms made did not necessarily reduce
buyer firms' exit intention toward them, compared to dyads where supplier firms were
required to invest less. Rather the contrary, since buyer firms with high expectations and
requirements vis-a-vis their partners, typically demonstrated low tolerance with regard to
defections in supplier firm performance. Consequently, strict performance aspects would be
of greater importance than the more soft relational aspects in these dyads because of buyer
firms' high requirements. Therefore, these buyer firms would exhibit lower tolerance of
conflict, higher exit intentions and lower extendedness of relationship than buyer firms with
lower requirements. For instance, in dyads where the level of supplier firm product adaptation
is low, buyer firms typically had low expectations with regard to supplier firm product
adaptation, because they are satisfied with general market standards.
Thus in dyads, actors typically invest because of some reasons, such as high market
requirements and demanding customers. Buyers firms having low market requirements and
less demanding customers have lower expectations with regard to supplier firm investment.
Heterogeneity in the sample with respect to differences in market requirements among the
buyer firms may therefore be able to explain the opposite effects of supplier firm product
45 Within the seafood product category the share of private labels are increasing in France. Private labels also
include high quality products where the supplier and the country origin are emphasized in the marketing.
Recently, tropical shrimps from Madagascar were the most sold origin in French supermarkets. Buyers, such as
retailer chains and importers have been highly involved in developing the shrimp industry in Madagascar. These
are complicated products and strict supervision is conducted in order to ensure quality (Produits de la Mer,
2004).
172
adaptation. An additional measure asking whether buyer firms were satisfied with the actual
level of investments would increase the quality of data analysis.
11.4.4 Opposed effects of organization size, formalization and centralization
Opposed moderating effects of organization size
Results presented in Chapter 10 (Table 10.2) showed that organization size moderated the
effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation opposite to our directional expectations, i.e. buyer rep
cultural adaptation demonstrated higher effects upon tolerance of conflict and exit intention in
large organizations. According to our previous theoretical outline with regard to the logic
behind our hypotheses (Chapter 5), large firms would depend to a lesser degree on personal
relationships than smaller firms. Whereas this research showed that the effect of interpersonal
ties were even stronger in large organizations. This result may be due to specific industry
factors. Earlier discussions in Chapter 11.1 revealed that interpersonal relationships were
important because of e.g. the lack of formal contracts and the need for relational norms. The
personalization of supplier firm relationships is critical within this industrial context. Being a
large company that possesses market power and other social mechanisms did not, according
to both quantitative and qualitative data, seem to compensate for the human dimension in
exchange. The following quote from a buyer rep in one of France largest companies illustrates
this assertion.
"Impersonal relationships don 't work very well in the seafood industry. If I don 't have a
personal relationship with the suppliers they tend to forget us. We have a demand for seafood
products so we have to establish personal relationships -focus on the human dimension - in
order to get the products, especially when there 's a market shortage. ,,46 (40)
To conclude, it is necessary to personalize dyadic exchange in order to ensure regular supplies
of seafood products even for large companies.
Opposed moderating effects of formalization
Findings showed that two-way communication had stronger effects with regard to tolerance of
conflict and exit intention when formalization was high compared to when formalization was
46 "Depersonnaliser les relations ne marehe pas tres bien dans la filiere peche. Sije n 'ai pas des relations
personnalisees avee les fournisseurs - ils ont tendanee a nous oublier. On est demandeur des produits de la mer,
done on est oblige de personnaliser les relations - eultiver I 'aspect humain - pour avoir Ie poisson, surtout
quand il y a un marche de penurie. " (40)
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low (Table 10.2). This finding was contrary to our directional expectations, and requires
further explanations.
In order to understand this finding we resort to infonnants' perception of the construct
formalization. Discussions with infonnants filling out the questionnaire the majority of
informants revealed difficulties in reporting on formalization without relating this concept to
some empirical phenomenon, and the majority related formalization to various market and
customer requirements. Formalized procedures had a purpose and several factors, mostly
context-led'" contributed to the need of increasing the formalization of the buying process.
Therefore, informants naturally associated high degree of formalization with more strict
market and customer requirements, including traceability, product quality requirements", the
use of "cahier de charges" (formal specifications and requirements related to the product and
the production) etc. The quote below, uttered by a buyer rep reflects the above explanation
"You have to follow rules and procedures to meet the requirements of today's market,
especially when it comes to quality and traceability. The actors have to follow formal rules
andprocedures to an ever greater extent." 49(2)
In addition, informants emphasized that business exchange within the industry remams
complex and difficult to predict despite the fact that some exchange dimensions have been
subject to formalization, such as traceability and product quality.i" For example, despite
formalized procedures related to some exchange aspects, it was still difficult to specify ex
ante completed contracts. Further, a number of exchange activities within the industry, in
particular those related to the exchange with fresh seafood were difficult to standardize. This
activity was characterized as small scale and traditional'! and thus not adequate for increased
formalization and standardization. The following quote illustrates informants' positions.
47 By context, industry factors, market factors as well as customer requirements were included. These factors are
all interrelated and we refer to these factors as context factors.
48 Which currently are related to the market phenomenon of consumer power, recurrent scandals in agri-business,
(mad cow disease, salmonella), the implementation of European Union standards related to product quality and
production facilities and processes, requirements with regard to traceability ofproducts, French public veterinary
controls, etc.
49 "C'est imperatif de su ivre des regles et procedures afin d'accomplir les exigences dans le marche actuel,
surtout relatif a la qualite et la tracabilite. De plus en plus tous les acteurs sont obliges de suivre des regles et
des procedures formel/es. "(2)
50 Because of the emerging market requirements for firms within the seafood industry some firms hired people
solely responsible for ensuring the traceability ofproducts as well as product quality, and these activities were
formal and written. These issues had to be documented (needed to be traced) in case of complaints from
customers.
51 In French: "artisanal."
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"You can 't have highly formalized and standardized procedures because in this field you
have to be flexible, things keep changing: price, quality, quantity, exchange rates. One day is
never like the next. ,,52 (75)
The next quote illustrates the need to communicate, despite increased formalization with
respect to some exchange aspects.
"We work according to very strict product specifications. These are often very detailed. But
we also discuss things - market developments and other less formal issues. ,,53(90)
Thus, formalized procedures do not compensate for interpersonal communication. Rather,
high degree of formalization reflects greater complexity in exchange, which increases the
need for coordination and consequently requires high levels of communication. To conclude,
our ex ante theoretical perceptions of the concept formalization (cf. 4.2) did not coincide with
informants' perception of the concept, which can explain the opposite directional effects for
two-way communication.
Inconsistent moderating effects of centralization
In Chapter 10 (Table 10.2) the findings revealed low consistencies with respect to
centralization and its moderating effects. Centralization moderated the effect of buyer rep
cultural adaptation and two-way communication with regard to the dependent variables'", but
in both expected and unexpected directions. Further, it is difficult to assert a pattern with
respect to the findings. In order to search for alternative explanations, we resort to informants'
perception of centralization and their explanation of how organizational member in the
seafood industry actually worked together.
Our ex ante theoretical assumptions with respect to centralization were somewhat
simplistic confronted with informants' accounts on working practices. The need to consult
organizational members higher in the hierarchy depended largely upon the type of decision,
the type of problem or conflict with the current supplier firm relationship. Further, in most
firms buyer reps worked independently and had great autonomy in their work, but at the same
time they were also obliged to consult their working colleagues for various reasons.
52 "Ce n 'est pas possible d'avoir des procedures tres formalisees et standardisees - parce que dans ce metier il
faut etre flexible - il Y a constamment des changements: des variations des prix, qualite, quantite et de cours - il
n y ajamais un jour qui ressemble ei un autre. " (75)
53 « On travaille selon des cahiers de charges tres strietes. C 'est souvent tres precis et mises au point dans les
cahiers de charges. Mais ei cote on discute - l'evolution des marches et d'autres aspects pas tres formels. "(90)
54Twoof six interaction terms exhibited no significant moderator effects.
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First, because purchasing seafood products had implications for other activities in the firm,
buyer reps had to consult colleagues before making important decisions. For example,
purchasing agents had to inform each other continuously with regard to buying decisions. A
buyer rep could not order a truck of cod without consulting other members. This was because
he or she had to be ensured that no one else had bought a truck with cod the same day.
Further, the processing manager had to be informed to make sure the production facilities
could handle the volumes of fish. Last, the sales managers had to be consulted to make certain
there were customers willing to buy the ordered cod. Thus, all activities in house had to be
coordinated continuously across activities and departments. Consequently, the main purpose
of the ongoing consulting activities was mostly coordination and to a lesser degree was a
means to reduce purchasing agents' autonomy.
Second, informants emphasized the small scale and traditional traits of the seafood
industry. In particular, dealing with fresh seafood was emphasized as complex and difficult to
standardize. Fresh seafood had to be evaluated thoroughly among other factors because of the
large range of quality differences. Further, fresh products were perishable and consequently
decisions must be made rapidly. In addition there was often uncertainty with respect to
species and volumes because of low predictability in the harvesting activity. Therefore,
consulting other organizational members was necessary when making decisions, because
evaluations are qualitative in nature and complex and because decisions have to be made
quickly.
Thus, the overall impression from discussions with informants is that buyer reps
worked independently with respect to buying decisions, but consulted others for the purpose
of coordination and for the purpose of making the right decisions with respect to complex
products and buying decisions. According to the majority of informants there was no real
hierarchy in the firms55 although purchasing agents usually did not make decisions in
isolation. Informants explained there was not a hierarchy but the organizational members
shared the responsibilities'" with respect to working activities and decision-making in the
firm. Our ex ante theoretical presumptions related to decision-making being either centralized
or decentralized (along a continuum) therefore did not include this working practice: a
combination of autonomy in decision-making and shared responsibility in group.
55 There were however some informants who asserted there existed a real hierarchy. This was the case for both
small and large firms. For instance in family-run companies consisting ofhusband and wives, sons and
daughters, decision-making was often centralized.
56 In French: "ce n 'est pas vraiment une hierarchie, mais plutåt un partage de responsabilite. "
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Consequently, our measurement instrument therefore may not have been sufficiently
appropriate in order to capture nuances with respect to centralization within this context.
Hence, low construct validity may explain the low consistency in findings. The ex ante
postulated logic related to centralization and behavioral consequences (cf. Chapter 5)
therefore is not necessarily incorrect, and could have been empirically supported in contexts
where real hierarchies exist. In the focal context however, this empirical phenomenon was
rare. Thus, since the observed working practices diverged from the expected phenomenon
(degrees of centralization) we cannot expect the behavioral consequences to converge. Further
theoretical and empirical research is needed to assert appropriate constructs as well as to
assess behavioral outcomes.
With respect to the specific industry context, qualitative and observation data offered
some indications with regard to behavioral effects. The overall impression from interviews
and visits in the companies was low emphasis on centralized decision-making according to
positions and hierarchical levels. Some informants even accentuated that the concept of
hierarchy has pejorative connotations. Observation data further validated this impression.
Few companies had separate offices and usually organizational members (purchasing agents
and often also sales managers) sat together around a table or in the same large office, ensuring
the relevant organizational members were within reach for questions. While visiting the
companies I also observed and listened to how they worked and for instance consulted each
other in buying decision processes, which were characterized by high intergroup involvement
and informal interaction. Further, informants did not reveal tensions or conflicting interests
between departments or hierarchical levels with respect to buying decisions and the
importance of personal relationships.5758This observation is in contrast to earlier theoretical
accounts (cf. 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4). Thus, the human dimension was not less important for
organizational members higher up in the hierarchy. To conclude, lack of coherence between
theoretical construct, measure and the observed phenomenon probably produced
inconsistency in findings.
57 E.g. I interviewed both general managers and purchasing agents and no specific differences in perceptions
were revealed.
58 There is one exception to this assertion. The specific French company had recently been subject to acquisition
by a foreign (Nordic) company, and there were conflicting interests between the new top management and
French purchasing agents with respect to the importance of personal contacts in supplier firm relationships. The
Nordic company wanted to reduce the emphasis on personal relationships to obtain better prices and products.
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11.4.5 Summary and discussion of limitations
In this chapter we draw attention to limitations in the research. The main limitations are
related to the chosen deductive method. The conceptual model and hypotheses as well as the
causal mechanism are grounded in existing theory. Confronted with complex realities, these
abstract and somewhat simplistic ideas were challenged. The research design and cross-
sectional survey equally revealed several limitations that influenced the results. In Chapter 6
we explained that the concern of generalizability, precision and realism is a three-homed
dilemma in research. With reference to our empirical research we experienced that theory
testing in natural settings is a great challenge. Related to this is the major concern of both
heterogeneity and homogeneity of the sample population.
With regard to the sampling strategy we adopted recommended procedures to examine
internal validity threats as well as to ensure variation in the sample. In addition, previous
knowledge of the focal industry was evaluated as sufficient due to prior research experience
within the seafood industry and with French buyer firms, additionally strengthened by an
extensive reading of industry related materials (e.g. Produits de la Mer). Nevertheless,
anticipating all potential confounding effects due to either homogeneity or heterogeneity
proved to be unrealistic. Likewise, is it questionable whether a more thorough sampling
strategy procedure could remedy all concerns related to both internal and external validity?
To conduct qualitative, in-depth interviews prior to the data collection could however
have clarified cause-effect relationships postulated in the model. The pre-test of the
questionnaire was in principle directed at improving ambiguous questions, imprecise
vocabulary and scaling methods and less related to illuminate causal mechanisms in the
model. If employed, this alternative procedure refers rather to a more inductive method,
allowing empirical data to build theory. Moreover, integrating holistic, contextual factors and
explanations would be incompatible with our quantitative approach, emphasizing parsimony
and predicting abilities. Hence, some limitations are consequently associated to the hypothetic
deductive method and cross-sectional surveys. One limitation is that this approach favors
simple and abstract models of the empirical world. When this abstract, theory-based reasoning
is confronted with individuals in specific industry contexts, the complexity of the real world,
specificities associated to organizations, markets and industries typically interfere and create
noise with respect to the results. Related to this, we argue that our access to qualitative data
increased our ability to explain findings by integrating and referring to contextual specificities
as well as contextual realities.
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During the research process we experienced that some theoretical aspects and ideas related to
the conceptual model and hypotheses were less relevant because of industry related factors.
Critical aspects in the seafood industry that interfered in the study were: 1) the overall
emphasis on interpersonal relationships, 2) a relatively lesser need for relationship-specific
investments at the interorganizational level'", 3) the practice of using multiple suppliers, and
4) the combination of autonomy and group -decision-making in the organizations, etc. These
aspects interfered in the study and influenced the results. Confounding factors are however
not specific to this study, but typically exist in all field-experiments (empirical studies in
natural settings, Cook and Campbell, 1979). Based on our research we therefore ask how
theory-testing studies can contribute to scientific progress while simultaneously considering
contextual factors (or at least not totally neglecting these factors).
The sample of the study was small (n=96). A larger sample would probably increase
the statistical power of the study and give additional and stronger findings. A larger sample
could equally permit the use of more sophisticated statistical tools, such as structural equation
techniques. Yet, the chosen data collection strategy of using personal interviews would not
permit a larger sample because of time and financial constraints.
In the research we adopted a buyer perspective and collected data from one side of the
dyad (this strategy is argued in 6.3.3). Even though several arguments (both theoretical and
practical) support this strategy, we recognize some shortcomings. For instance, key
informants (buyer reps) would sometimes have problems reporting on supplier reps and
supplier firms' investments in the dyad.6o Yet, the overall impression was that key-informants
were knowledgeable of the selected supplier firm relationship.
The research investigated the buyer-supplier relationships at one point in time (cross-
sectional) by using retrospective accounts (with the exception of the prospective measure,
tolerance of conflict). This method has necessarily some limitations and weaknesses, such as
memory error and social desirability bias when reporting on the phenomena of interest
(Wilson, 2003). Additionally, relationship aspects are dynamic and constantly evolving and
hence could benefit from longitudinal research methods. A longitudinal study of some
selected relationships by observation methods in combination with qualitative research
59 This fact had consequences for the moderator analysis in the sense that a large number of interorganizational
variables were excluded from the moderator analysis (cf 10.2). Independent variables showing positive effects
would be an advantage in order to test the moderator hypotheses.
60 Key informants sometimes expressed this difficulty in the personal interviews. Occasionally, the key-
informant selected another relationship if his knowledge was not sufficient to answer the questions. The personal
interview situation gave me the opportunity to evaluate whether key-informants were knowledgeable.
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techniques could provide additional and in-depth insights with regard to the governance of
these cross-national dyads.
As aforementioned, we treated the concept of relationship dissolution as a continuous
variable, and not as a dichotomous variable. The main reason for this choice was problems
related to retrospective reports in dissolution studies, such as social desirability biases'" and
non-response problems. Since we asked informants to report on current relationships (and not
dissolved ones), it is difficult to predict, even ex post data collection, whether an alternative
strategy could have worked. It is possible that another research design, e.g. including reports
on both dissolved and current relationships or only dissolved relationships would produce
additional insights with respect to dissolution in the business setting.
11.5 Theoretical perspectives, empirical support and contribution
This research investigated the effect of specific investments on tolerance of conflict, exit
intention and extendedness of relationship. The measure tolerance of conflict was developed
for the study, and proved to function satisfactorily with respect to internal consistency (cf.
Chapter 8). Further, nomological validity was to some degree supported in the regression
analysis, since tolerance of conflict exhibited the same statistical tendency as the conceptually
close construct exit intention for a number of variables. Correlation analysis equally supported
our a priori theoretical expectations with regard to the conceptual relationships between the
dependent variables: Tolerance of conflict was negatively correlated to exit intention (-
.298**), and positively correlated to extendedness ofrelationship (.188*).62The development
of the measure tolerance of conflict therefore is a contribution to the dissolution literature.
In the study we specified relevant specific investments at both the interpersonal level
and at the interorganizational level. In Chapter 4 we revealed that the non-specification of
levels and the mix of levels are common in the dissolution literature. The specification of
levels as well as the examination of specific investments at both the interpersonal and
interorganizational levels represent a contribution to this literature. The findings from the
regression analysis suggest that specific investments at the interpersonal level were more
important than investments at the interorganizational level. Specific investments at the
interorganizational level generally exhibited low impact. With respect to interpersonal ties,
supplier rep cultural adaptation and two-way communication had the strongest impact on the
61These were assumed higher with respect to reporting on dissolved relationships than other relationship
phenomena (cf. 7.4).
62Exit intention was negatively related to extendedness ofrelationship (-.510**).
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dependent variables. These findings indicate that supplier reps cultural adaptation efforts
toward the buyer rep were critical in these dyads. Cultural adaptability and flexibility
associated with the supplier rep therefore are of great importance when dealing with cross-
national business exchange. Communication was found equally important in these
relationships. This is logical since communication is central with respect to conflict solving
and hence highly critical in order to prevent dissolution (Borisoff and Victor, 1998). High
quality and levels of communication were likewise crucial because communication barriers as
well as cultural differences related to conflict resolution styles are presumed to exist in these
dyads.
Moreover, we examined whether organizational and interorganizational dimensions
moderated the effect of interpersonal and structural ties on the dependent variables. By testing
moderating effects we claimed that boundary spanners are organizational members influenced
by organization e.g. size, structure and procedures. The moderator analysis represents a
contribution to the dissolution literature since few studies specify how organizational contexts
influence e.g. the decision-making power of organizational members (cf. Chapter 4), and
hence these individuals impact on dissolution. The findings however are mixed. With respect
to the moderating effects of organizational dimensions, a limited number of moderator
hypotheses received empirical support and several of the interaction terms exhibited
significant opposed effects. History moderated interpersonal ties in both expected and
opposed directions, while structural ties were moderated by history in accord with our
expectations. Levels of inclusiveness moderated structural ties in accord with our theory.
Nevertheless, the split-file analysis revealed significant differences in Beta-coefficients
between subsamples, such as between small and large organizations (cf. Chapter 10 and in
Appendix F). The moderators therefore had an impact on the effect of interpersonal and
interorganizational ties upon relationship outcome. Hence, organizations should not be treated
as 'black boxes' in interorganizational research. Yet, some theorizing remains to fully
comprehendhow the included moderators affected structural and interpersonal ties and further
how these ties effected relationship outcome (cf. Chapter 11.4). Additionally, industry-
specific factors, such as common rules of exchange within the industrial setting, equally
influenced organizational members' perceptions and behavior (cf. 11.2), and hence produced
isomorphism across firms with respect to, e.g. the emphasis on personal relationships (cf. 11.1
and 11.4.4)
In addition to the survey and quantitative data, the personal interviews permitted
access to observation and qualitative data. These data provided additional insights to the
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phenomena of interest. In Chapters 11.1 and 11.2we used these data to offer additional, more
in-depth explanations for the results from the regression analysis. These data revealed that
interpersonal variables or interpersonal ties were important in this industry because ties
between boundary spanners typically embodied the contract. Formal and fully-specified
contracts were difficult to obtain because of high fluctuations in both resources and markets.
For this reason buyer reps were obliged to personalize the supplier firm relationships in order
to get supplies. Interpersonal relationships therefore represented a substitute for
comprehensive, formal contracts. The personalization of relationships was additionally
important because the seafood market was characterized by equivalent products across firms.
The main differentiators in consequence were relational aspects, such as interpersonal trust,
service and mutually developed idiosyncrasies. These findings reconciled with other studies
in commoditized industrial markets (e.g. Uzzi, 1996,Narayandas and Rangan, 2004).
Furthermore, relational norms, such as solidarity, flexibility and reciprocity were
found critical in the governance of the dyads. These relational norms were typically
materialized through interpersonal relationships. The relational norms reduced the cost of
potential adjustments in the ongoing exchange, more specifically costs related to negotiation
and conflict solving. The above findings rather support Relational Contract Theory than
Transaction Cost Theory (cf. Chapter 2). Adjustment problems in bilateral exchange were
managed by personal contacts across firms, and did not represent a great governance problem
in the dyads. Non-contractual mechanisms were highly efficient. The performance evaluation
problem, which was assumed large because of geographical distance, was largely solved by
the role of external parties to the dyad (cf. 11.2.4) and by intangible assets developed in the
interpersonal relationships. Generally, buyer reps safeguarded themselves by using the same
set of suppliers, in whom they trusted. Moreover, socialization processes across firms in the
business setting produced a common set of rules of exchange, which guided and sanctioned
actors' behavior (cf. 2.2.3, 11.2.1). Opportunism was therefore equally subject to severe
control at a level beyond the dyad.
Specific inter-firm investments had generally low impact on relationship outcome in
the dyads. Qualitative data indicate that the practice of multi-sourcing as well as the
emergence of general standards for production and product quality in the seafood industry
reduced the need for specific investments at the interorganizational level. With respect to a
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priori theory and specifically Transaction Cost Theory,63 this theory failed to recognize the
role of external parties (cf. 11.2.4) in the development of general standards (e.g. ED-norms),
the monitoring of these standards, as well as the assistance to meet the standards. In the
current process of globalization of trade and production, the evolution of international
standards is likely to continue. The existence of international standards however did not
completely exclude governance activities undertaken by the internal dyadic partners,
specifically toward supplier firms located in countries where public assistance was weakly
developed. Hence, both external and internal parties are responsible for the governance of the
advanced and complex division of labor in today's global seafood industry. This fact was not
incorporated in our a priori theory, and consequently reduced the appropriateness of our
logic.
Specific investments were a priori presumed to increase perceived switching costs and
thereby reduce exit intentions. The logic in this argument assumed some similarity or
relatedness with respect to underlying reasons for making specific investments. Further, this
logic presupposed actors to possess equal power with respect to decisions of dissolution. Our
qualitative data revealed that different rationales and strategies caused buyer firms to make
specific investments (cf. 11.4.2 and 11.4.3). Perceived dependence vis-å-vis supplier firms
was found to increase the amount of own investments, without the expected effect of reducing
exit intentions. Buyer firms involved in marketing and selling brands, private labels, and high
quality products were more concerned about own and partner-specific investments. Yet, these
investments did not produce the expected effects. In consequence, when examining the effect
of specific investments it would be useful to identify possible rationales for making specific
investments, because divergence in rationales could alter the outcome of these investments.
Based on the above summary as well as discussions in Chapter 11, the findings
provided little support for Transaction Cost Theory. This is because the main principles and
behavioral assumptions in this theory were not in harmony with actors' perceptions and
behavior, and consequently did not produce the postulated effects on outcome variables. This
theory-testing research was conducted in one specific industry, the seafood industry. Findings
resulting from this study may not be completely generalizable to other global industries or
businesses. The conceptual framework of Transaction Cost Theory may be more relevant in
industries and businesses where the use of comprehensive contracts is common, where firms
63 Relational Contract theory (cf. 2.2) addresses the role of external actors, when referring to intermediate
contract norms, e.g. in the form of legal systems. Macaulay (1963) (cf. 2.2.3) explains the use of general
standards in industries.
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relate to a limited number of partner firms, and where specific inter-firm investments are
greatly needed. In contrary, Relational Contract Theory is to a greater extent relevant in the
chosen business setting. Hence, the specific business setting influences the relevance of
theoretical perspectives and vice versa.
Nevertheless, generalizability of findings is our concern (cf. Chapter 6). With respect
to external validity there are two concerns: l) generalizing to particular target persons,
settings and times, and 2) generalizing across types of persons, settings and times (Cook and
Campbell, 1979). With respect to the former concern, we argue that our sampling strategy
ensured a representative sample that enabled us to generalize our findings to the French
seafood industry as well as to relationships between French buyers and suppliers worldwide.
Our findings are likely to be relevant for the seafood industry in other countries as well. This
is because there are specific traits related to seafood resources and markets that are likely to
influence business relationships globally. Yet, some differences may exist because of actors'
different positions in the value chain as well as in the globalmarket. Divergence may equally
exist because of national culture, such as differences in the reliance upon personal
relationships between high context cultures versus low context cultures (Hall, 1976).
Even though our data and insights were drawn from one specific business setting we
argue that some findings can be generalized in accordance with the latter concern. Findings
related to the relative importance of interpersonal versus structural ties can to some extent be
generalized to industries and markets characterized by equivalent products at competitive
prices, high fluctuations in resources and price, multiple-sourcing, and by infrequent use of
complete contracts. Furthermore, the critical importance of supplier rep cultural adaptation
and communication would be relevant for businesses that operate across nations. In addition,
exploratory analysis (cf. 11.3) showed that supplier rep cultural knowledge had a strong
indirect effect on relationship outcome, as it operates through supplier rep cultural adaptation
and two-way communication. Hence, boundary spanners' basic cultural competence of the
partner' s culture, society and language is of great importance in order to increase the
functioning of cross-national dyads. The research therefore suggests that cultural competence
and cultural adaptation efforts related to individuals playa critical role in the governance of
cross-national dyads.
From the presented findings (cf. Chapters 9 and 10) and discussions (cf. Chapter 11)
we equally deduce some implications, which we generalize to business relationships in a more
general scope. This is because the relevance of the fmdings should, on a conceptual or logical
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basis, not be restricted to the specific context of the study, but are likely to be relevant in other
contexts as well.
With respect to the theory of specific investments and postulated effects, we suggest
that actors' different rationales underlying specific investments initiatives, such as perceived
power asymmetries and strict market requirements (cf. 11.4.2 and 11.4.3) bring forth
consequences and may alter effects of specific investments. Further, with respect to the issue
of dependence between firms in value chains, actors' perceived dependence can be associated
to other levels than partner-related dependence, such as perceived dependence released by
market shortage of specific products (cf. 11.2.2). This form of dependence differs from
dyadic-related dependence (e.g. switching costs), and should equally be considered in studies.
Related to the issue of general versus specific investments, the research suggests that
governance of value chains typically are assisted and undertaken by both external and internal
partners to the dyad (cf. 11.2.4). This fact has implications for the relative need and effect of
general versus specific investments in dyads. When external partners, such as public and
private institutions, are highly competent and efficient, firms would rely on general standards
and specific investments made by internal partners would be hence less relevant.
The research revealed other associations to the construct formalization than our ex
ante theory. Actors' associations to formalization were market and customer requirements.
This finding is equally plausible for other industries, which are less bureaucratic in character.
Perceptions related to this construct are therefore likely to differ across business settings.
Different associations to formalization are important to consider because these differences are
likely to produce dissimilar behavioral effects.
With respect to the construct centralization, the research revealed a specific working
practice, which combined autonomy with shared decision-making. The behavioral
consequences of this practice differed from the postulated consequences of centralized
decision-making. It is probable that the abovementioned combination as well as other
combinations exist in several organizations and industries. In consequence, we propose that
variants other than centralized and decentralized decision-making are likely to have
implications for organizational members' autonomy and behavior, and hence should be
considered.
With respect to contribution we argue that the combination of deductive and inductive
methods increased the quality of this research. The deductive approach provided an empirical
test of the hypotheses in the form of statistics, while the inductive methods gave the
opportunity to confront a priori theory and ideas with actors that operate in real business
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settings (which in my opinion should be considered an empirical "test" of our theoretical
perspectives as well).
11.6 Suggestions for future research
Data analysis of direct effects revealed that cultural knowledge and buyer rep cultural
adaptation had opposed effects with respect to the dependent variables. Furthermore, the
moderator analysis showed that history moderated the effect of interpersonal variables
differently. This thesis did not offer or generate theory to explain these differences in effects.
Exploratory research is therefore needed to illuminate these differences in findings.
Qualitative data indicated that idiosyncrasies exist between firms and specifically
between boundary spanners. With respect to inter-firm investments we failed to specify
relevant specific investments. Opposed effects of some interpersonal variables indicate that
other variables should be sought. Even though we grasped some relevant factors that bind
actors (for instancewhy interpersonal ties are important, cf. 11.1), we lacked in-depth insights
with respect to: 1) why buyers tend to stick to the same suppliers." 2) what were the main
idiosyncrasies that bind actors, 3) what characterized the process of relationship building that
produces idiosyncrasies, etc. Exploratory research is therefore needed to fully grasp the
relevant specific investments in the dyads investigated.
The research suggests that general investments were sufficient for a number of buyers.
Other buyers were more concerned about specific investments (cf. 11.2.4). The reasons for
this were factors related to buyer firms (strategies and perceptions), as well as factors related
to capabilities of external actors (public institutions). It would be useful to incorporate the
suggested factors that moderated the importance of general versus specific investments in
future studies. This could be done by conducting a survey that investigates e.g. buyers'
expectationstoward suppliers with respect to making general versus specific investments.
Even though we investigated cross-national business relationships, we put little
emphasis on cross-cultural issues in this thesis (cf. 11.3). The study however showed that
individuals' cultural competence (cf. 11.3) and cultural adaptation efforts increased the
functioning of these dyads, despite national cultural differences. Additionally, buyer reps
explained that prior experience increased their capability to deal with culturally distant
partners (11.4.1). These findings indicate that boundary spanners' competence and efforts can
reduce problems connected to national cultural barriers. Future research is recommended to
64 In this chapter, supplier and buyer refer to supplier firm and buyer firm. When suggesting future studies we
operate at a more generallevel and do not specify in detail the level (firm or individual).
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gain more insights with respect to the role of boundary spanners in the governance of cross-
national business relationships, more specifically how these individuals can reduce the
cultural distance in the dyads.
The research revealed the existence of a common business culture within the seafood
industry. This culture produced isomorphism with respect to rules of exchange across firms
and across nations, and thereby contributed to facilitate exchange across national cultures. We
barely grasped the issue of industry cultures, since this issue was not the main focus of our
research. Future research is needed to fully understand how industry cultures affect business
exchange across cultures, such as: 1) what processes bring forth the building and sustaining of
industry cultures, 2) in what respect may industry cultures facilitate exchange across national
cultures, and 3) how does industry culture interact with national cultures?
In the thesis we adopted a buyer perspective, more specifically the perspective of
French buyers. To gain increased knowledge of cross-national dyads within the seafood
industry it is necessary to investigate other buyer markets as well, such as the British and the
Japanese. These buyers' perceptions and strategies toward suppliers (such as exit intentions
and tolerance of conflict) could differ from the French buyers because oftheir position within
the global market, as well as because of their national cultures.
Moreover, future studies are recommended to adopt a supplier perspective. Suppliers'
perceptions and explanations would possibly give both different and similar views of the
researched phenomena. Conducting a dyadic data collection, i.e. to investigate both buyers
and suppliers, would equally add knowledge with respect to the governance of cross-national
business relationships. Further, longitudinal research using qualitative methods could provide
deeper insights with regard to how partners establish and maintain business exchange in this
setting.
Different research designs may produce different results and insights with respect to
dissolution or exit intentions. Future research should employ other designs, e.g.: 1) treat the
concept of dissolution as a dichotomous variable, 2) compare dissolved and current
relationships, and 3) investigate factors that caused relationship dissolution (exploratory
research).
The findings of the moderator analysis (cf. Chapter 11) as well as discussions of
opposed and inconsistent effects (cf. 11.4.4) indicated that more research is needed to: 1)
clarify the conceptual cause-effect relationship between the included moderators and the
independent variables and further suggest how this relationship affect dissolution, 2) ensure
the theoretical meaning of constructs (e.g. formalization) that coincide with actors'
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perceptions of the meaning of these constructs/" Propositions developed by multi-level
theoreticians (cf. Chapter 3) have been tested to a small extent in interorganizational settings.
Our research indicates that exploratory research is needed to illuminate the abovementioned
factors, before conducting new research employing a multi-level perspective.
11.7 Managerial implications
A great number of industries today are confronted with the process of globalization in
different ways. This evolution implies building and managing business exchange with
geographically and culturally distant actors. Importers are typically involved in global
sourcing in the search for products and services, while suppliers are confronted with
various customer and market requirements in important seafood markets. Since this study has
investigated the perception and strategies of French buyers, fmdings from this research should
bear some implications for suppliers exporting to the French market. The managerial
implications are however likely to be relevant for other buyer-supplier dyads as well.
When suppliers deal with buyers, they should consider both formal and informal
aspects. In addition to fulfilling the more formal requirements of buyers, such as product
quality, stable delivery, high volumes and price, suppliers should equally be aware of the
more informal aspects of governance. Assets in the form of interpersonal relationships,
mutually developed idiosyncrasies, interpersonal trust and relational norms are equally
important, and may constitute the main differentiators in some business settings. Emphasizing
personal aspects of the business relationships could further improve the functioning of the
dyad, such as increasing the mutual understanding of business partners, thereby improving
market adjustments and profits. Suppliers can increase learning and dynamics in business
dyads because of strong interpersonal relationships. Likewise, if suppliers aim to maintain
relationships with buyers, they should emphasize communication and efficient and smooth
conflict solving. Related to these activities, both communication and relational conflict
solving is facilitated within the frame of close, interpersonal relationships.
When dealing with culturally different business partners, actors should equally be
aware of culturally induced differences related to critical aspects in business exchange. In
order to anticipate and deal with these cultural differences individuals responsible for the
business exchange can reduce cultural barriers by using their cultural competence and cultural
adaptability to approach the partner. Supplier reps are advised to make an effort in cultural
6S This concern differs from concerns ofconstruct validity. For instance, both formalization and centralization
exhibited high internal consistency (cf. Chapter 8).
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adaptations toward the partner, because these efforts typically are highly rewarded. Cultural
adaptation efforts are specifically important in the early phases of relationships. Supplier
firms and more specifically human resource management are recommended to increase their
focus on cultural competence. Initiatives should be implemented in order to improve
organizational members' cultural competence, specifically the competence of individuals
responsible for managing cross-cultural relationships. Possible initiatives could be to
emphasize cultural competence, cultural awareness and cultural flexibility when selecting new
organizational members. Moreover, employees within the company who frequently deal with
culturally distant business partners could benefit from cross-cultural training (e.g. Bhawuk,
Dharm and Brislin, 2000). By implementing these initiatives, organizational members' ability
to carry out business exchange with cultural distant business partners would improve.
Not all buyers were equally concerned about specific investments. Overall satisfaction
with supplier firm performance was not connected to supplier firms' specific investments, but
more to general investments made in supplier firms to meet requirements from several
markets and customers. Suppliers therefore are advised to make investments (general or
specific) in accord with buyers' expectations and requirements. Suppliers are further
recommended to encourage and value public assistance related to meeting general standards,
because the effort and competence of external partners in governance would reduce the need
for making specific investments. Buyers' expectations and requirements are however closely
connected to the evolution in markets. Suppliers should therefore be attentive to changes in
markets which could alter and increase market requirements and hence the need for specific
investments. The increased focus on issues such as traceability, consumer power and branding
could imply closer, fewer and more long-term buyer-supplier relationships in order to ensure
product traceability as well as product quality and associated brand image.
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Appendix A: Presentation letter
Inger Beate Pettersen
Norwegian School of Economics and Business administration
Bergen (Norvege)
Tel: (47) 55 95 94 41
Fax:(47) 55 95 97 80
E-mail: inger.pettersen@nhh.no
Mai2003
Suiet : Proiet de recherches
Monsieur, Madame
Suite å la preparation de rna these de doctorat, je voudrais passer å l'interview des entreprises dans la
filiere peche en France. Lors de mon enquete en France je contacte des societes en Boulogne-sur-Mer, le
sud de la France (MarseillelMontpellier) et Paris.
Mon etude est conduite par le 'Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration' å Bergen
(Norvege), et traite sur les relations commereiales entre importateurs francais et leur fournisseurs de
produits de la mer. Le questionnaire est compose de questions relatives aux echanges de biens et services
entre votre entreprise et un fournisseur important. Il comprend des questions relatives å differents aspects
de cette relation entre fournisseur et importateur, ainsi que des questions relatives å votre entreprise.
Je serai å MarseillelMontpellier dans la periode 5 mai au 15 mai, et je me permets de vous contacter par
telephone l'un des prochains jours pour eventuellement prendre un rendez vous. Je serais tres
reconnaissante si vous pourriez me recevoir.
Dans l'attente de votre reponse.je vous prie d'agreer, l'expression de mes salutations distinguees.
Inger Beate Pettersen

Questionnaire code ....1 ----'
Questionnaire destined to firms in the French seafood industry
Thank you for participating in my research project. This study is conducted by the Norwegian
School of Economics and Business Administration in Bergen (Norway), and deals with business
relationships between French importers and their suppliers of seafood products.
This questionnaire contains a number of questions concerning your firm's exchange of goods and
services with an important supplier. The questionnaire includes questions regarding a number of
aspects in supplier-importer exchange, as well as questions concerning characteristics of your
firm. Most questions are given as statements, and you will be asked to indicate on a rating scale
(from 1 to 7) to what extent you agree with these statements.
It is unnecessary to search for information in order to answer the questionnaire.
All information given in this questionnaire will be treated strictly confidentially. Research will be
presented only in an aggregated form, and cannot be traced back to any specific firm.
Questionnaire
Part A
Question 1 Information about your firm
What activities are performed in your firm? Please, place a cross mark behind activities
performed in your firm.
o 4 Packaging
O 7 Salting and curing
o 2 Import
O 5 Filleting
O 8 Canning
o 3 Export
O 6 Filleting by order
O 9 Ready-cooked dishes/value-added products
O 11 Stockage & distribution O 12 Logistics
o 1 Fish wholesaler
o 10 Processing of deep-freezed products
Other activities? ---------------------
Question 2 Information about your firm
2a How many people were employed in your company last year?
Full-time employees _
Part-time employees _
2b Business sales 2002? _
2c Is your firm a part of a larger group? Yes O No O
If yes, what were the business sales for the whole group in 2002? _
1
If yes, is your firm partly owned by this group?
If yes, what was the ownership rate?
Yes D No D
Is your firm a voluntary member? Yes D No D
In this section we will ask you to select one supplier based on the following criteria andfurther give
some information about this supplier.
We would like you to select a supplier with whom you are currently doing business.
This supplier should fulfill the following criteria:
• The supplier should be the second or third most important supplier
• The supplier should preferably be of Nordic origin (e.g, Norway, Iceland, Baltic countries,
Russia) or from a non-European country (e.g. Brazil, Chili, Thailand etc.)
• Financial ties, except the exchange of goods and services, cannot exist between your firm and
the supplier firm.
Question 3 Information on the supplier
3a Please indicate the supplier's country of origin: _
3b Please indicate one of the main fish species you by from this supplier
Farmed fish: or Wild fish: _
3c Please indicate the type of product: D 1Fresh D 2 Frozen D 3 Canned
3d Please indicate the supplier's percentage of total supply (related to this fish species) to your firm:
In volume (ca. %) In value (ca. %). _
3e What activities are performed by your supplier? Please, place a cross mark behind activities
performed by your supplier.
O 1 Seafood trader D 2 Export D 3 Fishing D 4 Seafood farming
o 5 Packaging
O 8 Logistics
D 6 Filleting
Other activities ? _
D 7 Processing of deep- freezed products
3f Please indicate the type of transport:
o 1By truck D 2 By ship D 3 By plane
2
3g Please specify the time of transport:
In hours/in days/or in weeks:
Question 4a History of business with the supplier firm
1. How many years have your firm done business with the supplier firm? Years
PartB
Question 5
In this part of the questionnaire we are interested to know about specific investments your firm
and the supplier firm have made in this particular supplier-importer exchange. More specifically,
we will ask you about investments related to product adaptations, personnel, and logistics. With
reference to product adaptations we propose two different sections, one for farmed fish and one
for wild fish. Please, choose the section which corresponds to the type of fish selected in question
3.
Please, indicate to what degree the following statements are not at all true or to a large degree true
by circling a number from 1 to 7.
Question 5a Product adaptations made by the supplier firm. FARMED FISH
Not at all To a large degree
1. This supplier has made specific
investments in plant and equipment
in order to deliver fish to our firm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. This supplier has chosen specific
fish farmers as suppliers to our firm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. This supplier has invested in
specific fish feeding methods
adapted to our firm's requirements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. This supplier has made significant
investments in slaughter methods
adapted to our firm' s requirements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. This supplier has made significant
investments to provide fish of quality
adapted to our requirements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. This supplier has made specific
adaptations ensuring that the fish is
traceable according to our requirements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. This supplier has made specific investments
to adapt the method of packaging
in accordance with our firm' s requests 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3
Question 5a Product adaptations made by the supplier firm. WILD FISH
Not at all To a large degree
1. This supplier has made specific
investments in plant and equipment
in order to deliver fish to our firm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. This supplier has chosen specific
fishing boats as suppliers to our firm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. This supplier has invested in specific
capture methods adapted to our firms
requirements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. This supplier has made significant
investments in technical improvement
aboard adapted to our firm' s requirements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5.This supplier has made significant
investments to provide fish of quality
adapted to our requirements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. This supplier has made specific
adaptations ensuring that the fish is
traceable according to our requirements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. This supplier has made specific investments
to adapt the method of packaging
in accordance with our firm' s requests 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question5b Product adaptations made by your firm
Not at all To a large degree
1. We have made specific
investments in plant and equipment
in order to take delivery of fish products
from this supplier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. We have made specific investments
in our processing methods
to deal with fish from this supplier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. We have invested significantly
in the method of handling fish
from this supplier resulting
in the best possible quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4
4. We have invested a great deal
to ensure the traceability of the fish
delivered from this supplier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. We have made specific investments
in the method of packaging dedicated
to fish products from this supplier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. We have invested a great deal to market
fish products from this supplier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 6a Investments in personnel and procedures made by the supplier
Not at all To a large degree
1. This supplier has made a substantial
investment in personnel dedicated
to this relationship 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. In cooperation with our firm, this supplier
had to learn about our firm
on many dimensions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. This supplier has put a lot of energy
in order to establish satisfying
communication procedures with our firm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. This supplier has put a lot of effort
in order to become familiar with our firm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. The supplier has developed procedures and
routines that is dedicated
to this specific exchange relationship 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 6b Investments in personnel and procedures made by your firm
Not at all To a large degree
1. We have made a substantial
investment in personnel dedicated
to this supplier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5
2. We have had to learn about this
supplier on many dimensions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. We have put a lot of energy
in order to establish satisfying
communication procedures with the supplier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. We have used much time and
resources to become familiar
with this supplier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. The procedures and routines developed
with this supplier is dedicated to this
specific exchange relationship 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 7a Logistic adaptations made by the supplier
Not at all To a large degree
1. This supplier has tailored
his logistics systems to meet our firm's
requirements with respect to terms of delivery 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. This supplier has made internal adjustments
in order to deliver fish in accordance
with our firm's freshness/cold chain requirements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. This supplier has made significant
adaptations in order to meet our firm's requests
regarding volumes of fish to be delivered 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. This supplier has made extensive adjustments
in order to meet our firm' s requirements
with respect to punctual delivery 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 7b Logistic adaptations made by your firm
Not at all To a large degree
1. We have adapted our logistical systems
to meet the requirements of further
distribution of fish from this supplier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. We have made significant internal
adjustments in order to take delivery
of fresh/frozen fish from this supplier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6
3. We have made significant adaptations
in order to handle the volumes offish
delivered from this supplier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. We have made extensive adjustments
in order to take punctual delivery of fish
from this supplier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 8 Contact with supplier representative
In this part of the questionnaire we will ask you about aspects related to the contact you have
with one specific supplier representative. These questions concern aspects related to the
representative's knowledge about French language, customs and culture as well as abilities and
willingness to adapt, abilities to communicate, liking and the frequency of contact. Even if you are
in contact with several persons in the supplier firm, we will ask you to select one person you have
had most contact with.
1. How many persons are you in contact with, on a regularly basis, in the supplier firm? _
2. What is the nationality (country of origin) of your selected supplier representative? _
3. History of business with the supplier representative
1. How many years have you been doing business with this supplier representative? ___'ears
Question 8a Cultural knowledge
Please, indicate on a scale from 1 to 7, to which extent you agree with the following statements
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1. This supplier representative has good
knowledge about French society and culture 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. This supplier representative has a good
understanding of French norms and customs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. This supplier representative
speaks well French 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7
Question 8b Supplier representative's ability and willingness to adapt
Not at all To a large degree
1. This supplier representative has put
a lot of energy in understanding
my way of thinking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. This supplier representative has
invested much time to comprehend
my values and beliefs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. This supplier representative has put
a lot of energy into adapting
to my way ofnegotiating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. This supplier representative has made
an effort to become accustomed
to my way of handling disagreements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 8c Buyer representative's ability and willingness to adapt
Not at all To a large degree
1. I have put a lot of energy
in understanding the supplier representative' s
way of thinking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. I have made an effort
to comprehend the supplier representative's
values and beliefs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. I have put a lot of energy to adapt
to the supplier representative's
way of negotiating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. I have made an effort to become accustomed
to the supplier representative's
way of handling disagreements I 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 9a Supplier representative's ability and willingness to communicate
Strongly disagree Stronglyagree
1. This supplier representative keeps us
well informed about what is going on
in their firm and related activities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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2. This supplier representative seeks our advice
and counsel concerning their marketing efforts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. This supplier representative is willing to let
us see their weaknesses as well
as their strengths 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. This supplier representative will share
confidential information to help us 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 9b Buyer representative's ability and willingness to communicate
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1. I keep the supplier representative
well informed about what is going on
in our firm and related activities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. I seek this supplier representative's advice
and counsel concerning our marketing efforts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. I am willing to let them see
our weaknesses as well as our strengths 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. I will share confidential information
in order to help them 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
QuestionlO Liking
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1. This supplier representative is friendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. This supplier representative
is always nice to us 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. This supplier representative is someone
we like to have around 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. I have an affinity for this
supplier representative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Question 11 How often are you in contact with the supplier representative?
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1. The supplier' s rep and I
conduct business together frequently 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. I deal with this supplier' s rep
on a frequent basis 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. I frequently come into contact
with the supplier' s rep 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. This supplier's representative frequently
visits our place of business 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Please, indicate how often you are in contact with the supplier representative
5a Face-to-face, number oftimes in a year? ca. _
5b On telephone, number of times in a month? ca . _
Question 12 Supplier performance
Please circle a number indicating if the supplier needs improvement or executes superior
performance on the given domains.
Needs improvement Executes superior
performance
2a Product quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2b Delivery/logistics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2c The management and the workers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2d After sale service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Part C
13 Characteristics of your firm
In this section we present a number of statements regarding the way of working in your firm, and
more specifically within the buying group. Please indicate on a scale ranging from 1 to 7 to what
extent you agree with the following statements.
Question 13a
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1. In this department tasks are described
by formal rules and written documents 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. In this department we follow standard
procedures when performing
work activities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. In this department we follow standard
operating procedures when
making decisions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. In this department we follow
written and/or verbal instructions
in ourwork 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 13b
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
In this department approval from
someone higher in the organization is
required for making decisions l 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. In this department we follow instructions
from someone higher in the organization
when existing rules and procedures
are not adequate to make decisions l 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. In this department individuals (alone or a
few together) cannot make decisions without
consulting members higher in the organization l 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. In this department individuals
(alone or a few together) cannot resolve
problems without consulting members
higher in the organization 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Question 14a The way of handling conflicts and disagreements
In ongoing business exchange conflicts, disagreements (large and minor) related to for example
product quality, delivery requirements, lack of information exchange, price, and service usually
occur. These kinds of events need to be handled and resolved by the implicated firms. Please,
indicate on a scale from 1 to 7 to what extent you agree in the following statements which describe
how these kinds of problems are handled in your firm.
Question 14a
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1. The management of conflicts/disagreements
with this supplier are described by formal rules
and written documents? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. There are standard procedures
to follow when handling problems related
to the on-going exchange with this supplier? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Buyers have to follow
standard operating procedures when making
decisions related to the handling
of relationship problems? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. You have to follow written and lor verbal
instructions when managing
problems related to the on-going exchange? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 14b
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1. The approval from someone
higher in the organization
is required for decisions related to handling
conflicts/disagreements with this supplier? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Instructions from someone higher in the
organization is needed when existing
rules and procedures are not adequate
to make decisions related to problems
in the current supplier relationship? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Buyers (alone or few together) cannot make decisions
related to problems in this specific supplier
without consulting members
higher in the organization? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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4. Problems related to
this particular relationship cannot be resolved
by buyers (alone or a few together)
without consulting members higher
in the organization? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 15The capacity to solve relationship conflicts
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1. Together with the supplier we are able
to solve all conflicts that may occur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Both parties, intend to solve conflicts
by working together rather than
responding to neutral party or lawsuits 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Occasionally, particular difficult conflicts
that are threatening our cooperation may occur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. It is expected that both parties in a positive
way are helping to solve conflicts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 16 Contact with other activities and firm personnel
In this question we are interested to know to what extent you are involved with other activities
than purchasing in your firm. In addition, we want to know if and how many other
organizational members you regularly work and cooperate with.
Question 16a Involvement in other activities
Please indicate on a scale from 1 to 7 how often, (never to always), you are involved in the
following activities in your own firm.
Never Always
1. Processing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Product-development 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Logistics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Question 16b Cooperation with other personnel
With reference to the following activities, could you please indicate the number of persons within
your_own firm you work or cooperate together with?
I work together with persons, performing market activities
I work together with persons, performing processing activities
I work together with persons, performing product-development activities
I work together with persons, performing logistic activities
Question 17a Availability of alternative suppliers
The following question asks about how your firm considers the availability of other suppliers.
Please, circle a number to indicate to what extent the below statement is not true at all to
perfectly true.
Not true at all Perfectly true
1. If this supplier-relationship is dissolved
other firms can deliver what we buy
from this supplier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. If there are alternative suppliers who can deliver what you buy from the current supplier firm, what is
the number of alternative suppliers? Please circle the correct number of alternative suppliers.
a) 1-2 O b) 3-4 D c) 5-9 o d) 10-15 O e) 16-20 o
Question 17b Overall satisfaction with the supplier firm
Please, circle any number from 1 to 7 describing your agreement with the following statements.
Strongly disagree Stronglyagree
1. Overall, we are satisfied with the supplier
representative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. In general, we are satisfied with the supplier
firm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Our relationship with this supplier
is not at all pleasant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. All in all, the quality of products delivered
from this firm is satisfactory 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. All in all, the quality of services provided
from this supplier is satisfactory 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Overall, the quality of the relationship with
this supplier is good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Question 17c Switching costs
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1. Considering everything, the costs
of terminating our business relationship
with the current supplier and start up with
an alternative supplier would be high 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PartD
Question 18
The following question asks whether your firm occasionally would think to leave the current
supplier. Please, circle a number, from 1 to 7, to indicate the extent of agreement with the
following statements.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1. Occasionally my firm will consider
ending the business relationship
to the supplier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. My firm is not likely to continue the
business relationship with the supplier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. My firm will probably consider a
replacement supplier in the near future 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. My firm will probably stop doing
business with my supplier in the future 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 19
This question asks about your firms expectations of how long the supplier relationship is going to
last. Please, judge the following statements and describe your firm's extent of agreement by
circling a number.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1. We expect our relationship with
this supplier to continue a long time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Renewal of the relationship
with this supplier is virtually automatic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Our relationship with this
supplier is enduring 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Our relationship with this
supplier is a long-term alliance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Question 20 How is your firms tolerance for conflict situations?
Below follows a number of statements describing possible conflict situations between your firm
and the supplier. With respect to each of the below statements please indicate, by circling the
appropriate number, the degree to which it is likely that you would leave the current partner.
Not likely at all Very Likely
1. If this supplier occasionally delivers
products of lower quality than our firm require,
we would consider leaving the current partner 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. If this supplier delivers less quantity
than we order, we would consider
leaving the current partner 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. If this supplier does not deliver on time,
a day later than agreed upon, we would consider
leaving the current partner 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. If this supplier does not deliver on time,
some hours later than agreed upon,
we would consider leaving the current partner 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. If this supplier holds back information
that could be useful to us,
we would consider leaving the current partner 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. If this supplier demands too high prices,
we would consider leaving the current partner 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. If this supplier occasionally does not respond
in order to correct failures, we would consider
leaving the current partner 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Question 21 Some information about you
1.What is your post in this firm? _
2. Could we ask you about your educational background?
• Secondary school/high school O
• Avlevels/high-school diploma + 2 O
• More than Aelevels/high-school diploma + jJ
3. Your age, please? _Jears
Your sex: F O M O
Thank you very much for your cooperation!
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Code questionnaire._I ___.
Questionnaire destine aux entreprises dans la filiere peche en France
Merci d'avoir accepte de me recevoir. Cette etude est conduite par le «Norwegian School of Economics
and Business Administration» il Bergen (Norvege), et traite sur les relations commerciales entre
importateurs francais et leur fournisseurs de produits de la mer.
Ce questionnaire est compose de questions relatives aux echanges de biens et services entre votre
entreprise et un fournisseur important. Il comprend des questions relatives ildifferents aspects de cette
relation entre fournisseur et importateur, ainsi que des questions relatives ilvotre entreprise.
La plupart des questions correspondent en fait il des affirmations pour lesquelles vous devez indiquer sur
une echelle (allant de 1 il 7) dans quelle mesure vous etes en accord avec cette affirmation.
Il n'est pas neeessaire de rechercher des informations pour remplir le questionnaire.
Toutes les informations donnees dans ce questionnaire seront traitees de facon strictement confidentielle.
Les resultats de cette recherche ne seront presentes que de faeon agregee, et ilne sera pas possible d'y
retrouver une entreprise en particulier.
Questionnaire
Partie A
Question 1 Quelques informations sur votre entreprise
QueUes activites exerce votre entreprise? Merci de cocher les activites conduites par votre entreprise:
D 1Mareyage
D 4 Conditionnement
D 2 Import
D 5 Filetage
D 8 Conserverie
D 3 Export
D 6 Filetage en prestation de service
D 9 Fabrication de plats cuisines et produits elaboresD 7 Saleur, saurisseur
D 10 Fabrication de produits surgeles D 11 Stockage & distribution D 12 Logistique
D'autres activites ?
Question 2 Quelques informations sur votre entreprise
2a Combien de personnes etaient employees par votre entreprise l'annee passee?
Employes fl temps plein'-- _
Employes fl temps partiel _
2b Chiffre d'affaires 2002? _
2c Votre entreprise fait-elle partie d'un groupe? Qui D NonD
Si oui, quel a ete le chiffre d'affaires de ce groupe en 2002? _
1
Si oui, votre entreprise est-elle :
Possedee seulement partiellement par ce groupe ?
Si oui, quel est le taux de possession ? _
Membre volontaire du groupe? Oui
Qui O Non O
O Non D
Dans cette section, nous vous demandons de selectionner un de vos fournisseurs sur les criteres presentes ci-
dessous et de nous donner quelques informations sur ce fournisseur.
Nous souhaiterions que vous sålectionniez un fournisseur avec qui vous avez actueUement une relation
commereiale.
Ce fournisseur doit remplir les conditions suivantes :
• Il doit etre votre treisieme plus important fournisseur ;
• Il doit etre, de preference, d'origine nordique (par exemple, la Norvege, I'Islande, Pays Baltiques, la
Russie) ou d'un pays non europeen (par exemple Ie Bresil, Ie Chili, la Thailande etc.)
• Aucun lien financier ne doit exister entre votre entreprise et ce fournisseur, a l'exception des
transactions a caractere commercial
Question 3 Informations sur le fournisseur et le produit
3a Merci d'indiquer le pays d'origine du fournisseur : _
3b Merci d'indiquer l'une des principales especes de poisson que vous achetez aupres de ce foumisseur
Poisson d'elevage : ou Poisson sauvage : _
3c Merci de cocher le type de produit: O 1Frais O 2 Congele O 3 En conserves
3d Merci d'indiquer le pourcentage de vos approvisionnements (par rapport å cet espece) realise par votre
entreprise aupres de ce fournisseur :
En volume (ca. %): En valeur (ca. %) :
3e QueUes activites exerce votre fournisseur? Merci de cocher les actrvites conduites par votre
fournisseur :
O 1Negoce
O 5 Conditionnement.
o 2 Export
O 6 Filetage
O 3 Capture D 4 Aquaculture
O 7 Fabrication de produits surgeles
o 8 Logistique D' autres activites ?------------------
3f Merci d'indiquer le moyen de transport pour ce produit :
O 1 Par carnion O 2 Par bateau O 3 Par avion
2
3g Merci d'indiquer combien de temps il faut pour le transport :
En heures/enjours/ou en semaines :
Question 4a Duree de votre relation avec ce fournisseur
1. Depuis combien d'annees travaillez-vous avec ce fournisseur? Annees
Partie B
Question 5
Dans cette partie du questionnaire, nous nous interessens aux adaptations specifiques que votre
entreprise et votre fournisseur ont realisees pour cette relation commerciale. Plus precisement, nous
allons vous interroger sur les modifications relatives il l'adaptation des produits, au personnel et il la
logistique. A propos des questions qui sont relatives il l'adaptation des produits, nous vous proposons
deux sections differentes, une pour les poissons d'elevage et une pour les poissons sauvage. Merci, de
choisir celle qui correspond au type de poisson selectionne dans question 3.
Merci d'indiquer dans quelle mesure vous etes d'accord avec les affirmations suivantes.
Question 5a Adaptations des produits realisees par votre fournisseur. POISSON D'ELEV AGE
Pas du tout Tout il fait
l. Ce fournisseur a fait des investissements
specifiques dans son usine et en matiere
d'equipement pour nous livrer du poisson 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Ce fournisseur a selectionne des fermes
d'elevages specifiques pour nous livrer du poisson 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Ce fournisseur a investi dans des methodes
d' alimentation specifiques adaptees it nos exigences 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Ce fournisseur a fait des investissements
importants pour adapter ses methodes d'abattage
it nos exigences 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Ce fournisseur a fait des investissements
importants pour nous fournir une qualite de poisson
adaptee it nos exigences 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Conformement it nos exigences, ce fournisseur
a fait des adaptations specifiques pour permettre
la tracabilite du poisson 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Ce fournisseur a fait des investissements
specifiques pour adapter ses methodes de conditionnement
pour repondre aux demandes de notre entreprise 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Question Sa Adaptations des produits realisees par votre fournisseur. POISSON SAUVAGE
Pas du tout Tout a fait
1. Ce foumisseur a fait des investissements
specifiques dans son usine et en matiere
d'equipement pour nous livrer du poisson 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Ce fournisseur a selectionne des bateaux de peche
specifiques pour nous livrer du poisson 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Ce foumisseur a investi dans des methodes
de capture specifiques adaptees fl nos exigences 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Ce fournisseur a fait des ameliorations techniques
å bord adaptees å nos exigences 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Ce foumisseur a fait des investissements
importants pour nous fournir une qualite de poisson
adaptee å nos exigences 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Conformement å nos exigences, ce fournisseur
a fait des adaptations specifiques pour permettre
la tracabilite du poisson 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Ce fournisseur a fait des investissements
specifiques pour adapter ses methodes
de conditionnement pour repondre aux demandes
de notre entreprise 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question Sb Adaptations des produits råalisees par votre entreprise
Pas du tout Tout a fait
1. Nous avons fait des investissements specifiques
dans notre usine et en matiere d'equipements
pour pouvoir nous faire livrer du poisson
par ce foumisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Nous avons fait des investissements specifiques
dans nos methodes de production afin de traiter
Ie poisson de ce fournisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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3. Nous avons investi de facon importante
dans nos methodes de traitement du poisson
de ce fournisseur de facon å obtenir
la meilleure qualite possible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Nous avons beaucoup investi pour assurer
la tracabilite du poisson livre par ce fournisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Nous avons fait des investissements specifiques
dans des methodes de conditionnement propres
au poisson de ce fournisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Nous avons beaucoup investi pour
commercialiser le poisson de ce fournisseur lå 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 6a Investissements en matiere de personnel et de procedures realises par votre fournisseur
Pas du tout Tout il fait
1. Ce fournisseur a fait des investissements
substantiels dans le personnel participant
it cette relation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. En cooperation avec notre entreprise,
ce fournisseur a du apprendre å connaitre
notre entreprise dans differents domaines 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Ce fournisseur a depense beaucoup d'energie
pour mettre en place des procedures de
communication satisfaisantes avec notre entreprise 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Ce fournisseur a fait beaucoup d'efforts
de facon it devenir familier avec notre entreprise 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Ce fournisseur a developpe des procedures et
des pratiques specifiques å notre relation commerciale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 6b Investissements en matiere de personnel et de procedures realises par votre entreprise
Pas du tout Tout il fait
1. Nous avons fait des investissements
substantiels pour le personnel travaillant
specifiquement avec ce fournisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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2. Nous avons du apprendre a connaitre
notre fournisseur dans differents domaines 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Nous avons depense beaucoup d'energie
pour mettre en place des procedures
de communication satisfaisantes avec le fournisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Nous avons depense beaucoup de temps
et d'energie pour devenir familier avec ce fournisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Nous avons developpe des procedures
et des pratiques specifiques a notre relation commerciale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 7a Adaptations en termes logistiques realises par le fournisseur
Pas du tout Tout a fait
1. Ce fournisseur a adapte ses systemes
logistiques pour repondre aux besoins
de notre entreprise en terme de respects
des conditions de livraison 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Ce fournisseur a opere des ajustements
en interne pour nous livrer le poisson
en accord avec nos exigences de fraicheur/
da la chaine du froid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Ce fournisseur a fait des adaptations
importantes pour repondre a nos demandes
en terme de volume de poisson livre 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Ce fournisseur a fait des modifications
pour repondre aux conditions de notre entreprise
en terme des livraisons en juste a temps 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 7b Adaptations en term es logistiques realises par votre entreprise
Pas du tout Tout a fait
1. Nous avons adapte notre systeme logistique
afin de repondre aux conditions de livraison
des clients a qui nous livrons le poisson
provenant de ce fournisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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2. Nous avons fait des modifications
importantes en interne de facon ilpouvoir
recevoir le poisson frais/congele de ce fournisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Nous avons fait des adaptations importantes
de facon it traiter le volume de poissons
livre par ce fournisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Nous avons fait d'importantes modifications
adaptations pour prendre des livraisons en
juste il temps de ce fournisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 8 Contact avec le representant du fournisseur
Dans cette partie du questionnaire, nous vous interrogeons sur vos contacts avec un representant de
votre fournisseur. Ces questions concernent les connaissances de ce representant relatives a la langue,
aux coutumes, a la culture francaises ainsi que sur sa capacite et sa veloute a s'adapter, sur ses capacites
a communiquer et sur la frequenee des contacts. Måme si vous etes en contact avec plusieurs personnes
chez votre fournisseur, nous vous demandons de ne selectionner que celle avec laquelle vous avez le plus
de contacts et de repondre en fonction de cette personne.
1.Avec combien de personnes etes-vous en contact, de facon reguliere,
dans l' entreprise de votre fournisseur? _
2. Quelle est la nationalite (pays d'origine) du representant de votre fournisseur? _
3. Duree de votre relation avec ce representant du fournisseur
1. Depuis combien d'annees travaillez-vous avec le representant de ce fournisseur ? Annees
Question 8a Connaissance de la culture francaise
Indiquer, sur une eehelle de 1 a 7, dans quelle mesure vous etes d'accord avec les affirmations suivantes.
Pas du tout d'accord Tout a fait d'accord
1. Le representant de ce fournisseur
a de bonnes connaissances sur la societe
et la culture francaises 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Le representant de ce fournisseur
a une bonne comprehension des nonnes
et des coutumes francaises 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Le representant de ce fournisseur parle bien francais 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Question Sb Capacites et volonte du representant du fournisseur de s'adapter
Pas du tout Tout il fait
1. Le representant de ce fournisseur
a depense beaucoup d'energie pour
comprendre rna facon de penser 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Le representant de ce fournisseur
a investi beaucoup de temps pour
comprendre mes valeurs et mes volontes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Le representant de ce fournisseur
a depense beaucoup d'energie pour
s' adapter il rna facon de negocier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Le representant de ce fournisseur
a fait des efforts pour s' accoutumer
il rna facon de gerer les desaccords 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question Se Votre capacite et votre volonte de vous adapter
Pas du tout Tout il fait
1. J'ai depense beaucoup d'energie pour comprendre
la facon de penser du representant de mon foumisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. J'ai investi beaucoup de temps pour comprendre
les valeurs et les volontes du representant
de ce foumisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. J'ai depense beaucoup d'energie pour m'adapter
il la facon de negocier du representant de ce foumisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. J' ai fait des efforts pour m' accoutumer il la facon
de gerer les desaccords du representant de ce fournisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 9a Capacitå et veloute du representant du fournisseur il communiquer
Pas du tout d'aeeord Tout il fait d'aeeord
1. Le representant de ce fournisseur nous tient
bien informes de ce qu'il se passe dans
son entreprise et dans ses activites 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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2. Ce fournisseur nous demande notre avis
et nos conseils fl propos de ses actions
de commercialisation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Le representant de ce fournisseur nous permet
de constater ses forces et ses faiblesses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Ce fournisseur est pret fl partager des informations
confidentielles afin de nous aider 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 9b Votre capaeite et votre volontå il communiquer
Pas du tout d'accord Tout il fait d'accord
1. le tiens le representant de ce foumisseur
bien informe de ce qu'il se passe dans
notre entreprise et dans nos activites 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. le demande fl notre fournisseur son avis
et ses conseils fl propos de nos actions
de commercialisation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. le permets fl notre fournisseur
de constater nos forces et nos faiblesses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. le suis prette) fl partager des informations
confidentielles afin de les aider 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 10 Amabilite
Pas du tout d'accord Tout il fait d'accord
1.Le representant de ce fournisseur
est tres sympathique 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Le representant de ce fournisseur
est toujours tres aimable avec nous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Le representant de ce fournisseur
est quelqu'un que nous aimons rencontrer souvent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. l'ai des affinites avec le representant de ce fournisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Question 11Frequence des contacts avec le representant du fournisseur
Pas du tout d'accord Tout il fait d'accord
1. Le representant de ce foumisseur
et moi-memo travaillons frequemment ensemble l 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Je traite avec le representant
de ce fournisseur de facon reguliere l 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. le suis regulierement en contact
avec le representant de ce fournisseur l 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Ce foumisseur visite frequemment nos bureaux l 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Merci d'indiquer la frequence avec laquelle vous aviez communique avec le representant de votre foumisseur
Sa. En face-å-face, nombre de fois dans l'annee ? ca. _
5b. Par telephone, nombre de fois par mois? ca. _
Question 12Performance du fournisseur
Merci d'entourer le nombre correspondant il la performance de votre fournisseur sur chacun des points
suivants :
A besoin de s'ameliorer Est tres performant
a La qualite des produits l 2 3 4 5 6 7
b La livraison l 2 3 4 5 6 7
c La direction et les travailleurs employes l 2 3 4 5 6 7
d Le service å la clientele l 2 3 4 5 6 7
10
Partie C
Question 13 La faeon de travailler dans votre entreprise ...
Nous nous interessons ici il la fa~on dont vous travaillez dans votre entreprise, notamment au niveau du
departement ou d'une unite d'achat. Merci, d'indiquer sur une eehelle de 1 il 7 dans quelle mesure vous
etes d'accord avec les affirmations suivantes.
Question l3a
Pas du tout d'accord Tout il fait d'accord
1. Dans cette unite, les taches sont decrites
par des regles formelles et des documents ecrits 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Dans cette unite, nous suivons des procedures
standards lorsque nous travaillons 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Dans cette unite, nous suivons des procedures
operationnelles standardisees lorsque nous avons
ilprendre des decisions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Dans cette unite, nous respectons des instructions
ecrites et/au verbales pour realiser notre travail 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 13b
Pas du tout d'accord Tout il fait d'accord
1. Dans cette unite, l'approbation d'un superieur
hierarchique est necessaire pour prendre des decisions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Dans cette unite, nous suivons
les instructions d'un superieur hierarchique
lorsque les regles et les procedures existantes
ne permettent pas la prise de decision 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Dans cette unite, les individus (seuls au ilquelques uns)
ne peuvent pas prendre des decisions sans consulter
un superieur hierarchique 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Dans cette unite, les individus (seuls au ilquelques uns)
ne peuvent pas resoudre des problemes sans
consulter un superieur hierarchique 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Question 14a Resolution des conflits et des desaccords
Les conflits, les desaccords (importants ou mineurs) relatifs, par exemple, il la qualitå des produits, aux
conditions de livraison, au manque d'information, au prix, aux services sont une realitå de la vie des
affaires. Ces dffferents types de problem es necessitent d'etre traites et resolus par les entreprises
concernåes. Merci d'indiquer sur une echelle de 1 il 7 dans queUe mesure vous etes en accord ou en
desaccord avec les enonces suivants qui decrivent la faeon dont les problemes sont traites dans votre
entreprise.
Question 14a
Pas du tout d'accord Tout il fait d'accord
1. La gestion des conflits/ desaccords avec
ce fournisseur est decrite par
des regles formelles et des documents ecrits 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Il existe des procedures standardisees li suivre
lorsque vous devez reglez un probleme lie liun echange
existant avec un fournisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Les acheteurs doivent suivre des procedures
operationnelles standardisees quand ils prennent
des decisions liees au reglement des problemes relationnels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Vous devez suivre des instructions verbales
et/ou ecrites pour regler des problemes lies
å des echanges en cours 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 14b
Pas du tout d'accord Tout a fait d'accord
1. Il est necessaire d'avoir l'approbation
d'un superieur hierarchique pour prendre
des decisions relatives å la resolution
de conflits/desaccords avec ce fournisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Lorsque les regles et les procedures existantes
ne permettent pas de prendre de decisions relatives
å un probleme avec ce fournisseur, il est necessaire
de faire appel liun superieur hierarchique 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Les acheteurs (seuls ou en groupe) ne peuvent pas
prendre des decisions relatives å des problemes
avec ce fournisseur sans faire appel
å un superieur hierarchique 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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4. Les acheteurs (seuls ou en groupe) ne peuvent pas
resoudre les problemes relatifs il. cette relation commerciale
sans en referer il. un superieur hierarchique 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 15 La capacite it resoudre des conflits
Pas du tout d'accord Tout it fait d'accord
1. Ensemble avec le fournisseur,
nous sommes capables de resoudre
les conflits qui se produisent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Les deux parties se proposent de travailler
ensemble pour resoudre les conflits,
plutot que de faire appel il. une tierce partie
ou de recourir il. des poursuites judiciaires 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Occasionnellement, des conflits particulierement
durs et menacant notre cooperation peuvent apparaitre 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Il est attendu que les deux parties cherchent
il. resoudre les conflits de facon constructive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 16 Implication dans d'autres activltes et cooperation avec d'autres personnes
Nous souhaitons savoir, ici, dans queUe mesure vous etes, au sein de votre entreprise, impliquete) dans
d'autres activites que les achats. Nous souhaiterions egalement savoir avec combien d'autres personnes
vous travaillez regulierement au sein de votre entreprise.
16a Implication dans d'autres aetivites
Merci d'indiquer, sur une echelle de 1 it 7, combien de fois (jamais it toujours) vous etes impliquete) dans
les activites suivantes, dans votre entreprise.
Jamais Toujours
1. Production l 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Developpement de produits 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Logistique l 2 3 4 5 6 7
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l6b Cooperation avec d'autres personnes
Par rapport aux activites suivantes, pourriez-vous indiquer le nombre de personnes, au sein de votre
entreprise, avec qui vous travaillez?
Je travaille avec __ personnes pour realiser les activites commerciales
Je travaille avec __ personnes pour realiser les activites de production
Je travaille avec __ personnes pour realiser les activites de developpement de produits
Je travaille avec __ personnes pour realiser les activites logistiques
Question l7a Presence d'autres fournisseurs
La question suivante vise a savoir s'il existe d'autres fournisseurs potentiels pour votre entreprise. Merci
d'indiquer, sur une echeUe de 1 a 7 dans quelle mesure vous considerez Penoneå suivant comme etant
entierement faux ou totalement exact.
Entierement faux Totalement exact
1. Si cette relation avec ce fournisseur s'arrete,
d'autres entreprises pourraient nous fournir
ce que nous prenons chez lui. l 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. S'il existe d'autres fournisseurs capables de vous proposer ce que vous achetez it ce fournisseur, combien
sont-ils? Merci de cocher la bonne reponse:
a) 1-2 O b) 3-4 O c) 5-9 O d) 10-15 O e) 16-20 O
Question l7b Satisfaction globale par rapport au fournisseur
Merci d'indiquer, sur une ecbelle de 1 a 7 dans queUe mesure vous etes en accord avec les affirmations
suivantes.
Pas du tout d'accord Tout a fait d'accord
1. De facon generale, nous sommes satisfaits
de notre relation avec le representant de ce fournisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. De facon generale, nous sommes satisfaits
de notre relation avec ce fournisseur l 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Notre relation avec ce fournisseur n'est vraiment
pas agreable l 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Dans l' ensemble, la qualite des produits
livres par ce fournisseur est satisfaisante l 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Dans l'ensemble, la qualite des services
rendus par ce fournisseur est satisfaisante 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Dans l'ensemble, la qualite de cette relation que nous
entretenons avec ce foumisseur est bonne l 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Question 17c Couts relatifs au changement de fournisseur
Pas du tout d'accord Tout il fait d'accord
17c Tout considere, les coåts lies å l'arret
de cette relation et au demarrage d'une relation
avec un nouveau foumisseur seraient tres eleves I 2 3 4 5 6 7
Partie D
Question 18
Les questions suivantes sont relatives au fait de savoir si votre entreprise envisage de quitter ce
fournisseur. Merci d'entourer un nombre, entre 1 et 7, indiquant dans quelle mesure vous etes en accord
ou en desaccord avec les affirmations suivantes.
Pas du tout d'accord Tout il fait d'accord
1.Par moment, nous pensons mettre
un terme å notre relation avec ce foumisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Nous avons peu de chances de poursuivre
notre relation commerciale avec ce fournisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Nous allons probablement considerer
un nouveau foumisseur en remplacement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Nous allons probablement cesser nos
relations commerciales avec ce foumisseur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 19
Les questions suivantes s'Intåressent aux attentes de votre entreprise en matiere de duree de la relation
avec ce fournisseur. Merci d'evaluer les affirmations suivantes et d'entourer le nombre correspondant il
votre situation.
Pas du tout d'accord Tout il fait d'accord
1. Nous pensons que cette relation commerciale
avec ce foumisseur va durer encore longtemps 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Le renouvellement de notre relation
avec ce fournisseur est tacite 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Notre relation avec ce fournisseur est durable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Notre relation avec ce fournisseur
est une alliance de long terme 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Question 20 Le niveau de tolerance de votre entreprise face aux situations de conflit
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un ensemble d'enonces qui decrivent des comportements possibles d'un
fournisseur. Pour chacun des eneneås, merci d'indiquer a quel degre c'est probable que les incidents
suivants pourraient mener a une rupture de relation avec votre fournisseur.
Tres peu probable Tres probable
1. Si ce fournisseur nous livrait occasionnellement
des produits de qualite inferieure
li ce que nous attendons, nous considererions de le quitter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Si ce fournisseur nous livrait occasionnellement
des quantites inferieures li ce que nous avons commande,
nous considererions de le quitter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Si ce fournisseur occasionnellement
ne nous livrait pas dans les temps mais un jour
apres la date convenue, nous considererions de le quitter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Si ce fournisseur occasionnellement
ne nous livrait pas dans les temps mais quelques heures
apres l'heure convenue, nous considererions de le quitter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Si ce fournisseur occasionnellement faisait
de la retention d'informations qui pourraient
nous etre utiles, nous considererions de le quitter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Si ce fournisseur occasionnellement nous demandait
des prix trop eleves, nous considererions de le quitter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Si, occasionnellement,
ce fournisseur ne reparait pas ses erreurs,
nous considererions de le quitter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Question 21 Quelques renseignements sur vous
1. Quelle est votre fonction dans l'entreprise ?
2. Pouvons-nous vous demander quel est votre niveau de formation? (Cocher la case correspondante)
• Secondaire O
• Niveau Bac + 2 O
• Au-delå de Bac+ 2 O
3. Pouvons-nous vous demander votre åge ? ans
Merci de cocher votre sexe : F O M O
NODS VODS remercions infiniment de votre collaboration!
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Appendix D: Factor analysis
The constructs centralization and formalization at the buyer department level (13a and 13b)
and the task level (14a and 14b) came out as distinct constructs (cf7.6).
Table 12.1: Factor structure and factor loadings - centralization and formalization at buyer
department level and at task level
Rotated Factor Matrii'
Factor
1 2 3 4
FORM13A1 5,946E-02 ,136 ,607 ,249
FORM13A2 4,537E-02 4,424E-02 ,835 ,183
FORM13A3 2,658E-02 -2,04E-02 ,718 ,111
FORM13A4 2,512E-02 ,152 ,719 9,972E-02
CENT1381 ,297 ,827 ,134 -7,98E-03
CENT1382 ,420 ,720 ,162 4,227E-02
CENT1383 ,349 ,867 7,469E-02 -1,66E-02
CENT1384 ,339 ,807 4,375E-02 -3,13E-02
FORM14A1 4,103E-02 -3,43E-02 ,187 ,719
FORM14A2 ,162 -1,66E-02 ,130 ,749
FORM14A3 ,166 2,374E-03 ,142 ,751
FORM14A4 -1,08E-02 3,943E-02 ,124 ,613
CENT1481 ,864 ,340 3,634E-02 9,972E-02
CENT1482 ,791 ,356 3,525E-02 ,131
CENT1483 ,879 ,341 3,659E-02 ,129
CENT1484 ,891 ,366 8,453E-02 ,135
Extraction Method: Alpha Factoring.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.
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Factor matrixes for the oblique method (promax) (cfChapter 8, section 8.2)
Table 12.2: Factor structure and/actor loadings - Independent variables supplier
Pattern Matrii'
Factor
1 2 3 4 5 6
prowf5a1 ,660 3,567E-02 ,212 -2,77E-02 -7,55E-02 7,871E-02
prowf5a2 ,790 ,125 -3,97E-03 2,880E-02 -8,11E-02 -,135
prowf5a3 ,716 -,109 ,125 4,904E-04 -,112 ,164
prowf5a4 ,743 -7,32E-02 ,191 -5,14E-02 -6,30E-02 ,102
prowf5a5 ,840 -,145 ,190 -2,22E-02 3,187E-02 ,116
prowf5a6 ,823 7,466E-02 -,257 6,846E-02 8,747E-02 -,184
prowf5a7 ,735 ,244 -,299 8,645E-02 ,139 -,126
ass6a1 ,219 -,214 ,698 -,164 7,913E-02 ,102
ass6a2 2,471E-02 ,348 ,505 ,184 -1,31E-02 -,139
ass6a3 5,052E-02 9,397E-02 ,678 5,528E-02 -6,36E-03 -2,09E-02
ass6a4 -,115 9,008E-02 ,781 ,119 9,363E-02 -,110
ass6a5 -4,46E-02 ,169 ,604 ,211 6,327E-02 -,197
log7a1 -1,79E-02 -,206 1,976E-02 ,849 -6,56E-03 5,613E-02
log7a2 -3,88E-02 -9,38E-03 ,263 ,740 -,169 9,263E-02
log7a3 3,416E-02 -2,11E-02 7,150E-02 ,765 4,112E-02 5,189E-02
log7a4 8,862E-02 -,110 -9,09E-02 ,829 ,115 -8,43E-03
frcu8a1 5,545E-03 ,107 -1,80E-02 5,674E-02 6,058E-02 ,907
frcu8a2 -9,39E-02 ,291 -,222 ,218 -7,20E-02 ,753
frcu8a3 7,318E-02 -4,59E-02 1,161E-02 -5,51E-02 ,108 ,715
cuad8b1 -8,39E-02 -3,88E-02 ,102 -,191 ,955 6,018E-02
cuad8b2 -4,09E-02 ,186 5,174E-02 1,105E-02 ,675 -1,15E-02
cuad8b3 1,119E-02 -9,65E-02 5,846E-02 ,184 ,721 ,101
cuad8b4 2,908E-02 4,708E-02 -1,83E-02 ,148 ,737 -1,31E-02
com9a1 2,448E-02 ,614 -4,50E-02 ,121 2,033E-02 7,755E-02
com9a2 2,651E-02 ,863 1,109E-02 -4,88E-02 -5,12E-02 1,873E-02
com9a3 3,075E-02 ,816 ,187 -,211 4,565E-03 ,129
com9a4 -2,11E-03 ,728 -8,85E-04 -,218 5,208E-02 8,559E-02
Extraction Method: Alpha Factoring.
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 8 iterations.
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Table 12.3: Factor structure andfactor loadings - Independent variables buyer
Pattern Matrix"
Factor
1 2 3 4 5
pro5b1 -,288 ,631 1,836E-02 5,079E-02 ,266
pro5b2 -1,47E-03 ,825 -3,29E-02 3,843E-02 -,109
pro5b3 -,168 ,890 -3,58E-02 2,658E-02 6,227E-02
pro5b4 6,923E-02 ,549 ,113 -5,61 E-02 9,280E-02
pro5b5 ,120 ,598 3,353E-02 -9,32E-02 -9,85E-02
pro5b6 ,373 ,498 1,793E-02 -4,36E-02 -5,33E-03
ass6b2 ,108 ,108 4,743E-02 ,140 ,567
ass6b3 5,165E-02 2,558E-02 -7,33E-02 -4,53E-02 ,870
ass6b4 ,211 -6,61 E-02 2,924E-02 -5,23E-02 ,792
ass6b5 ,386 9,141E-02 -1,57E-02 -2,39E-02 ,517
log7b1 -,107 ,130 ,431 1,987E-02 ,279
log7b2 -1,16E-02 ,110 ,877 3,561E-02 -,118
log7b3 ,220 ,105 ,850 -6,50E-02 -,187
log7b4 -,131 -,165 ,923 3,742E-02 ,155
adap8c1 ,777 -5,20E-02 -,112 -2,02E-02 ,220
adap8c2 ,849 -1,41 E-02 -,106 3,450E-02 3,640E-02
adap8c3 ,793 -3,84E-02 6,086E-02 ,103 6,055E-02
adap8c4 ,693 -8,83E-02 ,193 1,624E-02 1,365E-02
com9b1 ,237 ,225 -,153 ,673 -,209
com9b2 -8,31E-03 -3,54E-02 ,103 ,685 2,974E-02
com9b3 -,107 -8,65E-02 -1,03E-02 ,971 5,355E-02
com9b4 ,109 -7,94E-02 6,794E-02 ,682 2,850E-02
Extraction Method: Alpha Factoring.
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.
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Table 12.4: Factor structure and factor loadings - dependent, control and moderator
variables
PatternMatrir
Factor
1 2 3 4 5 6
form13a1 8,789E-02 8,178E-02 ,121 ,653 4,582E-02 -,138
form13a2 -,135 -5,73E-03 -6,19E-02 ,850 2,596E-02 9,220E-02
form13a3 -6,82E-03 -5,38E-02 4,099E-02 ,710 -7,47E-02 5,383E-02
form13a4 ,149 9,645E-02 -7,59E-02 ,735 1,250E-03 -1,63E-02
cent13b1 -,144 ,920 -9,20E-02 2,069E-02 3,668E-02 ,107
cent13b2 -1,81E-02 ,794 3,075E-02 ,112 -5,22E-02 -2,92E-02
cent13b3 5,045E-02 ,943 3,479E-02 -1,29E-02 3,612E-02 -5,56E-02
cent13b4 5,283E-02 ,868 ,105 -2,95E-02 -6,15E-02 -4,04E-02
exit18.1 -,187 1,773E-02 ,641 ,129 1,268E-02 3,700E-02
exit18.2 -1,66E-02 1,316E-02 ,810 ,130 -4,13E-02 ,119
exit18.3 -5,59E-02 2,309E-02 ,614 -4,65E-02 ,164 -,105
exit18.4 ,140 3,920E-02 ,931 -,158 -2,32E-02 -2,37E-02
perf12.1 ,413 -3,85E-02 1,902E-02 3,031E-02 2,676E-02 ,390
perf12.2 ,144 ,107 4,245E-02 -,244 -5,77E-02 ,429
perf12.3 -6,49E-02 -,112 7,001E-02 ,120 -3,98E-02 ,758
perf12.4 ,179 9,593E-02 -6,20E-02 -2,58E-02 ,108 ,747
exte19.1 ,894 1,562E-02 -9,05E-02 4,854E-02 3,331E-02 -2,79E-02
exte19.2 ,621 2,445E-02 6,151E-02 -,119 -5,55E-02 7,623E-02
exte19.3 ,960 -2,34E-02 -,108 6,314E-02 4,314E-02 -5,61E-02
exte19.4 ,869 -5,94E-02 ,124 6,290E-02 -5,82E-02 1,227E-02
tolc20.1 -,125 -8,04E-02 ,129 -2,46E-03 ,639 4,648E-02
tolc20.5 9,410E-02 -,174 ,138 7,802E-02 ,540 -1,64E-02
tolc20.6 -9,15E-02 9,024E-03 -3,02E-02 -1,54E-02 ,632 4,875E-02
tolc20.7 6,986E-02 ,125 -,117 -4,88E-02 ,876 -5,45E-02
Extraction Method: Alpha Factoring.
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.
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Appendix E: Descriptive statistics
Table 13.1:Mean, Standard deviation, Skewness and Kurtosis ofvariables
Variables (number ofitems) Mean Std Skewness' Kurtosis2
Independent variables
Inter12.ersonalvariables
Supplier rep cultural knowledge(3) 4.5 1.9 -0.11 -1.18
Supplier rep cultural adaptation (4) 3.8 1.7 0.24 -0.89
Buyer rep cultural adaptation (4) 3.8 1.9 0.18 -1.12
*Supplier rep two-way communication (4) 3.9 1.8 0.09 -1.01
*Buyer rep two-way communication (4) 3.9 1.7 0.06 -0.92
Interorganizational variables
**Supplier firm product adaptation (7) 304 1.6 0.03 -0.74
(Farmed seafood, n=18)
**Supplier firm product adaptation (7) 3.2 1.6 0.22 -1.18
(Wild seafood, n=78)
Buyer firm product adaptation (6) 2.3 1.5 1.10 1.77
Supplier firm human asset specificity (5) 3.3 1.7 0.09 -1.27
Buyer firm human asset specificity (4) 3.6 1.9 0.17 -1.19
Supplier firm logistical adaptation (4) 3.7 2.0 0.12 -1.17
Buyer firm logistical adaptation(4) 2.6 1.8 0.98 -0.28
Moderators
Formalization (4) 4.6 1.6 -0.42 -0.55
Centralization (4) 4.2 1.8 0.08 -1.41
Levels of inclusiveness (3) 4.8 1.7 -0.42 -0.62
***History with supplier firm (1) 7.6 6.3
*The measures Supplier rep and Buyer rep two-way communication are combined to one measure in data
analysis (cf chapter 8).
**The two measures Supplier firm product adaptation are combined to one measure in data-analysis
***The number given in table reflects number ofyears
1 A positively skewed distribution indicates few large values, while a negatively skewed distribution indicates
few small values. Skewness values falling outside the range of -1 to +1 indicate a substantially skewed
distribution. Consequently, the measures Exit intention, Extendedness ofrelationship and Availability of
alternative supplier firms have a substantial skewed distribution (Hair et al., 1998).
2 Measures the peakedness or flatness of distribution compared to a normal distribution. A positive value
indicates a peaked distribution while negative values indicate a flat distribution (Hair et al., 1998).
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Variables (number ofitems) Mean Std Skewness Kurtosis
Dependent variables:
Exit intention (4) 2.l 0.5 2.22 4.56
Tolerance of conflict (4) 4.5 1.4 -0.25 -0.31
Extendedness ofrelationship (4) 5.7 0.9 -1.15 0.73
Control variables:
Availability of alternative supplier firms (1) 5.8 1.7 -1.41 1.19
Switching cost (1) 3.0 1.9 0.59 -0.69
Overall satisfaction with
supplier firm performance (4) 5.4 1.1 -0.42 -0.21
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Appendix F: Split-Half analysis
variables and their effect in subsamples
Examination of independent
In this part of appendices we examine the effect (direction and strength) of independent
variables in the subsamples (cf 10.2). We equally test for the significance of differences
between coefficients in the subsamples, and comment on this related to each table. Based on
the below examination, we exclude independent variables from the moderator analysis
presented in Chapter 10.
14.1 Organization size
Estimation of the regression models for the subsamples - Tolerance of conflict
With respect to tolerance of conflict we expect the independent variables to be positively
related. In Table l4.1a below, Beta-coefficients and significance levels for the subsamples are
presented. Statistics in Table l4.la show the effect ofbuyer rep cultural adaptation is negative
in sample O and positive in sample 1, although we expected the effect to be positive and
higher in sample Othan in sample 1. This finding is contrary to our expectations, however, the
effect is large and differences between subsamples are significant. We therefore include the
variable and search for alternative explanations.
The effect of two-way communication is positive in both samples and higher in sample 1.
Thus, strength is not in accord with theory. The effect of two-way communication is as well
stronger in sample 1 compared to sample O with regard to exit intention. These findings are
not consistent with our theoretical expectations, however, since the effects are large, and the
effects are positive in sample 1 for both variables, and since differences in Beta-coefficients
between subsamples are significant we include the variables in further analysis, and search for
alternative explanations.
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Table 14.1a: Size of organization - Tolerance of conflict
Dependent variable - Tolerance of conflict
Independent Beta-coefficient F (Sig.)
variables
Interpersonal Sample O Sample I Sample O Sample 1
variables
Buyer rep cultural -.120 .541 .676 18.248
adaptation (.208) (.000)***
Two-way .291 .483 4.248 12.754
communication (.023)** (.000)***
Interorganizational
variables
Buyer firm product -.014 .005 .009 .001
adaptation (.464) (A88)
Buyer firm human -.125 .237 .733 2.672
asset specificity (.198) (.055)*
Buyer firm logistical -.061 .084 .170 .317
adaptation (.341) (.288)
Sample O=smallorganizations, Sample 1=large organizations
F (sig.j=Beta-coefficient (Sig.), Significance level (one-tailed)
Further, the effect of buyer firm product adaptation is positive, but weak in sample 1. In
addition, there is no significant difference between Beta-coefficients in the subsamples.
Buyer firm product adaptation is therefore excluded from further analysis. Buyer firm human
asset specificity exhibit a negative effect in sample Oand a positive in sample 1, which is in
harmony with expectations. The variable is therefore included in the moderator analysis.
Buyer firm logistical adaptation is negative with regard to tolerance of conflict in sample 0,
but positive in sample 1 and is used in further analysis.
Estimation of the regression models for the subsamples - Exit intention
With regard to exit intention, independent variables are presumed to be negatively related to
exit intention. In Table 14.1b below, buyer rep cultural adaptation shows a positive effect in
both subsamples which is contrary to theory. The variable is therefore not included in further
analysis. Two-way communication has a negative effect in both subsamples and the effect is
higher in sample 1 than in sample O,which is not in accord with theory. This is likewise for
the effect of two-way communication upon tolerance of conflict; the effect is positive in both
samples, but higher in sample 1. We observe a pattern, include the variable and seek for
alternative explanations.
Buyer firm product adaptation and buyer firm logistical adaptation show negative effects in
sample 1, which is in accord with theory, and the two variables are included in further
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analysis. Buyer firm human asset specificity has positive effects in both subsamples and is
excluded from further analysis.
Table 14.1b: Size of organization - Exit intention
Dependent variable - Exit intention
Independent Beta-coefficient F (Sig.)
variables
Interpersonal Sample O Sample l Sample O Sample l
variables
Buyer rep cultural .128 .029 .763 .039
adaptation (.194) (.423)
Two-way -.115 -.133 .618 .777
communication (.218) (.192)
Interorganizational
variables
Buyer firm product .237 -.053 2.555 .129
adaptation (.059)* (.361)
Buyer firm human .127 .025 .760 .029
asset specificity (.194) (.433)
Buyer firm logistical .094 -.079 .412 .293
adaptation (.262) (.296)
Sample O=small organizations, Sample 1=large organizations
F(sig.)=Beta-coefficient (Sig.), Significance level (one-tailed)
Estimation of the regression models for the subsamples - Extendedness of relationship
In Table 14.1c, below, the effect ofbuyer rep cultural adaptation and two-way communication
are both positive in sample 0, which is in accord with our postulations. The variables are used
in further analysis. Further, the effect of buyer firm product adaptation, buyer firm human
asset specificity and buyer firm logistical adaptation have a large and negative effect in
sample 1, which is in disharmony with our expectations. These variables therefore are not
included in further analysis.
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Table 14.1c: Size of organization - Extendedness of relationship
Dependent variable - Extendedness of relationship
Independent Beta-coefficient F (Sig.)
variables
Interpersonal Sample O Sample 1 Sample O Sample 1
variables
Buyer rep cultural .112 -.011 .582 .006
adaptation (.225) (.470)
Two-way .372 -.037 7.371 .057
communication (.005)*** (.406)
Interorganizational
variables
Buyer firm product -.145 -.312 .922 4.750
adaptation (.171 ) (.018)**
Buyer firm human .021 -.227 .020 2.436
asset specificity (.445) (.063)*
Buyer firm logistical -.060 -.264 .164 3.384
adaptation (.344) (.036)**
Sample O=small organizanons, Sample 1=large orgamzations
F(sig.)=Beta-coefficient (Sig.), Significance level (one-tailed)
14.2 Formalization
Estimation of the regression models for the subsamples - Tolerance of conflict
The results in Table 14.2a show the effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation and two-way
communication are positive in both subsamples. The positive effect is however higher in
sample 1than in sample 0, which is contrary to our expectations. Since the effect is positive in
both subsamples and because the analysis shows a consistent pattern for the two variables, we
include the variables for further moderator analysis. Alternative explanations have to be
searched for later on since the strength of the effects is contrary to our expectations.
Further, the effect of buyer firm product adaptation and buyer firm logistical adaptation is
negative in sample 1, which is contrary to our expectations. The effect of buyer firm product
adaptation is positive, in sample 0, which is likewise for this variable with regard to exit
intention. The variable is included in further analysis, and we search for alternative
explanations. The effect of buyer firm logistical adaptation is also positive in sample 0, but
the effect is very weak, and the variable is excluded.
With respect to buyer firm human asset specificity this variable shows a positive, although
low effect in both subsamples. Further, there is no significant difference between Beta-
coefficients in the subsamples, and the variable is not included in further analysis.
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Table 14.2a: Formalization - Tolerance of conflict
Dependent variable - Tolerance of conflict
Independent Beta-coefficient F (Sig.)
variables
Interpersonal Sample Sample 1 Sample O Sample 1
variables O
Buyer rep cultural .169 .197 1.269 1.896
adaptation (.133)d (.088)*
Two-way .282 .417 3.721 9.469
communication (.030)** (.002)***
Interorganizational
variables
Buyer firm product .039 -.034 .064 .053
adaptation (.401) (.410)
Buyer firm human .081 .076 .291 .276
asset specificity (.296) (.301)
Buyer firm logistical .003 -.011 .001 .005
adaptation (.491) (.471)
Sample O=low degree of formalization, Sample 1=high degree of formalization
F(sig.)=Beta-coefficient (Sig.), Sig.level (one-tailed)
Estimation of the regression models for the subsamples - exit intention
With regard to exit intention we expect the independent variables to have a negative
relationship. In Table 14.2b below, buyer rep cultural adaptation has a negative effect in
sample 0, whereas the effect is positive in sample 1. This result is in harmony with our
expectations, and the variable is included for further analysis. Two-way communication show
negative effects in both subsamples, while the effect is stronger in sample 0, which is in
accord with expectations. Two-way communication is hence included in the moderator
analysis.
The interorganizational variables exhibit negative effects in sample 0, while they show a
positive effect in sample 1, i.e. product adaptation, human asset specificity and logistical
adaptations decreases exit intentions by low degrees of formalization, while by high degrees
of formalization these adaptations increases exit intentions. This finding is contrary to our
expectations; however, since the pattern is consistent across the buyer variables we include
them in further analysis and search for alternative explanations.
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Table 14.2b: Formalization - Exit intention
Dependent variable - Exit intention
Independent Beta-coefficient F (Sig.)
variables
Interpersonal Sample Sample 1 Sample O Sample 1
variables O
Buyer rep cultural -.111 .221 .554 2.403
adaptation (.231) (.064)*
Two-way -.215 -.050 2.129 .111
communication (.076)* (.371)
Interorganizational
variables
Buyer firm product -.094 .086 .387 .337
adaptation (.269) (.283)
Buyer firm human -.112 .193 .570 1.812
asset specificity (.227) (.093)*
Buyer firm logistical -.164 .094 1.246 .418
ada_ptation (.135)d (.261)
Sample O=low degree of formalization, Sample 1=high degree of formalization
F(sig.)=Beta-coefficient (Sig.), Sig.level (one-tailed)
Estimation of the regression models for the subsamples - extendedness of relationship
We expect independent variables to be positively related to extendedness of relationship. In
Table 14.2c, buyer rep cultural adaptation shows a positive and large effect in sample 0,
which is in accord with our expectations. Further, two-way communication exhibit positive
effects in both subsamples, with stronger effects in sample 0, which is in accord with theory.
These variables are therefore included in further analysis.
Furthermore, the effect of buyer firm product adaptation, buyer firm human asset specificity
and buyer firm logistical adaptation is negative in all subsamples. These variables are
consequently excluded from further analysis.
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Table 14.2c: Formalization - Extendedness ofrelationship
Dependent variable - Extendedness of relationship
Independent Beta-coefficient F (Sig.)
variables
Interpersonal Sample Sample l Sample O Sample l
variables O
Buyer rep cultural .108 -.007 .511 .002
adaptation (.240) (.481)
Two-way .312 .121 4.641 .670
communication (.019)** (.209)
Interorganizational
variables
Buyer firm product -.150 -.265 .966 3.402
adaptation (.166) (.03~**
Buyer firm human -.028 -.172 .035 1.441
asset specificity (.427) (.118)
Buyer firm logistical -.213 -.069 2.087 .222
adaptation (.078)* (.320)
Sample O=low degree of formalization, Sample l=high degree of formalization
F(sig.)=Beta-coefficient (Sig.), Sig.level (one-tailed)
14.3 Centralization
Estimation of the regression models for the subsamples - Tolerance of conflict
With regard to tolerance of conflict we expect the independent variables to be positively
related. The results in Table 14.3a show the effect ofbuyer rep cultural adaptation is positive
in both samples, and higher in sample Othan in sample 1. This result is in accord with our
expectations, and the variable is included in further analysis. The effect of two-way
communication is positive in both subsamples, and exhibit higher effects in sample O,which
is in harmony with expectations, and the variable is included.
Moreover, the effect of buyer firm product adaptation and buyer firm logistical adaptation is
negative with regard to tolerance of conflict in sample 1. However, we expected a positive
effect. In addition, for buyer firm product adaptation andbuyer firm logistical adaptation there
are no significant differences between Beta-coefficients in the subsamples. These variables
are therefore not included in the moderator analysis. The effect of buyer firm human asset
specificity show a positive effect in sample Oand a negative effect in sample l, which is in
disharmony with our expectation. Nevertheless, we include the variable and search for
alternative explanations.
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Table 14.3a: Centralization - Tolerance of conflict
Dependent variable - Tolerance of conflict
Independent Beta-coefficient F (Sig.)
variables
Interpersonal Sample Sample 1 Sample O Sample 1
variables O
Buyer rep cultural .263 .048 3.268 .105
adaptation (.039)** (.374)
Two-way .429 .266 9.721 3.415
communication (.002)*** _(.036)**
Interorganizational
variables
Buyer firm product .017 -.131 .014 .756
adaptation (.454) (.195)
Buyer firm human .147 -.055 .993 .141
asset specificity (.162) (.355)
Buyer firm logistical -.029 -.057 .038 .152
adaptation (.423) (.349)
Sample O=low degree of centralization, Sample I=high degree of centrahzation
F(sig.)=Beta-coefficient (Sig.), Significance .level (one-tailed)
Estimation of the regression models for the subsamples - Exit intention
With regard to exit intention we expect independent variables to be negatively related.
According to statistics buyer rep cultural adaptation has a negative effect only in sub sample
1, which is in opposite to our expectations. This is likewise for the effect of this variable on
extendedness of relationship, which is as well contrary to theory. Since the statistics show a
consistent pattern, we include this variable and search for alternative explanations. Two-way
communication exhibit a negative effect in both subsamples, and the effect is higher in sample
0, which is in accord with expectations, thus the variable is included.
None of the interorganizational variables show negative effects with regard to exit intention,
with the exception of buyer firm logistical adaptation which has a weak and negative effect in
sample o. The variables are expected to exhibit negative and strong effects in sample 1. The
interorganizational variables are therefore excluded from further analysis.
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Table 14.3b: Centralization - Exit intention
Dependent variable - Exit intention
Independent Beta-coefficient F (Sig.)
variables
Interpersonal Sample O Sample 1 Sample O Sample 1
variables
Buyer rep cultural .285 -.072 3.972 .243
adaptation (.026)** (.312)
Two-way -.196 -.115 1.756 .607
communication (.096)* (.220)
Interorganizational
variables
Buyer firm product .030 .057 .040 .138
adaptation (.422) (.356)
Buyer firm human .138 .025 .890 .028
asset specificity (.175) (.434)
Buyer firm logistical -.052 .029 .126 .039
adaptation (.362) (.422)
Sample O=low degree of centralization, Sample 1=high degree of centralization
F(sig.)=Beta-coefficient (Sig.), Significance .level (one-tailed)
Estimation of the regression models for the subsamples - Extendedness of relationship
We expect a positive relationship between the independent and the dependent variable. The
results in Table 14.3c show that the effect of buyer rep cultural adaptation is negative in
sample 0, and positive in sample 1, which is not in accord with our expectations. The effect is
however large and the finding is likewise as for exit intention, the variable is therefore
included. The effect of two-way communication is positive in both subsamples and higher in
sample 0, which is in accord with the hypothesis. The variable is hence included.
Further, the effect of buyer firm product adaptation, buyer firm human asset specificity and
buyer firm logistical adaptation is negative with regard to extendedness of relationship in all
subsamples, although we expected a positive effect. These variables are therefore not included
in the moderator analysis.
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Table 14.3c: Centralization - Extendedness of relationship
Dependent variable - Extendedness of relationship
Independent Beta-coefficient F (Sig.)
variables
Interpersonal Sample O Sample 1 Sample O Sample 1
variables
Buyer rep cultural -.047 .170 .099 1.374
adaptation (.378) (.124)d
Two-way .298 .176 4.197 1.445
communication (.024)** (.118)
Interorganizational
variables
Buyer firm product -.129 -.253 .749 2.945
adaptation (.196) (.047)**
Buyer firm human -.104 -.063 .496 .186
asset specificity (.243) (.334)
Buyer firm logistical -.130 -.100 .771 .463
adaptation (.192) (.250)
Sample O=low degree of centralization, Sample 1=high degree of centralization
F(sig.)=Beta-coefficient (Sig.), Sig.level (one-tailed)
14.4 Levels of inclusiveness
Estimation of the regression models for the subsamples - Tolerance of conflict
With regard to the moderator levels of inclusiveness we presume this variable to influence the
effect of interorganizational variables and not the interpersonal variables, hence only
interorganizational variables are examined. In accord with the postulated hypotheses we
expect interorganizational variables to have a positive effect, and the effect is presumed to be
stronger when levels of inclusiveness are high (sample 1). In Table l4.4a below all
interorganizational variables show positive effects in sample 1, while they exhibit negative
effects in sample O.This finding is in accord with theory and the variables are included in the
moderator analysis.
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Table 14.4a: Levels of inclusiveness - Tolerance of conflict
Dependent variable - Tolerance of conflict
Independent Beta-coefficient F (Sig.)
variables
Sample O Sam_ple1 Sample O Sample I
Buyer firm -.170 .096 1.243 .428
product adaptation (.136) (.258)
Buyer firm human -.177 .336 1.397 6.119
asset specificity (.122) (.009)***
Buyer firm -.118 .089 .611 .383
logistical (.220) (.270)
adaptation
Sample O=lowlevels of inclusiveness, Sample 1=high levels of inclusiveness
F(sig.)=Beta-coefficient (Sig.), Significance level (one-tailed)
Estimation of the regression models for the subsamples - Exit intention
With regard to exit intention we expect interorganizational variables to be negatively related.
The effect of buyer firm product adaptation is positive in both subsamples, consequently this
variable is excluded in further analysis. Buyer firm human asset specificity show a large
positive effect in sample Oand a zero effect in sample 1, thus the result show that the positive
effect, which is contrary to theory, is dramatically decreased when levels of inclusiveness is
high. This result support theory, but since the effect is zero we do not include this variable in
further analysis. Buyer firm logistical adaptation show a negative effect in sample Owhile the
effect is positive in sample 1. Exploratory regression analysis testing moderator effect show
the effect is stronger by high levels of inclusiveness. Consequently, the result has no meaning
since the split file analysis reveal the effect is positive and contrary to expectations. Thus, all
interorganizational variables are excluded with regard to exit intention.
Table 14.4b: Levels ofinclusiveness - Exit intention
Dependent variable - Exit intention
Independent Beta-coefficient F (Sig.)
variables
Sample O Sample 1 Sample O Sample 1
Buyer firm .038 .076 .061 .268
product adaptation (.403) (.304)
Buyer firm human .228 .000 2.417 .000
asset specificity (.064)* (.500)
Buyer firm -.053 .055 .123 .147
logistical (.364) (.352)
adaptation
Sample O=lowlevels of inclusiveness, Sample 1=high levels of inclusiveness
F(sig.)=Beta-coefficient (Sig.), Sig.level (one-tailed)
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Estimation a/the regression models/or the subsamples - Extendedness a/relationship
The results in Table 14.4c show the effect of buyer firm product adaptation and buyer firm
logistical adaptation is negative related to extendedness of relationship in both subsamples,
these variables are therefore not included in the moderator analysis. However, buyer firm
human asset specificity show a positive effect in sample 1, which is in accord with our
expectations, and is therefore included in further analysis.
Table 14.4c: Levels a/inclusiveness - Extendedness a/relationship
Dependent variable - Extendedness of relationship
Independent Beta-coefficient F (Sig.)
variables
Sample O SamJ'le 1 Sam_pleO Sam_ple 1
Buyer firm -.254 -.192 2.896 1.717
product adaptation (.048) (.099)
Buyer firm human -.327 .079 5.259 .296
asset specificity (.014) (.295)
Buyer firm -.227 -.111 2.387 .587
logistical (.065) (.224)
adaptation
Sample O=low levels of inclusiveness, Sample 1=high levels of inclusiveness
F(sig.)=Beta-coefficient (Sig.), Sig.level (one-tailed)
14.5 History
Estimation a/the regression modelsfor the subsamples - Tolerance of conflict
The moderator variable history is presumed to influence both the supplier and the buyer side
of the dyad. We therefore examine both supplier and buyer variables with regard to this
moderator. In Table 14.5a below, statistics show the effect of supplier rep cultural knowledge
is negative in both subsamples, and the variable is hence excluded. Further, the effect of
supplier rep cultural adaptation is positive in both subsamples, showing a higher effect in
sample 0, which is in accord with theory, and the variable is included. The effect ofbuyer rep
cultural adaptation is positive in both subsamples, but higher in sample 1,which is contrary to
our expectations. The effect is large and the finding is consistent across the dependent
variables, and the variable is consequently included. Further, the effect of two-way
communication is positive in both subsamples, and higher in sample 0, which is in accord
with theory, and we include the variable for further analysis.
Statistics show that buyer firm product adaptation and buyer firm logistical adaptation have
negative effects in both subsamples, and the variables therefore are excluded.
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Furthermore, the effect of supplier firm product adaptation, supplier firm human asset
specificity and buyer firm human asset specificity is negative in sample O,while the effect is
positive in sample 1, which is in accord with expectations. However, exploratory regression
analysis testing moderating effects show that the effect of supplier firm product adaptation
and supplier firm human asset specificity is highest in young business relationships, and thus
in relationships where the effect is negative. The theoretical implications of the finding are
therefore meaningless, and these variables are therefore excluded. However, buyer firm
human asset specificity is included for further analysis. Last, supplier firm logistical
adaptation has positive effects in both subsamples, and is included in further analysis.
Table 14.5a: History - Tolerance of conflict
Dependent variable - Tolerance of conflict
Independent Beta-coefficient F (Sig.)
variables
Interpersonal Sample Sample 1 Sample O Sample 1
variables O
Supplierrep cultural -.022 -.005 .021 .001
knowledge (.443) (.488)
Supplierrep cultural .235 .121 2.569 .666
adaptation (.058)* (.210)
Buyer rep cultural .098 .263 .435 3.347
adaptation (.257) (.037)**
Two-way .448 .246 11.070 2.826
communication (.001)*** (.050)*
Interorganizational
variables
Supplier firm -.072 .149 .234 1.051
product adaptation (.316) (.156)
Buyer firm product -.014 -.088 .009 .347
adaptation (.462) (.280)
Supplier firm human -.051 .293 .119 4.143
asset specificity (.366) (.024)**
Buyer firm human -.113 .228 .579 2.519
asset specificity (.226) (.060)*
Supplier firm .038 .009 .006 .004
logistical adaptation (.399) (.476)
Buyer firm logistical -.044 -.035 .089 .056
adaptation (.384) (.407)
SampleO=youngbusiness relationships, Sample 1= old business relationships
F(sig.)=Beta-coefficient (Sig.), Significance level (one-tailed)
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Estimation of the regression models for the subsamples - Exit intention
With regard to exit intention we expect independent variables to be negatively related. The
effect of supplier rep cultural knowledge and buyer rep cultural adaptation show negative
effects in sample 1, while the effect in sample O is positive. This is not in accord with our
expectations. However, the tendency for cultural knowledge is similar for extendedness of
relationship, while there is a consistent pattern for buyer rep cultural adaptation across the
dependent variables. These two variables are hence included. Supplier rep cultural adaptation
shows a negative effect in sample Oand a positive effect in sample 1. This is in harmony with
our expectations, and the variable is included. The effect of two-way communication has a
negative effect in both samples and is therefore included in further analysis. The effect of
buyer firm product adaptation is positive in both subsamples, and is hence excluded.
The effect of supplier firm logistical adaptation is weak and positive in sample 1, and the
variable is excluded. The effect of supplier firm product adaptation, supplier firm human asset
specificity, buyer firm human asset specificity and buyer firm logistical adaptation show a
negative effect in sample 1, which is in harmony with the postulated hypotheses. Exploratory
regression analysis testing moderating effects show, however, that the effect of supplier firm
human asset specificity has a greater effect in young relationships, thus where the effect is
positive. This variable is therefore excluded. In consequence, for further analysis we include
supplier firm product adaptation, buyer firm human asset specificity and buyer firm logistical
adaptation.
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Table 14.5b: History - Exit intention
Dependent variable - Exit intention
Independent Beta-coefficient F (Sig.)
variables
Interpersonal Sample Sample I Sample O Sample 1
variables O
Supplier rep cultural .110 -.033 .542 .052
knowledge (.233) (.411)
Supplier rep cultural -.070 .097 .216 .437
adaptation (.322) (.256)
Buyer rep cultural .340 -.091 5.893 .383
adaptation (.009)*** (.270)
Two-way -.057 -.191 .143 1.704
communication (.354) (.099)*
Interorganizational
variables
Supplier firm .208 -.126 2.038 .756
product adaptation (.080)* (.195)
Buyer firm product .088 .061 .344 .164
adaptation (.280) (.344)
Supplier firm human .111 -.053 .560 .128
asset specificity (.229) (.361)
Buyer firm human .331 -.131 5.543 .819
asset specificity (.012)** (.185)
Supplier firm -.001 .001 .000 .000
logistical adaptation (.497) (.498)
Buyer firm logistical .124 -.082 .706 .315
adaptation (.203) (.289)
Sample O=youngbusiness relationships, Sample l= old business relationships
F(sig.)=Beta-coefficient (Sig.), Significance level (one-tailed)
History - Extendedness of relationship
All interpersonal variables show positive effects in both subsamples, with the exception of
buyer rep cultural adaptation which has a negative effect in sample o. Supplier rep cultural
adaptation and two-way communication have higher effects in sample O,which is in accord
with our expectations. In contrast, supplier cultural knowledge and buyer rep cultural
adaptation exhibit stronger positive effects in sample 1. Thus, the results are somewhat mixed,
and not consistently in concurrence with theory. However, the pattern for buyer rep cultural
adaptation is likewise with regard to tolerance of conflict and exit intention. Further, supplier
rep cultural knowledge has higher decreasing effects in sample 1 with respect to exit intention
as well. All interpersonal variables are therefore included in further analysis.
Statistics show that all interorganizational variables exhibit negative effects in both
subsamples, with the exception of supplier firm product adaptation and supplier firm logistical
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adaptation which have positive effects in sample l. Thus we exclude all but supplier firm
product adaptation and supplier firm logistical adaptation from further analysis.
Table 14.5c: History with supplier firm - Extendedness a/relationship
Dependent variable - Extendedness of relationship
Independent Beta-coefficient F (Sig.)
variables
Interpersonal Sample Sample 1 Sample O Sample 1
variables O
Supplier rep cultural .189 .216 1.597 2.310
knowledge (.l 07) (.068)*
Supplier rep cultural .326 .217 5.112 2.275
adaptation (.015)** (.069)*
Buyer rep cultural -.035 .045 .055 .092
adaptation (.408) (.382)
Two-way .252 .180 2.913 1.507
communication (.048)** (.113)
Interorganizational
variables
Supplier firm -.156 .191 1.093 1.783
product adaptation (.151 ) (.094)*
Buyer firm product -.228 -.204 2.361 1.917
adaptation (.066)* (.087)*
Supplier firm human -.020 -.152 .017 1.062
asset specificity (.448) (.154)
Buyer firm human -.237 -.015 2.626 .011
asset specificity (.056) (.459)
Supplier firm .067 .169 .196 1.387
logistical adaptation (.330) (.123)d
Buyer firm logistical -.063 -.252 .173 3.181
adaptation (.340) (.041)**
Sample O=young business relationships, Sample 1= old business relationships
F(sig.)=Beta-coefflcient (Sig.), Sig.level (one-tailed)
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